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Abstract:
This dissertation uses a series of historical and contemporary legal cases to foreground
relationships between identity, fiction, and the law. Drawing from literatures in feminist studies,
critical race theory, critical legal studies, and history and American Studies, I trace the salience
of fiction in the legal cases and legal memory of six women (Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret
Garner, Edith Maxwell, Joan Little, and Crystal Mangum). I argue that forms of fiction, which I
term representational fictions, became the primary means of transmitting information about these
legal cases and the broader issues of race, gender, and class surrounding them. Representational
fictions enable the violence of the law by reinforcing negative cultural narratives about race,
gender, and class while also justifying legal disciplining.

This project makes contributions to the fields of law and society, feminist studies, critical legal
theories, and intersectionality scholarship. In addition to theorizing the violence of the law via
relationships to fiction, I argue that specific regional expectations about identity within the US
South must be incorporated into intersectional analyses where relevant. This dissertation seeks to
more fully account for the experiences of marginalized women within the legal system, and more
broadly to account for the interconnectedness of law and narrative.
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Chapter I: Narrative, Identity and Legal Violence
I.

They Won’t Hang a (White) Woman
One winter night in 1831, Frankie Silver committed an act that made her name part of the

folklore tradition of North Carolina. Frankie lived in an isolated, rural area of the mountains of
Western North Carolina. She was young, married, and had a one-year-old daughter. Little
information about her life remains recorded, aside from one thing. That night, Frankie Silver
raised an axe. She killed her husband, Charlie, and attempted to dispose of his body. When it
became clear that Charlie was missing, Frankie was instantly suspected. By the summer of 1833,
she had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. North Carolina folklore attributes a
ballad to Frankie. Supposedly, on the day of her hanging she approached the gallows and began
to sing:
“This dreadful dark and dismal day
Has swept my glories all away;
My sun goes down, my days are past,
And I must leave this world at last.”
What did the law promise Frankie Silver? Perhaps nothing. She lived to be only nineteen
years old. She never learned to read or write, and thus could not access the law in its own
language.
“Judge Donnell my sentence has passed,
These prison walls I leave at last;
Nothing to cheer my drooping head
Until I'm numbered with the dead.
But Oh! That awful judge I fear.
Shall I that awful sentence hear:
“’Depart, ye cursed, down to Hell
And forever there to dwell.’”

2
I have stood in a place Frankie once occupied and looked down upon the Toe River
valley, just as she likely did in 1831. I know that her home was far from the Morganton
courthouse where she was sentenced and the Morganton jail where she was imprisoned.
Frankie’s ballad, itself not her own, was not published until the 1860s. In it, the law on earth is
equated with the law of god—Frankie fears not only a North Carolina judge’s sentence, but also
a sentence to hell. Thus, the ballad reflects an understanding of the law as objective, neutral, and
deriving from universal moral codes as opposed to an institution that reflects social norms.
“Then shall I meet that mournful face,
Whose blood I spilled upon this place;
With flaming eyes to me he'll say,
"Why did you take my life away?"
His feeble hands fell gently down.
His chattering tongue soon lost its sound.
To see his soul and body part
It strikes with terror in my heart.”
The fictional Frankie expresses worry that she will meet the ghost of her husband,
Charlie. We know very little about what led to Charlie’s death in the winter of 1831.
“The jealous thought that first gave strife
To make me take my husband's life,
For months and days I spent my time
Thinking how to commit this crime.
And on a dark and doleful night
I put the body out of sight,
With flames I tried to him consume.
But time would not admit it done.”
In the ballad, Frankie kills Charlie in a jealous rage. Later accounts stress a jailhouse
confession in which Frankie admits to being abused by Charlie. In this story, Charlie is loading
his gun to kill her when Frankie raises an axe. She tries to burn Charlie’s remains in the fireplace
but is unsuccessful. I have seen the remains of that fireplace, repurposed for another home in
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Kona. I have seen Charlie’s three graves1 on a Kona hillside, clearly marked. Frankie’s grave is
lost to forest, to property lines, and to time.
“Farewell, good people, you all now see
What my bad conduct's brought on me;
To die of shame and disgrace
Before the world of human race.”

The law promised Frankie Silver little. It gave her much—death, a punishment for her
“bad conduct,” conduct that occurred in part because of the law’s refusal to interfere with private
violence. The law gave Frankie a new story and an old silence. She did not testify at her own
trial because the law of North Carolina barred this. Her confession was not entered as evidence
because private violence by husbands was expressly legal. Instead the law left a gaping, gasping
silence where Frankie’s story could have been. That silence was soon filled with a song of
jealousy that legitimates the state’s actions in killing Frankie.
In fictitious representations of Frankie’s hanging, we are almost always told that she sang
the ballad excerpted above. Sometimes we are told that she asked for a piece of cake and calmly
ate it before ascending the scaffold. In these versions, Frankie is carelessly violent; her own
death does not whet her appetite. Other times we are told that she tore the sash of her dress to
pieces and threw it out to the crowd. Nearly every account includes a description of Frankie’s
silence. Her executioner asked if she had any final words. Frankie nodded and began to speak.
Before a single word came out, her father shouted from the crowd:
“Die with in you, Frankie, die with in you!”

1

Charlie Silver’s three graves are located in the Kona Baptist cemetery in Kona, NC. Charlie’s
body was recovered over time, and local custom did not allow for bodies to be exhumed in order
to bury all remains in one grave. For this reason, Charlie has one headstone but three footstones,
each marking a different area where his remains were buried.

4
Frankie did. Her silence tells us something about the law and about its relationship to
fiction and storytelling. Not only is the law’s protection dependent on the ability to tell the
proper story, but also the law creates fictions and silences alternatives. Frankie Silver’s story and
ballad do important work. They uncover power relations through their narratives and many reimaginings, which I trace throughout this thesis. Frankie’s stories allude to political space
because to understand them we must also interrogate images of Appalachia, of the US South, of
whiteness, womanhood, aggression, violence, property, and law. In this dissertation, I argue that
forms of fiction that represent particular legal narratives like that of Frankie Silver are sites of
political space. It is through an analysis of fiction that the violence of the law can be laid bare
and read openly. That is, fictional representations of legal cases carry with them embedded
meanings about race, gender, class, region, and violence—all of which converge in images of
legitimate and illegitimate citizenship and notions of who “deserves” state disciplining and who
“deserves” protection. I build from work by critical legal theorists and other feminist theorists,
who argue that the law serves the interests of the state and disciplines deviant and marginalized
bodies. Fiction and narrative serve as means of theorizing the law’s failures and its violence.
In this dissertation, I trace how powerful and pervasive forms of fiction are institutional
facets of the law. Legal narrative and representations of those narratives provide a means of
illuminating how and why legal discourse and institutions do not function in the interest of
marginalized groups. The forms of fiction I discuss in this thesis touch many aspects of social
life—the core identities of race, gender, class, and region, and beyond these, notions of
victimhood, aggression, property, and their relationship to legal renderings of personhood. While
I do not offer an overarching account of each and every manifestation of these fictions, I do
grasp at them throughout time as they make their ways, twisting and turning, through the
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centuries and through the lives of the women and men whose cases I discuss. They are grounded
in legal institutional structures, from which they cannot be fully separated. Sometimes the fiction
shows itself through a painting. Other times it is sung out over a mountain hillside. Sometimes it
is not told at all, kept quiet and small, overshadowed by its louder cousins. I argue that there are
manifestations of interactions between law and fiction in trials and in the memory of those trials.
These fictions are constituted in part by larger narratives; that is, they always already exist prior
to an individual case, but they also shift over time as they appear and re-appear in memory and in
the courtroom.
This dissertation is an intervention into critical conversations about law that have, for
some time, questioned the interests of law. I situate this thesis as a conversation within critical
legal theories and sites such as critical feminist geographies in order to build from their
foundational critiques. I also seek to highlight the particular power of fiction and narrative; while
previous scholars have provided analyses of fiction and law (Sarat; Sarat and Kearns 1998), a
discussion of specific representations and identities strengthens claims about the law’s link to
dominant social norms and groups and makes possible a new articulation of the law’s violence.
When analyzing fiction in this dissertation, I consider not only concepts such as gender, class,
and race, but also the more specific implications of region (the US South), whiteness and
blackness,2 and definitions of property and personhood. This allows for a theorizing of law and
fiction that moves beyond discussions of broad legal narratives. It is not a “new thing” to say that
2

I do not wish to suggest that race is a dichotomy of white and black, but in this dissertation I
engage in a particular discussion about the interrelatedness of whiteness and blackness under the
law. I note that under the law, categories of whiteness and blackness need one other as
articulations “against” one other; thus each category informs the other and is necessary for the
other’s existence. Furthermore, the spectacularity of this dichotomy both within the US and the
US South in particular elides the histories of “other” races that have significant histories within
that space. In particular, the colonization of the South and its Native inhabitants falls away, but
so do other histories of migration and racialization. See for example Holloway (2008).
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the law does not always live up to its promises, or to name the identities and bodies who find
those promises broken again and again. Rather, I wish to further illuminate how the law’s failed
protection has, over time, constructed, reconstructed, and been shaped by sets of narrative and
fiction that are important to a critical understanding and continued questioning of the law’s
power and violence.
II. Law, Identity, and Narrative
Many scholars have doubted the promises of the law. Drawing from Marx’s ([1843] 1972)
critical intervention into Enlightenment-era discussions of rights, legal scholars forming the field
of critical legal studies (CLS) have questioned the aims of the law and the use of rights-based
language. Scheingold (1974) has documented American society’s reliance on a “myth of rights”
that is powerful and pervasive; this relationship to rights is one that urges individuals to view
legal remedies as the primary source of justice, in spite of Scheingold’s finding that rights-based
claims rarely result in swift social change. Other scholars (Altman 1990; Tushnet 1984; Unger
1986; West 1990) are even more skeptical, arguing that law is formed in the image of the
dominant ideologies of American society3 and that rights language often limits the goals of
radicals and distracts groups from advocating for widespread social change. As these scholars
argue, the law is intricately connected with violence in that it does violence to those who seek to
use it as a grievance system. Many view the law as a system of dominance and discipline built
upon a foundation of power relations that reinforce racism, sexism, homophobia, and
neoliberalism (Bumiller 1987; Foucault [1977] 1996; West 1990). As Cover (1986) notes, the
courtroom is inherently a violent space which requires a commitment that “places bodies on the
line” (1605). Sarat and Kearns (Sarat 2001; 1992) also articulate the violence of the law, arguing
3

For West, these ideologies are racism, sexism, homophobia, imperialism, and an emphasis on
capitalism.
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that violence is not only part of the law’s imagined necessity (i.e., protection from violence), but
also the means by which it acts. I am interested not only in questioning the promise of the law
and rights-based claims, but also in the specificities of how and to whom the law does violence,
Bumiller (2008) argues that rights and legally based strategies for ending sexual violence are not
only ineffective, but highly susceptible to manipulation by the state, which co-opts new policies
in order to re-inscribe legal disciplining. Bumiller further notes that narratives are highly
influential within the courtroom in cases of sexual violence. She documents “prosecutorial
narratives,” which must construct rape victims in a manner that is consistent with legal and social
sexual, racial, and class norms if a rape prosecution is to be successful. Bumiller’s focus on
narrative combines the CLS critique of rights and legal discourse with a more particular
discussion of how law is a space that forces out marginalized individuals.
CLS is joined, to some extent, in its claims by other legal studies scholars. Both critical race
theorists (CRT) and feminist legal theorists analyze the relationship between oppression and law.
CLS, CRT, and feminist legal theory all hint at the power of legal narratives and their influence
on one’s ability to effectively use the law. Feminist legal theorists have largely relied on legal
remedies to address sexual violence (see for example Bartlett et al. (2006) and MacKinnon
(1979)) while also recognizing that law has been a central facet of women’s oppression (Basch
1982; M. A. Fineman and R. Mykituik 1994) and that law is limited in its ability to address such
issues (Crenshaw 1991; Harris 2003). Perhaps the most influential contribution of feminist legal
theory to this dissertation has been the continued focus on the public-private sphere divide and
its centrality to understanding women’s experiences of private violence. Feminist theorists more
broadly (Elshtain 1993; Okin 1979, 1991) as well as those who focus on the law (Basch 1982;
M. Fineman and R. Mykituik 1994; Kelly 2002; Schneider 1994) have long articulated the
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public-private divide as a harmful feature of liberalism that discourages state intervention into
situations of domestic violence. Many of the cases in this dissertation, including those of Frankie
Silver, Margaret Garner, and Edith Maxwell, involve the pervasive violence women have
historically experienced in the private sphere. Problematizing the public-private divide is
essential to understanding the legal violence associated with historical refusals to recognize or
intervene into this violence. Feminist legal theorists have also discussed how legal narratives
shape cases of gender violence. Bartlett et al. (2006) note that feminists have attempted to
counter narratives that construct domestic violence as a classed phenomenon or as one that
women bring upon themselves, as well as narratives about the acceptability of marital rape and
other forms of sexual violence. Bumiller (2008), whose work spans the already partly artificial
divide between CLS and feminist legal theory, also discusses artistic representations of sexual
violence and how those speak to public images of appropriate victimhood and (racialized)
aggression.
CRT presents a critique of law that focuses particularly on how the law has been shaped by
and itself shaped constructions of race. These theorists argue that law places people of color in a
peculiar bind. While the legal landscape of the US was built around systems of slavery and
racism, legal rights grant the ever-important markers of citizenship necessary to life in the US as
we know it (Williams 1992). Thus, marginalized individuals must inhabit a space in which they
recognize that their oppression stems from the legal system’s tainted history as well as the
theoretical legacy of an Enlightenment that promised the “universal” rights of man only to white,
propertied men. However, that very system is constructed as the only avenue through which
social change occurs. Critical race theorists, too, have outlined how racial constructions of law
are interconnected with representations of people of color. Crenshaw (1997) uses the obscenity
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case against 2 Live Crew as a starting point for a discussion of violence against women of color
and the image of black men as sexual aggressors. CRT also has a tradition of using storytelling,
sometimes completely fictitious and sometimes otherwise, to illuminate how the law functions.
Delgado (1989, 1995) argues that storytelling plays a central role in communicating both current
debates about race as well as the normative implications of social change. Though the narratives
that I analyze in this thesis are hardly normative, I do trace how they communicate notions of
race that have become naturalized.
I situate this dissertation within a conversation among critical legal theorists, and particularly
CLS, CRT, and feminist legal theory, because I seek to build off of these scholars’
understandings of the law’s relationship to narrative. Scholars in each of these created categories
have, in reality, straddled them, creating legal theory that combines facets of all three. For this
reason, scholarship by critical race feminists is central to my understanding law and narrative.
Lucinda Joy Peach’s (2000) feminist analysis of the law’s violence poses a strong critique of
CLS; Peach notes that these scholars never speak of the gendered violence of the law. When
Peach discusses the law’s violence, she argues that law only allows violence to be legitimately
read as male and that women who commit violent acts are ignored or made invisible. Critical
race feminists (Crenshaw 1994, 1997; Davis 1983; Harris 2003; hooks 2000; Volpp 2000;
Williams 1992; Wing 1997) further note that as race, gender, class, and sexuality overlap, there
is a specificity of experience that cannot be separated into the sums of its parts. I use an
intersectional and layered analysis of law to interrogate the forms of fiction that appear in
particular cases and how these fictions speak to legal violence and legitimacy. Intersectionality
becomes important to this text not only as a theoretical underpinning, but also as a contribution. I
argue throughout this dissertation that intersectionality scholarship must also take seriously the
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added layer of region when considering the construction of identity. The cases I analyze involve
both white and black women as defendants, and it becomes clear that their legal and social
experiences are shaped not only by their race, class, and gender, but also by their regional status
as Southern women. Regional expectations and images shape expectations about racialized and
gendered behavior. Critical race feminism provides the necessary background to make this
theoretical move, as well as others. As I discuss in a later section, critical race feminists have
been attentive to the power of representation in a manner that is formative to this dissertation. By
building off of these earlier theoretical interventions, I articulate the role of specific forms of
fiction as they inform the law and are informed by it, and as they contribute to the memory of
particular cases that later become symbolic on larger scales.
III. Hearing Voices: Fiction and Storytelling
Throughout this dissertation, I highlight how storytelling and fiction are part of many
individual’s encounters with the law. Stories about the law, individuals, and violence are lenses
through which I build theory and also a method of illuminating the violence of the law. Mary
Frances Berry (2000) writes, “Courts are a theatrical venue where disparate stories
interact…These stories are shaped by thousands of years of common-law tradition and by intense
professional training” (6). Furthermore, as Haltom and McCann (2004) note, “familiar legal
constructions of social relations in terms of individual choices and private contracts by citizen
subjects are repeatedly reconstructed and reinforced by the cultural stories that we Americans tell
ourselves about law, law’s promises, and law’s failures” and these stories shape “routine public
constructions of legal events in our culture” (23). Stories are important not only because they are
part of the foundation of law and everyday life, but also because their status as such is hidden. In
a rejection letter from a prominent law review journal, Patricia Williams was told that her work
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was too personal and that perhaps she should write “short stories” (1991, 214). The implication
is that these “stories,” these events in her life, are not real and do not convey meaning about legal
understandings of race and gender. On the contrary, I argue that stories build and shape our
reality. When Anzaldúa ([1990] 2009) and Mignolo (2000) discuss decolonizing writing and
research, they ask scholars to uncover the “authentic,” that which feels the realest. Speaking with
stories as reality and makers of reality is one means of doing this, for it is through this process
that I un-or-re-cover the relationship between law and sexual violence. To pretend that stories are
just “stories,” as Williams was told, is an acquiescence to a myth of the law, the myth that tells
us that law’s origins are inherently just, that law is not a space of physical and mental
colonization, that the law’s foundations are Objective Truths.
When I use the terms stories and fiction, I engage multiple meanings. I refer in part to the
way in which narratives are written, told, illustrated, sung, or otherwise communicated socially
and passed from one person to another, within and throughout history. Legal storytelling is part
of, but not the entirety of, the way in which I define the fictions within this thesis. Legal
storytelling is necessarily broad, as Berry (2000) notes, and refers to overarching narratives
about the law. There are, for example, broad narratives about ideal and non-ideal rape victims
(Bumiller 2008), about when using the law is appropriate (Engel 1984), and about how one
stands in opposition to the law (Ewick and Silbey 1995, 1998 ). These broad legal narratives are
part of our social and cultural understanding of how the law functions in our everyday lives.
When we interact with these narratives, we may do so in a way that configures our own
experience such that it fits into the narrative that is more socially acceptable. This relates to how
other scholars have used the term “myth.” Doezema (2010) analyzes the myth of the white slave
and its relationship to contemporary discourses of sex trafficking. In doing so, she notes that
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“myths operate in sustaining relations of domination through regulation and production of
meaning in modern political cultures.” (51). Doezema uses the terms myth and narrative nearly
interchangeably, also arguing that narratives and myths are the telling of stories that are
discursively familiar to the audience. This is in keeping with Berry (2000) and Bumiller’s (2008)
uses of the terms narrative and storytelling. In this thesis, I build from their distinctions in order
to theorize the spaces in which specific fictions are informed by narrative—that is, I am
interested in furthering theories of the power of legal narratives by analyzing case-specific
instances. It is through these more specific spaces of fiction that I am able to theorize how law
and fiction interact to communicate notions of legitimate citizenship and relationships to the state
vis-à-vis who is “allowed” to experience violence.
In order to distinguish between broad terms such as narrative and the forms of fiction I
analyze in specific cases, I use the term “representational fiction.”4 With this term, I refer to
something more distinct than legal narratives or stories, but that has a mutually constitutive
relationship with them. Individual cases that communicate cultural meanings are embedded
within the notion of the ideal rape victim or the appropriateness of taking legal action. I draw
from Crenshaw’s (1997) work on “representational intersectionality,” which refers to “the way
that race and gender images, readily available in our culture, converge to create unique and
specific narratives deemed appropriate for women of color” (554). Crenshaw further argues,
“Not surprisingly, the clearest convergences are those involving sexuality, perhaps because it is
4

I do not mean to suggest that the term “representational fiction” is itself new, but rather that my
own use of the term is specific, as is the intellectual genealogy leading to it. Scholars of literature
and literary criticism have used the term representational fiction to differentiate between forms
of fiction that are not realist in nature. The term also appears casually in other disciplines—
published work in philosophy, history, and even architecture shows use of the term, but often
without strict definition or theoretical significance. While the use of term within literary
scholarship bears some similarity to my own, I am primarily using this term to draw from
scholarship in cultural studies and black feminist theory.
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through sexuality that images of minorities and women are most sharply focused” (554). Images
of “others” are intricately connected to notions of sexuality and shape public understandings of
identity. Crenshaw’s use of the term representational pulls from Stuart Hall’s (1997) work on
representation, by which he refers to systems of symbols and images that are culturally
meaningful forms of organization. Hall notes, “Things don’t mean: we construct meaning, using
representational systems—concepts and signs” (25). Crenshaw and Hall both articulate
representation as a means of conveying culturally understandable narratives. For both scholars,
these narratives become more specific as they are represented and interpreted. As Katherine
McKittrick (2006) notes, it is “what we imagine, see, believe, disbelieve, and wonder” (67) when
encountering particular sites and representations that creates meaning.
My use of the term representational fiction draws from this foundation—I am arguing that
some forms of fiction about specific legal cases are able to do representational work. Some legal
cases, though by no means all, will inspire and become part of a more specific fiction that
informs and memorializes a particular understanding of the law. Representational fiction may be
transmitted through folklore, literature, and ghost stories (to name only some examples)—these
are all means of developing and shaping understandings about the world and about racial,
gendered, and classed hierarchies. But what distinguishes representational fiction from broad
legal narratives is its specificity. Frankie Silver’s ballad, for example, gives us both a broad
narrative about a murder and a very particular fiction about Frankie Silver’s life and interaction
with the law. Furthermore, the ballad sends a message about what it means to be a woman who
transgresses social norms that define violence as the province of men: that woman will be
swiftly, legally disciplined. This process of conveying meaning is similar for each text I engage
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throughout this thesis, though the fiction in question may be a traditional literary text, a painting,
or a piece of popular culture. Doezema tackles the question of particular images, writing,
“What about words or phrases and visual images? Can these be myths as well?...While an image
or phrase may not be in itself a myth, it may have ‘the capacity to evoke a myth…a photograph,
a painting, a piece of sculpture, a carving, a cartoon, a poster, a mosaic, a collage, among other
things, can all represent an established political myth or set of myths by a form of synecdoche—
part for the whole’. I interpret this to mean that something can be mythical without necessarily
appearing in the traditional narrative form of a written or spoken story with a beginning, middle
and end.” (2010, 52)
What Doezema calls “mythical” but not exactly myths are the types of images and signs that
I label fictions. These representational fictions are important precisely because they narrow legal
narratives down into more easily transmittable pieces of information, which may then become
broadly understood publically and within the courtroom. Representational fiction, as I use the
term, becomes a means of collapsing a broad variety of meanings into an individual event; these
meanings are created in part by the law itself and also by cultural renderings of the law. For
example, one does not need to unpack the implications of the narrative of the “bad” rape victim
or the purported folly of hasty public judgments when one can instead invoke the phrase
“remember the Duke Lacrosse case”5 in reference to a larger body of work that makes an explicit
argument about the case. Thus, representational fiction is specific, it is tied to particular cases,
and it also carries with it cultural meanings that have an impact on a wide variety of cases that
are both like and unlike it. Representational fictions present tales about real legal cases as if they
are fact, when instead they are typically presenting negative and misleading narratives about the
cases. An analysis of representational fictions of the law can expose underlying assumptions
5

The phrase “remember the Duke lacrosse case” has become shorthand for an understanding of
false rape accusations. The phrase references the 2006 case from Durham, North Carolina in
which Crystal Mangum, a black woman hired as an exotic dancer, reported that three white
members of Duke University’s lacrosse team had raped her. While three men from the team were
indicted, the case eventually fell apart and public sentiment maintained that the rape allegations
were false.
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about how law functions, and to what ends. By this, I mean that the individual representational
fictions I examine tell us something broader—that the promises the law has made and that the
very idea that it is an objective and protecting force are themselves falsehoods, and possibly
fictions as well.6 Representational fiction opens up a space not only of legal critique, but also of
explanation. If, as critical legal scholars posit, the law is violent, then representational fiction is a
space in which cultural messages about that violence are conveyed.
Furthermore, engaging with representational fictions can reveal the centrality of narrative and
storytelling to the American legal system. In chapter four, this becomes important to an
understanding of the courtroom. Simultaneously constructed as a space of neutrality and a
theatre, I analyze representational fictions in the courtroom in order to theorize the extent to
which images, representations, and narratives shape the legal experiences of members of
marginalized social groups. I argue that on the surface, an uncritical examination of law as
practiced in the courtroom focuses on the truth to be discovered by the evidentiary process.
However, a close look at the role of narrative in the courtroom instead shows that the legal
system relies on storytelling as well. The successful attorney, either prosecutor or counsel for the
defense, will advance a full narrative that not only purports to account for how and why a crime
was (or was not) committed, but will also incorporate social expectations about identity into the
narrative. Members of marginalized social groups are at a distinct disadvantage in the courtroom
because their identities are subject to a long history of mythmaking and negative representation.
What Patricia Hill Collins calls “controlling images,” representations that serve not only to
demonize a social group but also to justify their poor treatment, make their way into the
6

Here I am thinking of the more specific, broader renderings of the promise of the law. For
example, the fictions that Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau construct of the state of the nature and
the social contract are meant to convey a message about the necessity of law and the state and are
also so specific in their form in that they are representational rather than “real” history.
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courtroom. For the women whose cases are included in this dissertation, controlling images
joined with broader narratives about criminality, region, and the acceptability of forms of
gendered violence to shape their experiences with the law both broadly construed and more
narrowly within the courtroom.
IV. What Law? Whose Law?
By situating this dissertation at the nexus of critical legal theories, feminist theories, and a
variety of cultural studies and historical scholarship, I also invoke specific ideas about what
constitutes law. Throughout the text, I use several terms when referencing the law. I use the
general term, “law,” in keeping with the law and society tradition. That is, I define “law” as a
general set of socially created rules and norms, shaped by legal and other social actors, that are
socially constituted and malleable. Law and society scholarship focuses on the mutually
constitutive relationship between law and social life—rather than viewing law as an objective,
neutral, or “from on high” set of rules and processes, law and society scholars call attention to
the ways in which social actors are shaped by and continue to shape a variety of legal norms.
Because this dissertation involves studies of legal cases, the term “law” here refers to the specific
norms associated with the US legal system. However, I still wish to recognize that the norms,
codified or otherwise, are socially produced. Indeed, the cases I have chosen to highlight make
clear that the rules and norms of the legal system are drawn from pre-existing social norms and
ideas. The legal cases of members of marginalized social groups often make this fact the most
clear because these individuals, in their interactions with legal systems, demonstrate historically
consistent patterns of poor and even violent treatment within the system that typically results in
harsh legal disciplining, whereas members of socially powerful groups are likely to find that the
legal system works in their favor.
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Though law and society scholars (Ewick and Silbey 1998 ; Merry 1988) have often
discussed other forms of social norms as forms of law, this project focuses on law in both formal
and informal settings, but settings that either are or have ties to the US legal system. Ewick and
Silbey’s concept of “legality” most closely approximates how I employ the term “law.” Ewick
and Silbey note that social actors shape law on a variety of levels; socially and politically
powerful individuals construct the legal system, but individuals are also subject to “bottom up”
or commonsense understandings of appropriate social behavior. Legality remains tied to formal
legal institutions, but also encompasses the extent to which legally influenced rules and norms
flow into more general social life. Ewick and Silbey write, “Legality also operates through social
life as persons and groups deliberately invoke law’s language, authority, and procedures to
organize their lives and manage their relationships. In short, the commonplace operation of law
in daily life makes us all legal agents insofar as we actively make law, even when no formal
legal agent is involved” (20). Law as legality is a useful concept for this project because it
acknowledges the social roots of both formal and informal legal processes. While the women in
this project all experienced some form of formal legal process via interactions with courts,
police, lawyers, etc., they were also subject to informal invocations of legality as narratives were
constructed about their cases. Representational fictions are one type of informal legal process
that contribute not only to an understanding of how information about law is transmitted in daily
life, but also how presenting and reinforcing specific social narratives embeds them more fully
within the formal legal process. Often, when attempting to separate these two ideas, I refer to the
formal legal process as the “legal system,” given to mean the particular encoded operations of
the formal rules and norms that constitute US law as interpreted by legal actors. However, I wish
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to retain the informal aspects of legality by acknowledging that the rule of law functions at an
informal social level as well.
V. Imagining the South
Another strand of scholarship that is significant to this project is the interdisciplinary
field of Southern Studies. All of the cases featured in this dissertation are set in the region
defined as the US South, and many cases require even more specific attention to cultural regions
within the South, such as the Appalachian region. The commonality of a Southern location is no
coincidence—I argue that for the women whose cases I analyze, racialized, gendered, and
regionalized expectations helped to form representational fictions about them. These women
were subject not simply to representation based on their race, gender, and class, but also more
specific scripts about appropriate Southern femininity.
In chapter two, I begin to use the term “Appalachian imaginary” to capture a specific
pattern that emerges in the cases of Betsy, Frankie Silver, and Edith Maxwell. I draw from
Taylor’s (2004) term “social imaginary,” which refers to the practice of constructing a shared set
of social images that form a group identity. Taylor (2004) defines a social imaginary as “the
ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others…and the deeper
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (23). While social imaginaries
can serve as a form of identifying group commonality and community, they can also be
constructed to identify “others,” or members of social groups who are outsiders and “should” be
marginalized. I argue that within American cultural, a distinct imaginary of the Appalachian
South has been constructed over time, beginning with the “local color” tradition in journalism
and fiction, and solidifying through mass-produced popular culture. The Appalachian imaginary
defines the region for Americans who are not located there; it is a negative portrayal of the
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region and its people that presents them as violent, unintelligent, and culturally backwards.
Furthermore, I note that the Appalachian imaginary has raced and gendered implications that
contributed and continue to contribute to how some of the cases in this dissertation were
experienced and are remembered. Because Appalachia as a region is imagined wholly as white,
and because the women of Appalachia are subject to representations that cast them as different
and lesser than other Southern white women, the imaginary obscures and reinforces social and
legal violence. It forces some cases (Frankie Silver, Edith Maxwell) into scripts that allow
society to displace widespread social problems of gendered violence onto a small region, and it
outright denies the violence that occurs in cases involving slavery and black women (such as
Betsy).
I discuss the Appalachian imaginary more thoroughly in chapters 2, 3, and 5, and argue
that critically discussing regionalized representations is necessary to a deeper understanding of
intersectionality. I also draw from literatures in feminist geography, as scholars in this field point
to the importance of place, space, and location in both constructing identities and limiting
possibilities. This literature has much to offer Southern Studies in a critical take on the
functionality of real and imagined geographical borders and the significance of space (for
example, the private sphere of the home, or the public space of the slave auction block) for
shaping the memory and theorizing specific events. Throughout this dissertation, I return often to
the specifics of place, either in the form of region or in a more narrow sense—for example, the
arbitrary borders of state lines that meant the difference between slavery and citizenship for
Margaret Garner. I argue that place is necessary to understanding the cases, representational
fictions, and even legal developments illuminated within this dissertation.
VI. Spectral Evidence
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I have been haunted by Frankie Silver and by her case. I am not the only one, as the ballad
inspired by Frankie’s case as well as a longstanding folklore tradition surrounding her has
survived nearly two hundred years. As Avery Gordon (2008) writes, “haunting is one way in
which abusive systems of power make themselves known and their impacts felt in everyday life,
especially when they are supposedly over and done with (slavery, for instance) or when their
oppressive nature is denied (as in free labor or national security)” (xvi). Frankie Silver’s case
produced a specter that I followed to her home in the rural town of Kona, North Carolina. My
visit to Kona left me with even more questions about her case and the popular memory of it. The
fact that Frankie Silver haunts me occurs because of the abusive systems of power in her life: the
public-private divide that allowed her to experience abuse within her home, the system of sexual
private property that made her an object belonging not to herself but to a series of men and then
the state, and the lingering image of her whiteness that bleeds into the memory of her case.
While in Kona and Morganton, North Carolina, I stood in the same space that, many years
ago, was inhabited by Frankie’s physical body. This space is the locus of an Appalachian
tradition that created and sustained “The Ballad of Frankie Silver,” and thereby the case’s
memory. This is also the space once inhabited by a woman known only as Betsy, an enslaved
black woman who was executed in the same county as Frankie twenty years earlier than she.
Frankie became known as the first woman executed in the state of North Carolina. This is no
surprise—Betsy, legally and socially during her time period, was not viewed as a woman, but
rather as a black body, a piece of private property, and as a means of production and
reproduction (Davis 1998). Throughout this dissertation, I will return to Frankie Silver’s and
Betsy’s cases, their haunting, and the shifts and reiterations of law, violence, and systemic power
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relations that are central to their cases and every other that I discuss. Frankie and Betsy’s cases
are kindred, not only to each other but also to the other cases included in this thesis.

Figure 1: Gem Mountain Billboard, near Kona, North Carolina7
If you drive to Kona, North Carolina, you will pass very few billboards along the way.
You may notice one around Burnsville, a small town that is also the Yancey county seat. The
billboard features a cartoonish hillbilly figure, waiving a mining pick in one hand and holding
gemstones in the other. The sign is meant to grab the attention of tourists and direct them to a
local gemstone mine, where they can mine for fun, for just a day or a few hours. The sign also
signals what is contained in the space of the western North Carolina mountains: “hillbillies,”
white folks, and natural resources. The billboard tells a story of the region’s history while
tugging at the public image of Appalachia. It may seem far from a means of learning about law
and whiteness, but a closer look shows that this is not the case. The billboard is a representation,
and one that requires methods attentive to relations of power in order to unpack its meanings.
In this dissertation, I employ feminist political methods to further my analysis. These
methodologies call attention to marginalization and dominating discourses, making them useful
7

Photo taken on May 17, 2011, Highway 80 near Kona/Burnsville North Carolina, by Vanessa
L. Lovelace.

22
for an intervention into conventional understandings of law. In particular, I focus on three
methodologies that are interconnected. First, I work with an expanded archive. This method calls
for a questioning of the construction of conventional archives as well as a broadening of what
constitutes “matter” for analysis. Because I draw from sources that are contained within
conventional archives, such as legal cases, but also on sources not usually found there, such as
property lines and cultural representations, working with an expanded archive allows me to
discuss a larger body of material and to question the politics of what is included and excluded in
popular memory. Second, I use Avery Gordon’s concept of “haunting” as a method; Gordon uses
the term “haunting” to call attention to the unseen or the deliberately invisible. Throughout this
thesis, much of the archive I analyze is deliberately invisible—for example, the silence of Betsy
and the location of Frankie Silver’s grave. Haunting as a method requires not only attention to
marginalization and the unseen, but also an interrogation of why and how these spaces of
invisibility exist. I must question not only why Frankie Silver’s case haunts me, but also why
Betsy’s case is a specter within the discourse surrounding Frankie Silver—that is, what does
Frankie Silver’s whiteness cover? And what does Betsy’s invisible blackness produce? Third, I
use discourse analysis to further interrogate the many meanings contained within the
representational fictions included within this thesis. Using these three methods inherently
involves a process of what Alexander (2005) articulates as “layering.” Layering involves not
only using multiple methods, but also juxtaposing different moments in time and place, and that
which is seemingly separate (Turcotte 2011) in order to make visible nuanced political
connections. Layering methods and using them to enable particular conversations makes clear
the connections between representational fiction, physical sites and property, and forms of the
law’s violence.
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To name only a few sources, the Gem Mountain billboard, the property lines of Kona, the
fictions I analyze, and of course the legal record, serve as an expanded archive that informs this
project. I build from work by Mbembe and Nuttal (2004), Hartman (1999), and Arondekar
(2009) on expanded archives. When Hartman finds State v. Celia nearly hidden within a legal
archive, she questions why exactly this particular case merited such a fate. It is precisely because
archives are also constructed entities that some materials will be expelled from them. For
Hartman, Celia’s case becomes a means of theorizing the relationship between law, violence, and
black women’s experiences during slavery—theorizing this relationship means overcoming
acceptable discourse about the law and the supposed “progress” beyond slavery. Mbembe and
Nuttal, as well as Arondekar, further the analysis that Hartman begins. These scholars note that
archives, especially where they concern colonial or subaltern subjects, are likely to be
constructed by colonizers and will reflect the epistemology of the colonizers as well. Mbembe
and Nuttal outline an expanded archive that includes “the African metropolis,” moving beyond
an understanding of archives as only buildings containing paper and objects. Arondekar not only
questions the creation of colonial archives, but also transforms her own archive by outlining how
these spaces construct what becomes knowable. In drawing from these scholars, I move beyond
the understanding of the legal archive as containing only cases. Not only do I also focus on
representational fictions, which sit outside the conventional archive of the text of the law, but, as
Mbembe and Nuttal suggest, I include notions of space and place as topics of analysis that are
intricately connected with law and fiction. Furthermore, my analysis of these connections
requires me to question what is “left out” of legal archives and why, and what exactly these
spaces of silence tell us about law.
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Silence is not only part of an archive, but it is also an indication of what Gordon (2008)
terms “haunting.” She writes, “haunting describes how that which appears to be not there is often
a seething presence, acting on and often meddling with taken-for-granted realities, the ghost is
just the sign, or the empirical evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place” and
that “the ghost is not simply a dead or a missing person, but a social figure, and investigating it
can lead to that dense site where history and subjectivity make social life” (8). Gordon asks
scholars to consider the invisible and the silent, and to question what is contained within that
space, which she describes as ghosts. Spaces of silence, she argues, may pull at scholars for
particular reasons, begging for something to be uncovered. I write of Frankie Silver’s case as
haunting me, and this occurs in part because of the legal silence that she experienced. After
traveling to sites associated with her case in North Carolina, I also found that there was a
simultaneous silencing and spectacularization of the case. Some aspects of the Frankie Silver
case are highlighted locally—usually this is the traditional understanding of Frankie as the first
woman executed by the state of North Carolina, an understanding of her as a violence, jealous
woman, and a counter-narrative describing her crime as an act of self defense. This
spectacularization occurs not only in “The Ballad of Frankie Silver,” but also in the Burke
County Museum’s Frankie Silver exhibit, which contains copies of the ballad and the
compromised legal record.8 However, actual sites at which Frankie Silver experienced violence
are unmarked. There is no indication of where she was executed, where she was buried, or any
markers of her house, parts of which are still standing. In addition to this silence, there is the

8

I refer to the legal record of Frankie Silver’s case as “compromised” because the official
record has become linked to “The Ballad of Frankie Silver.” When local sites and archives
distribute or reprint copies of State v. Francis Silver, they always include a copy of the ballad
and note explaining that Frankie Silver sang the ballad before her execution. Even the “reality”
of Frankie Silver’s legal case has been invaded by the fiction of her ballad.
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silence surrounding the very existence of Betsy, who was executed 20 years before Frankie
Silver, yet whose case and story remain obscure. The concept of haunting allows me to
interrogate these sites of silence and ask what they reveal and what meanings they make.
As I call attention to silence, I also call attention to what speaks. When I analyze
representational fictions in this dissertation, I use discourse analysis to interpret meanings from
texts and images. Texts and images contain complex cultural meanings, and careful analysis is
necessary to trace which discourses are deployed within. I draw influence from Doezema’s
(2010) tracing of historical discourses of “white slavery” into contemporary discourses of the sex
slave. Doezema notes that historical discourses do not lose their power, but they do shift.
Throughout this thesis, I will trace shifting discourses of race, gender, class, and law over time.
Doezema also pays careful attention to the placement of text and the work that this placement
does. Considering textual placement and the meanings it illuminates is central to my analysis of
written representational fictions. Pathak and Rajan (1992) also note the totalizing power of
discourse in their analysis of the Shahbano case. Following their lead, I examine how particular
legal discourses of appropriate womanhood and victimhood create legal silence and violence.
Lubiano (2001) discusses the power of images as discursive agents. She notes that a seemingly
simple picture can contain within it broad sets of historical understandings. For visual
representational fictions, I pull from Lubiano’s work by analyzing the historical meanings that
draw from discourses about race, gender, and violence.
These methods allow me to move beyond traditional understandings of law, a move that
is itself the work of this thesis. The law has been characterized by its attention to and formation
from dominant cultural discourses, therefore I must call attention to different spaces in order to
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illuminate the relationship between law, violence, and representational fiction. As the law covers,
it also lays bare, and it is that space of “laying bare” that I interrogate.
In particular, I engage several different cases involving different women in very different
time periods. Each case involves multiple shared threads: first, each woman becomes involved
with the law because she has committed an act of violence against someone she claims was
violent towards her.9 Second, each woman lives in a state situated within the US South.10 Third,
each case contains elements of legal narrative and fiction that I have described above. The case
that touches each is that of Frankie Silver.
I also discuss the 1856 case of Margaret Garner, an escaped enslaved woman from Kentucky
whose body became a site of dispute when the state of Ohio attempted to try her, as a person
under the law, for the murder of her young daughter. Garner inspired not only Toni Morrison’s
novel Beloved, but also a painting titled “The Modern Medea.” I include Edith Maxwell’s 1935
murder trial, in which she was suspected of killing her father. Maxwell, a white Appalachian
woman from Virginia, became a media sensation known as “the Hillbilly Girl.” In many ways,
Edith Maxwell becomes a more recent Frankie Silver, whose case demonstrates the shifts in
legal understandings of white womanhood. I trace legal legacies of racism and sexual violence
9

The exception to this pattern is the Duke lacrosse case. In this case, Crystal Mangum’s initial
interaction with the law occurred in a coercive manner, but was primarily instigated by her own
report of rape. She did not engage in a form of violence against members of the Duke lacrosse
team, although later renderings of the case as a premeditated false accusation come close to
making this claim. However, in 2010 Crystal Mangum did stab her boyfriend to death; by her
account this was an act of self-defense against domestic violence. I include an analysis of this
interaction between Crystal Mangum and the law because it relates to her involvement in the
Duke case.
10
I recognize that the US South has historically had a distinct system of laws of property that
relate to its social and economic reliance on slavery. The US South has also developed distinct
sets of fictions both within its own space and within the larger national space that speak to
images of blackness and whiteness, class, and region. Scholars of Southern Studies also further
outline the historic specificities of life in the US South and their relationships to contemporary
images of the US South as an imagined, bordered region .
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from Betsy to Margaret Garner and then to the 1974 case of Joan Little, a black woman from
North Carolina who was tried for the murder of a prison guard who sexually assaulted her.
Little’s case moves beyond the previous cases because her defense attorneys recognized the
power of fiction and constructed a counter-narrative in the courtroom. I also discuss Crystal
Mangum and the broader Duke Lacrosse case of 2006. I use the journalistic accounts that
emerged from the trial to analyze how fiction in this case involved the invocation of the
“Scottsboro Boys” by the white, upper-class men who were the alleged assailants.
Chapter Outlines
In chapter two, I contrast two cases emerging from Western North Carolina in the early
1800s—the first is that of a woman known only as Betsy (1813), and the second is the better
known account of Frances “Frankie” Silver (1833), widely thought to be the first woman
executed in the state of North Carolina. Both women were tried for killing men in their lives; in
Betsy’s case this was the man who enslaved her, John McTaggart, and in Frankie Silver’s case it
was her husband, Charles Silver. In this chapter, I use these cases as entry points into the history
of legal narratives that correspond to images of race, gender, class, and region. The silence
surrounding Betsy’s trial and execution is a silence that extends to her memory—Frankie Silver
overshadows her in history and scholarship. I relate this to the popular image of Appalachia by
introducing the Appalachian Studies literature, which tracks the history of imagery surrounding
Appalachians. Scholars of Appalachian Studies have yet to theorize the legal regulation of
Appalachians and also oftentimes ignore issues of race in favor of a fictitious white Appalachia.
The silence of Betsey’s case is in part a product of this image, and it is also a product of a larger
legal narrative that constructed black, enslaved women as private property incapable of
experiencing violence (Hartman 1997). Betsy’s case is a conduit for the fiction of the enslaved
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black woman as property and the history of the law’s ties to slavery as forgettable. The case is, in
a sense, a mother to the cases that follow it (Margaret Garner, Joan Little, and Crystal Mangum).
I contrast Betsy’s case with Frankie Silver’s to interrogate not only the disparate fictions of
whiteness and blackness, but also to analyze the popular memory of each case and what it
reflects socially. For Frankie Silver, I use the ballad based on her trial and execution to trace the
role of fiction in the memory of her life. The ballad becomes an opportunity to analyze
conceptions of property, domestic violence, and the deviant white womanhood associated with
Appalachia. In this chapter, I also argue that Betsy and Frankie’s cases are connected because
they represent a formative period in which the convergence of race and gender are solidified in
law. Frankie’s deviant white womanhood and Betsy’s non-personhood as a black, enslaved
woman are both necessary sites of legal attention and disciplining because they help to construct
broader legal articulations of white womanhood, a construct that is central to the Southern legal
and social disciplining of black bodies, and particularly black male bodies. Frankie Silver and
Betsy’s cases are central to understanding how law articulates who is and who is not a legitimate
citizen.
In my third chapter, I discuss the cases of Margaret Garner and Edith Maxwell, as they speak
to legal notions of property and personhood. In Garner’s case, I use discourse analysis to trace a
mirroring of Betsy’s case in the legal fight over whether to try Garner for murder (as a person) or
destruction of property, as well as the later efforts to re-shape Garner’s case and cover its
relationship to the systematic sexual violence enslaved women experienced. The painting, “The
Modern Medea,” produced less than ten years after the trial, cements the representational fiction
that Garner is a destroyer of important “property” in the form of enslaved children,
overshadowing the more complex legal and discursive occurrences that took place. I analyze the
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painting with attention to the depiction of Garner as a deviant black mother and with an eye to
the issues of sexual violence that the painting fails to address. Maxwell’s case provides a window
into the shifts of legal and social understandings of Appalachian whiteness over time. Maxwell’s
pardon for the murder of her father shows that the image of Appalachian white womanhood
eventually became subsumed into the larger frame of Southern whiteness, a move that brought
with it a new urgency of legal protection. I argue that the law ultimately shrinks from
disciplining Maxwell, as whiteness has become an even more important commodity (Harris
1993) and a marker of citizenship, while always constructed in opposition to blackness. I focus
on newspaper accounts of the Maxwell case and a series of photographs of the trial found in the
Mary Gilliam papers and the Governor’s papers at the Library of Virginia. Through these
sources, Maxwell’s trial involves claims of self defense that are contingent on legal notions of
the body as one’s own property, a contrast to the Garner case, in which black bodies cannot
make such claims.
In my fourth chapter, I pair the case of Joan Little with the Duke Lacrosse case, allowing me
to focus on the deployment of fiction in the courtroom. Little’s defense narrative is one the first
attempts to counter representational fictions in a case of sexual violence. Little’s attorney’s use
of counter-narrative demonstrates that there is recognition of the power of fiction in the
courtroom. In my analysis of the Duke Lacrosse case, I argue that fictions of whiteness and
blackness merge, with the alleged attackers invoking the narrative of “The Scottsboro Boys” to
initiate a public discourse about race and the law. While the Scottsboro case centered on the legal
and social ramifications of Jim Crow laws for young black men, the alleged attackers in the
Duke case subvert this narrative, instead deploying it to insist that the legal system is now biased
against white men. In this case, Crystal Mangum’s experience serves as a continuity of the
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questions surrounding sexuality, property, and violence that emerged in former cases such as
Betsy’s and Margaret Garner’s. Discourse analysis is central to this chapter as I trace the shifts in
how fiction and counter-narratives are constructed in the Little case and how fictions of race and
gender are changed and co-opted in the Duke case.
My fifth chapter situates Southern women’s identities within the current landscape of
intersectionality research. I argue that the cases I analyze and the representational fictions that
followed demonstrate the importance of another intersecting strand of identity: region. For the
women in this dissertation, specifically Southern expectations about race, gender, and class are
present in their representational fictions and also shaped their legal and social experiences. Here
I use the artwork of Kara Walker and other cultural material to “read” relationships between
Southern black and white women. In particular, I note that the women whose cases are featured
in this project are tied together not only by their experiences of legal disciplining and violence,
but also their failure to adhere to the expectations of femininity placed upon them. Their
deviance, itself stemming from identity categories and violent actions, can tell scholars much
about how the South imagines itself and how it is imagined on a national scale.
My sixth chapter concludes my thesis with a broad discussion of the interconnectedness
between the previous cases, their representational fictions, and the larger frame of national legal
memory. I ask how the cases I have discussed contribute to a larger understanding of the law as
national fiction. I also question the construction of the South as an imagined region, arguing that
this notion centers issues of race, gender, and class onto a particular region, erasing the fact that
the US legal system also relies on violence to uphold state power. I argue that the discursive
construction of the South makes invisible the privileges that the state has derived from systems
of colonization, slavery, and sexual private property. By “othering” the South and displacing
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these discourses, a national fiction is created that conceives of the US state as exempt from
complicity in the violence of the law.

32
Chapter II: At the Gallows: Betsy and Frankie Silver
I. Gallows and Ghosts
Within twenty years of each other, two women would approach the gallows in Burke
County, North Carolina, both sentenced to death for murder. Legal and historical records tell
scholars very little about what each of these women did or said as they stood, waiting for
execution. Perhaps Betsy spoke, but if she did, there are no records of her words. Frankie Silver
somehow managed to speak and remain silent simultaneously—her father silenced her from the
crowd, according to historical records, but local folklore insists that she sang out her confession.
These final moments at the gallows, blending fiction and fact, represent the larger questions
associated with each case in this chapter: who does the law silence, and what are the political
stakes of this silencing? And whom does local memory spectacularize, and why? What fictions
and images are created and sustained through representational fictions of the law in these specific
cases?
In this chapter, I explore themes of race, gender, and legal violence through
representational fiction. My use of the term draws from Crenshaw’s (1997) work on
“representational intersectionality,” which refers to “the way that race and gender images…
create unique and specific narratives deemed appropriate for women of color” (554). I also pull
from Hall’s (1997) work on representation, by which he refers to symbols and images that are
culturally meaningful forms of organization. Representational fictions transmit messages about
race, gender, and class, and impose new but false narrative “realities” onto events. An analysis of
representational fictions can expose the interactions between race, gender and the law.
Traditional folklore of Frankie Silver’s case posits her as the first woman hanged in the
state of North Carolina. Betsy’s death at the gallows twenty years prior disrupts this popular
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myth. Within Frankie Silver folklore, Betsy haunts. Gordon (2008) writes that “hauntings”
represent not only the forgotten and the covered. They beg to speak and to have their history
uncovered. Betsy’s case prompts scholars to consider the implications for personhood
established by the memory of Frankie as the first woman executed by the state of North Carolina
and to interrogate the construction of Appalachia as a space mythically free from the Southern
system of slavery. In the same vein, we should ask why Betsy was involved in the murder of
John McTaggart, and analyze how the legal system treated her. Betsy and Frankie both represent
hauntings of the law and of the South, and they both speak to the violence of the law.
In this chapter, Frankie Silver and Betsy will speak to a theorization of the law. Their
ability to speak is not minutia within their legal cases, but represents the law’s disciplinary power
and creates the space for representational fiction to flourish. The folklore and the silence
surrounding each case relates to social imaginaries of the US South. Frankie and Betsy’s cases
are not only examples of representational fiction, but also exemplary of a broader regional
fiction. The fiction derived from each case does representational work; it presents images and
symbols that are gendered, raced, and regional to communicate socially meaningful information.
The silence of Betsy’s case is not only an artifact of law; it relates to what I outline as an
Appalachian imaginary that erases the existence of slavery and sexual violence against black
women in the region. In Frankie Silver’s case, folkloric attempts to preserve the memory of the
case reveal that the law maintains narrative power long after all parties leave the courtroom—this
folklore conforms to specific understandings of the law. In this chapter, one feature of fiction is
that it tends to reflect the law as known to the storyteller. Folklore such as “The Ballad of
Frankie Silver,” represents legal and social views at the time of Frankie Silver’s execution, yet it
cannot be separated from current popular images and local memory of the case. The memory of
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the case has survived in part because it can be molded into newer facets of law and narratives of
Appalachia. To capture these features of representational fiction, I move backwards and forwards
in time throughout this chapter.
I first recount the supposed facts and historical accounts that are knowable in these
convoluted cases. The records of each case present specific legal narratives that inform the
folklore tradition of Frankie Silver’s case and the silence of Betsy’s. Second, I piece together the
strands of folklore surrounding the Frankie Silver case, as these versions of her story serve to fill
in gaps left by the legal record. They are also clearly informed by popular understandings of the
law. Third, I discuss the social imaginary of the Appalachian South and the way in which
Frankie and Betsy’s cases reflect that imaginary. Though the Appalachian imaginary is more
recent than Betsy or Frankie’s cases, their representational fictions reflect the social meaning
inherent to it. Charles Taylor (2004) defines the social imaginary as a set of ideas that enables
group identity and a shared social life. Part of the construction of representational fiction
involves an understanding of both group identities and “others,” ideas that can be placed upon a
specific physical site such as the Appalachian South. Fourth, I analyze the “Ballad of Frankie
Silver” and contrast it with the silence of Betsy’s case. The ballad is one of the earliest pieces of
Frankie Silver folklore and the primary means of transmitting the memory of the case, though
more recent folklore has attempted to re-imagine Frankie Silver. Betsy’s case remains largely
forgotten, silenced in contemporary storytelling much as it was by the law at the time of Betsy’s
execution. How each case is remembered or not remembered speaks directly to how the law is
remembered and reshaped, which further shapes the specifics of representational fiction.
II. Trials and What Was Recorded
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For both Frankie Silver and Betsy, the first space linked to their representational fictions
is that of the legal record. Conventionally, a perusal of the legal record for each case would
reveal the “truth” about each, but both cases instead show that the law is a space of silence for
members of marginalized groups. There is no record of either Betsy’s or Frankie Silver’s voice
in their trials.
Betsy
Betsy was sentenced to execution in 1813. This remains one of the only surviving pieces
of information about her case. The legal record for her case is roughly 5 sentences long. Betsy
was tried alongside an enslaved man, Jerry. There is no mention of whether either Betsy or Jerry
had last names. Betsy was tried as an accessory to the murder of John McTaggart, with Jerry
listed as the principle instigator of the crime. Records of the case list no witnesses and no
account of how the murder took place. They simply include the judge’s finding of guilt for both
defendants, and a pithy sentence of execution by hanging. The cases of both Betsy and Frankie
Silver display what could charitably be called a compromised legal record. Complete records of
both cases have been lost, destroyed, or never existed at all.
The short legal record of State v McTaggart Slaves is a space of silence. Given the legal
status of Betsy and Jerry as slaves, it is likely that standards of evidence for their crime were not
high. There are no records of confessions from either, though North Carolina’s rules of testimony
at the time forbade defendants from testifying in their own defense in felony cases. The record of
the case contains no trace of Betsy’s voice. Legally, property does not have a voice.
A July 14, 1932 edition of the Morganton News Herald contains what may be the only
written account of the murder of John McTaggart. J.B. Cooper’s article contains reminiscences
about the land that originally belonged to the McTaggarts. Cooper writes,
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“He [the land’s first owner], with one of his slave negroes, was looking for a hole under
the fence where his hogs had been getting out…when the old man stooped down to look
the negro struck him in the head with a stick, killing him instantly…The negro was
suspected. When the men were digging McTaggart's grave the slave was sitting with his
feet hanging down inside the hole. Suddenly one of the grave diggers said to him: ‘if you
had it to do over would you do it?’ Before the slave thought of himself he answered: ‘No,
I wouldn't.’ He was then informed that he was known to have killed his master,
whereupon he revealed the whole story. He was later tried and hanged for the crime.
(1934, B-1).”
Given that John McTaggart was the original deed-holder on the property and that he was
killed by people he enslaved, it is likely that this article is referring to his murder. This account
of the crime must stem from oral tradition, as it is not contained in the legal record. It also makes
no mention of Betsy. Furthermore, it offers no theory of motive. This is unlikely a realistic
account of the murder, because it plays on racialized assumptions about the alleged intellectual
inferiority of African Americans and slaves, particularly as it details how the enslaved man was
supposedly tricked into admitting his crime.
The legal record and other official sources are indicative of the larger silence surrounding
Betsy and her case. Not only does Betsy’s trial give little information about her role in the
murder of McTaggart, but even the oral history of the crime gives no indication of how she
served as an accessory, or why. It is possible that both Betsy and Jerry killed McTaggart in hopes
of gaining freedom. Betsy’s involvement also hints at another possibility: sexual violence. The
legal status of enslaved women was linked to their ability to bear enslaved children (Davis 1998;
Hartman 1997, 1999; Hodes 1997, 1999; McKittrick 2006; White 1999), and the rape of
enslaved women was not only common but encouraged, given that it would result in more
property. Furthermore, both law and society viewed enslaved women’s sexuality as the property
of their enslavers and of white men more generally, a view accompanied by a persistent notion
that black women were “proper” outlets for white male sexuality (Berry 2000; Glymph 2008;
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Hartman 1997, 1999; Hodes 1997). Because the legal record lacks information, it is impossible
to know if sexual violence prompted Betsy to aid in the killing of McTaggart. However,
historically, enslaved women did engage in violence in response to rape, as Hartman (1997,
1999) documents, and legally they were held liable for it.
Frankie Silver
The legal record of Frankie Silver’s trial is more complete, but still missing crucial
details. Official records of the trial do list witnesses and a summary of the case, but do not
include witness testimony. Even the officially published trial records are appended with “The
Ballad of Frankie Silver,”11 supporting the myth that Frankie sang the ballad at her execution.
The ballad is listed on the record as “Frankie Silver’s Confession,” lending it the legitimate air of
courtroom confession. When Frankie was tried, however, the state of North Carolina still barred
defendant testimony in felony cases, so no courtroom confession or account of Frankie’s version
of the story can be found in the legal record.
The account of the crime given in the legal record is brief. Charles Silver went missing in
December 1830. In January 1831, his family began to search for him, eventually finding pieces
of his dismembered body around Kona, North Carolina, in the fireplace of his house, and under
the floorboards. Frankie claimed that she was not involved and that Charlie had left on a hunting
trip and not returned. However, the general consensus was that Frankie must have murdered
Charlie. She, her brother Blackstone, and her mother Barbara were arrested. Only Frankie
11

“The Ballad of Frankie Silver” was not recorded and perhaps did not exist until at least 30
years after Frankie’s trial. The ballad’s appendage to the county court records likely occurred for
two reasons. First, many of the Burke County court records were lost in a fire in the 1860s, and
second, the record of the case became printed and distributed as part of the county’s folklore.
After the fire, one of the only sources of the legal record is Clifton Avery’s (1952) printing,
which features the “Ballad of Frankie Silver,” attached under the title “Frankie Silver’s
Confession.” This record is now distributed by libraries and the county court as “The Official
Court Record of the Trial, Conviction, and Execution of Francis Silvers.”
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remained in jail and only she faced murder charges. Rather than introducing a defense, Frankie’s
lawyer, Thomas Worth Wilson, insisted that the state prove its case, arguing that there was a lack
of evidence sufficient to convict Frankie. This proved to be a poor strategy, as Frankie was
quickly convicted and sentenced to death.
After Frankie Silver’s sentencing but before her execution, some citizens of Burke
County began to petition for her pardon. A number of upper-class women from Burke began a
petition to Governor Stokes to save Frankie. They cited Frankie’s health and “frailty,” and
claimed, “The only inducement on the part of the defendant for the Commission of the alleged
offense was the brutal conduct of the husband toward the wife.” They also noted that “the
execution of a poor female for an alleged offense of this character has so seldom occurred within
the history of our county whilst it has so frequently happened that husbands have murdered their
wives and escaped Punishment” (Petition to Governor Stokes, no date). Wilson submitted
another petition on Frankie’s behalf to Governor Swain, who took office in 1832. This petition
noted that Frankie had confessed to the crime before the sheriff, Wilson, and another man, and
strongly implies that Frankie included details of abuse by Charlie. Wilson writes, “she made a
free and full disclosure of all the facts and circumstances attending this unhappy occurrence…To
her great surprise she found that many respectable and intelligent gentlemen…stepped forward
and said if her confession were true, she ought not to be executed” (Wilson, petition to Governor
Swain, 1833). Twelve additional men signed this petition, swearing that they had seen the
confession and that its contents made them believe that Frankie should be pardoned. Requests for
Frankie’s pardon appear to be influenced in part by a belief that a frail woman was not capable of
committing the murder of a man, but also by a recorded confession. However, that same
confession, which was originally attached to Wilson’s petition, cannot be found in Governor
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Swain’s papers. Governor Swain finally wrote to the clerk of the court on July 9, 1833, claiming
that he doubted his letter would reach Morganton in time to cancel Frankie’s execution. The
letter also contains no language indicating that Governor Swain intended to pardon Frankie—it
seems that he actively planned on his letter arriving after the execution date and hoped to have to
issue no direct judgment at all. Beyond this, he makes no statements on the crime. Frankie was
hanged from an oak tree on July 12, 1833. She was nineteen years old.
III. Stories of Frankie Silver
While Betsy’s case is cloaked in silence, Frankie Silver’s case has been preserved
through speech. As I have outlined above, the legal record on Frankie Silver lends little
information to scholars; instead, one must consult local folklore and journalism. In this section, I
discuss the differing versions of the Frankie Silver story and the meanings they reflect about law
and Appalachian identity. While “The Ballad of Frankie Silver” is one of the primary means of
transmitting the story of the case, many other versions exist in the oral tradition. I contend that
these spoken and written versions of Frankie’s story become necessary because of the law’s
silencing power. When Frankie’s voice and her own account of the killing of Charlie were
disallowed from the legal record, a space was left that locals in North Carolina quickly filled.
Stories of the Frankie Silver case in the oral tradition often emphasize Frankie’s jealousy, her
callousness, and her beauty. They constructed Frankie Silver as the prototypical overly
aggressive Appalachian white woman whose irrationality led to her husband’s demise. More
recent stories of the case instead focus on the claims that Frankie Silver killed Charlie in selfdefense. These versions of the tale attempt to stress Frankie’s innocence, but in doing so often
portray her as traditionally feminine and as a perpetual victim. They recast Frankie Silver as a
tragic figure by jettisoning her rage and violence, conforming her to the stereotype of non-violent
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femininity common to legal treatments of white womanhood. All versions of the story include
discussions of law and tend to develop theories of the crime that match specific legal narratives,
be they self-defense or premeditated murder. The more recent stories of Frankie Silver also tend
to emphasize an understanding of the law that superimpose more recent legal doctrines and
narratives onto the case, recreating Frankie Silver in our contemporary legal image. In this
section, I discuss the differing versions of Frankie Silver’s story with attention to the
representational fictions presented and their relationship to the law.
Many versions of the Frankie Silver story have been transmitted through oral folklore in
the Morganton and Kona, North Carolina areas (Patterson 2000). These versions of the tale
typically present Frankie Silver as a jealous wife or a dupe of her greedy family. Bobby
McMillon, a contemporary ballad performer, begins his story by noting, “Frankie they said was a
girl that had charms. They said that she was a very pretty girl…And her folks…were real poor
people” (Patterson 2000, 33). McMillon portrays Charlie as a good provider, claiming that on the
night of Charlie’s death he had just cut a large stock of firewood for Frankie and their daughter,
Nancy. Charlie was to leave the next day for a hunting trip. In McMillon’s version of the crime,
Frankie’s father Isaiah was present at the cabin that night. When Charlie fell asleep before the
fireplace, Isaiah said to Frankie, “Now’s your time, Frankie” (Patterson 2000, 33). Isaiah
threatened Frankie, telling her that he would kill her if she did not kill Charlie. At this point,
McMillon claims, Frankie finally killed Charlie with her axe, hiding under the bed sheets
because of her fear of Charlie’s response. In McMillon’s tale, both Frankie and Isaiah dispose of
Charlie’s body by burning it in the fireplace. The two then attempt to tell Charlie’s family that he
had failed to return from his hunting trip.
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McMillon notes that Frankie’s family was originally suspected as having some part in the
crime. In his account of Frankie Silver’s hanging, he supposes Frankie did not sing the famous
ballad, but that instead “her daddy had it printed up and was trying to make money off of it
because of greed” (Patterson 2000, 39). McMillon reasons that Isaiah Stewart ordered Frankie to
kill Charlie because he would not provide money or help for the family to go west—they may
have needed Charlie to sell his homestead to make a move possible. McMillon says,
“And so it’s said that that was the real reason Charlie died, that they just coerced Frankie into
it…And there was some other people…that put out word that Charlie was mean to Frankie, and
that he was in a fit of passion and about to kill her when she struck him. I’ve always felt that if
that were the case, it looks like Frankie could have claimed self-defense” (Patterson 2000, 41).

McMillon’s version of the story is not wholly unsympathetic to Frankie, but it is clear
that his version displays doubt about the physical abuse that Charlie may have inflicted on
Frankie. While McMillon claims that the Stewart family was responsible for this addition to the
tale, the court records and petitions citing Frankie’s confession imply that Charlie’s abuse played
a role in the case. However, McMillon’s story is strongly influenced by oral tradition. In spite of
its contemporary status, it reflects the legal norms of the 1830s. Frankie Silver is always under
the authority of a man, either her husband or father, and it is ultimately male authority that forces
her to murder Charlie. Frankie is not innocent, but she is weak-willed and intimidated by her
father. She is a loyal daughter who never speaks of her father’s role in the crime, preferring
instead to face death.
Muriel Earley Sheppard’s (1935) Cabins in the Laurel also contains a version of the
Frankie Silver story. Sheppard’s work is typical of the “local color” stories outsiders often wrote
about the region; these tales usually emphasize the strangeness of the people of Appalachia.
Sheppard’s record of the Frankie Silver case is called “The Quiltin.” The poem describes Frankie
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and Charlie’s cabin as “old and far too small” and claimed that Frankie “hated the lonely place”
([1935] 1991, 25). Furthermore, in this version we learn that “Frankie was jealous. She nagged
and spied while she thought Charlie courted; she worried and cried when he slipped away, now
two days, now four. Each time he came back she hated him more” ([1935] 1991, 25). Frankie
finally kills Charlie when he returns from a hunting trip, purely out of spite. She burns his body
in the fireplace and is not suspected of the crime for weeks. Eventually, Frankie is driven mad by
her deed; at a local quilting she smells bacon being burned while cooking, which reminds her of
the smell of Charlie’s burning body. Frankie finally confesses to the crime. The poem ends, “The
Law stepped in and Frankie hung for her heinous sin. And they still tell when bacon’s fried too
long and scorched, how Charlie died” ([1935] 1991, 30).
The broader oral tradition surrounding the Frankie Silver case presents Frankie as
irrationally violent or as a threatened daughter, but places little emphasis on the possibility of
domestic violence as a motive for Charlie’s killing. Three authors took up the case much later,
first in the 1970s and then in the 1990s, presenting new versions that focus on Frankie’s actions
as a form of self-defense. Maxine McCall, a former teacher and local historian in Western North
Carolina, published They Won’t Hang a Woman in 1972. Her text contains a new version of the
story, which she argues is the result of her own doubts about Frankie’s portrayal in the oral
tradition. She writes,
“This story does not presume to declare Frankie innocent. She did kill Charlie. There are facts
enough to say that with certainty. But the facts leave room for reasonable doubt that his death
was the result of cold-blooded premeditated murder.” (McCall 1972, II)
McCall’s new presentation of the case is intended to “give Frankie Silver her ‘day in
court’” (McCall 1972, III). The story is told entirely from the point of view of Frankie herself, as
if she were relating her story to an audience from her jail cell. Frankie openly admits to killing
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Charlie, saying “But I kilt Charlie. No way to git around that” (McCall 1972, 1). Frankie
describes Charlie returning home one night and going into a rage. Frankie claims, “He’d showed
a temper before, but I’d never seen him in such a wild rage as that. He yelled that I’d nagged him
fer the last time and the he’d shut me up…Then he was loadin’ his gun” (McCall 1972, 5).
Frankie’s response was swift—she grabbed a nearby axe. Frankie desperately tries to hide
Charlie’s body and concoct a story to account for his whereabouts. Throughout this version,
Frankie acts in immediate self-defense and her later actions, such as burning Charlie’s body, are
not acts of cruelty but rather her frantic attempts to hide a crime she did not intend to commit.
In the fictional account of the trial, McCall presents Frankie as intimidated by the
courtroom and jurors and doubtful that she will be acquitted. The narrative the prosecutor puts
forth, which paints Frankie as a vile, jealous woman, seems convincing to the jurors. The
prosecutor calls Frankie a “nagging wife” who planned to murder Charlie “for months” (McCall
1972, 16). Frankie is not surprised but is still horrified when the jury finds her guilty. As the
Frankie Silver of this story mounts the scaffold, she looks out over the mountains that were her
home. She thinks of confessing, but her father silences her from the audience. Frankie makes eye
contact with her father one last time, and then is hooded and hanged.
Perry Deane Young, a North Carolina journalist, offers another account of the case that
was intended to correct the oral tradition. While he writes that his purpose is “to set the record
straight” (Young 1998, i), he argues that it is important to engage with the fiction surrounding
the case because “the way stories are passed down, certain facts retained but others completely
ignored, is a kind of history all its own” (Young 1998, i). Young begins with a story in order to
participate in the telling of a good tale, but after that account he focuses mostly on uncovering
documents pertaining to the legal matters of the case.
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In Young’s version, Frankie and Charlie are initially a happy couple, but Charlie’s
drinking and abuse change their marriage. Young writes, “The Stewarts couldn’t help but know
Charlie was drinking again…Frankie didn’t have to spell it out for her people, they could see in
the haggard lines of her face that she was being abused” (Young 1998, 4). Though Young
portrays Frankie as an abused wife, he also notes her jealous streak, writing that she was upset
because “Charlie was goin’ with other women” and that “For months, she schemed and plotted
how best to kill Charlie” (Young 1998, 5). Frankie does not kill in immediate self-defense, but
rather out of a sense of outrage at both the physical abuse she endured, her fears for her
daughter’s safety, and her anger at a rumor of Charlie’s latest affair.
Young emphasizes the drama of the courtroom narrative in his account. He notes that the
jury was appalled at the evidence presented, including the axe and the witness accounts of blood.
Members of the Silver family also testified that Frankie had lied about Charlie’s whereabouts
and attempted to cover up the crime. In Young’s story of the execution, Frankie’s father attempts
to silence her, but Frankie disregards him and instead sings out her confessional ballad.
Afterwards, “Frankie swung free in death, her pretty neck broken by the rope” (Young 1998, 12).
Young ends his version of the tale by stating, “It is a powerful story. Unfortunately, almost none
of it is true” (1998, 13).
Jim Harbin, a Silver family descendent, has also published a version of the Frankie Silver
story. Harbin’s (2000) account is primarily told through the eyes of Nancy Silver, Frankie and
Charlie’s daughter. The version of the crime that Harbin presents is similar to McCall’s—young
Nancy learns that Frankie killed Charlie in self-defense. Young Nancy is told that Frankie and
others had “been hearing rumors that Charlie had been seen with his cousin, Nancy Wilson, on
several occasions in places that didn’t seem proper for a married man” (12) and that “when
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[Frankie] would bring things up to him he would sometimes get a bit too rough with her” (12).
Harbin’s version of the story presents a confrontation between Frankie and Charlie in December.
Charlie is readying himself to leave for another long hunting trip, and Frankie suspects that he
will actually be going to see his mistress. Frankie attempts to block the door to their cabin, and
Charlie threatens her several times with his gun. Harbin writes, “A savage look had come over
his face that scared [Frankie]…[she] knew that he was going to kill her” (13). Frankie notices the
axe behind her near the door, and manages to briefly distract Charlie. She sees “his trigger finger
sliding up the stock, his thumb was raising up to the hammer” (14). Frankie panics and swings
the axe at Charlie several times, killing him.
The version of the story that Harbin presents is sympathetic to Frankie and is careful to
preserve the narrative of acceptable self-defense. The reader is told that Frankie still loved
Charlie and that she was not bitter or angry at his physical abuse, and was more concerned about
the rumors circulating about his affairs. Frankie plays the dutiful wife who only wants her
husband to be a good provider and father. We also see that the self-defense motive for the crime
is in keeping with legal notions of self-defense—Frankie is in imminent danger, with an angry
man pointing a loaded gun at her. Only this type of self-defense would be viable legally at the
time Frankie was tried. There was no legal category for domestic violence, and women could
expect physical abuse by their husbands to be legally sanctioned (Bartlett, Harris, and Rhode
2006; Basch 1982). It appears that in the versions of the story that both McCall and Harbin have
written, Frankie’s ability to claim self-defense is strongly linked to a conventional understanding
of the term that would have applied in 1833.
Harbin also suggests a final intriguing point. He writes, when questioning why Frankie
did not have an attorney present at her Supreme Court hearing, “Let’s ask this question. Was
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Frankie a Melungeon, a Free Person of Color? An FPC has no legal rights at that time.
Remember that two white women were given pardons during the same time period” (2000, 72).
The Melungeons are a group of historically free people of color located in Southern Appalachia.
It is unlikely that Frankie was Melungeon.12 No other folklore surrounding the case has ever
suggested that Frankie was not white. To the contrary, her whiteness is typically overly
emphasized. By re-imagining Frankie as a person of color, Harbin attempts to merge
contemporary legal knowledge about the discriminatory treatment of people of color under the
law with Frankie’s obviously troubling treatment. Harbin’s question is one of the more obvious
examples of contemporary legal understandings being displaced onto the Frankie Silver case.
Folkloric versions of the story circumvent questions of the law’s treatment of women
during the period by erasing the possibility that Frankie killed Charlie in order to stop the abuse,
but not at the exact (imminent) moment when her life was in danger. This type of claim,
typically known as “battered woman’s syndrome,” would not be used in courts until the 1980s.
Even then, in cases like State v Norman (1989), courts found that women who killed abusive
partners at moments when the abuse was not occurring could not claim self-defense because the
threat of death was not imminent. As Martha Mahoney (1991) notes, the “battered woman
syndrome” defense was developed to answer the question of why women do not simply leave
their abusers. In Frankie’s case one wonders where she would have sought help. There were no

12

Melungeons were usually listed in census records as “some other race” or “other free,”
however, on every North Carolina census containing information about Frankie Silver (via her
father or husband), she is listed as a “white female.” While Melungeons were listed as white in
some census records in 1790, by 1800 their race was re-categorized. Perusal of the Stewart
family genealogical forums shows that at least a few other individuals have heard the rumor that
Frankie was Melungeon. Frankie’s maiden name, Stewart, is listed as Melungeon surname, and a
small number of Melungeons were listed as living in Anson county in 1840, though they were
not of the Stewart surname. Beyond these tenuous links, there is little evidence to suggest that
Frankie was Melungeon.
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domestic violence shelters, and she lived in a small rural community; furthermore, many state
laws had not yet explicitly criminalized spousal abuse, and typically women could expect that
violence instigated by their husbands would be socially and legally accepted (Anglin 1995;
Basch 1982). In spite of these complications, folklore that casts Charlie’s killing as self-defense
continues to rely on a scenario in which Frankie’s death is imminent and in which Frankie
regretfully kills Charlie. There appear to be no versions of the story in which Frankie takes the
opportunity to kill Charlie in his sleep because she refuses to continue to be abused, but fears
attempting to overpower him when he is in the process of abusing her.
There is also little mention of another source of legal inequity—the fact that Frankie, who
suspected Charlie was having an affair, could not rely on a defense of “heat of passion” or “hotblooded murder.” These claims rely on provocation, and downgrade murder to involuntary
manslaughter (Bartlett, Harris, and Rhode 2006). This defense is often used by men who kill
their wives, especially in situations in which the wife had an affair (Bartlett, Harris, and Rhode
2006). Yet we see that in Young’s version of the Frankie tale, Frankie is rendered a deviant,
violent woman for wanting to murder adulterous Charlie—there is no attempt to re-imagine
Charlie’s purported affairs as provoking “hot-blooded” passion as opposed to a cold-blooded
killing.
It seems that Frankie must be deviant or innocent, but never in between. Either her
agency in the killing must be minimized and she must be granted a legal self-defense case, or she
is entirely to blame for the murder. There is no room for a strong agent, a woman who suffers
violence but attempts to change her situation in one of the only ways possible in her time period.
Not only do these differing versions reflect social notions of appropriate and deviant femininity,
but they also adhere strongly to the fiction of the law. The law offers but three real possibilities
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for Frankie Silver. As a woman living in the 1830s, she has no access to legal defenses based on
provocation or domestic violence;13 she could only be either innocent completely, guilty but not
legally culpable via imminent self-defense, or guilty of premeditated murder. The differing
versions found in folklore reflect these legal understandings of the case, intertwining the law
with folklore and fiction, and shaping the memory of Frankie Silver.
IV. Imagining Appalachia
Appalachia as a space and place exists in part as a social construct. While the
Appalachian mountain chain covers ground from Maine to Alabama, the cultural and social
region of Appalachia typically includes only Southern states. The created space of Appalachia is
a Southern one, and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) has reinforced this notion.
The idea of Appalachia as a uniquely Southern space is not new—reformers, missionaries, and
“local color” writers from the 19th and early 20th centuries all took part in the construction of
Appalachia as a Southern “other” within the US (Billings, Norman, and Ledford 2000; Fox 1908;
Harkins 2004; Holloway 2008; McNeil 1995; Pudup, Billings, and Waller 1995; Sheppard
[1935] 1991). The ARC lent state approval to this construction by formally linking Appalachia
with poverty and naming “official” Appalachian counties in mostly Southern states. For the
ARC, to become part of Appalachia required a county to be both poor and within the
Appalachian mountain chain. This definition helped shape the larger image of the region by
reinforcing pre-existing notions found in fiction and media reports. In this section, I outline the
Appalachian imaginary because I contend that the region as presented in the national imagination
shapes the memory and representational fictions of both Frankie Silver and Betsy.
13

I also do not mean to imply that Frankie Silver would have been acquitted of murder under the
contemporary legal system. As State v Norman shows, defenses of domestic violence still require
claims of imminence to reach a verdict of self-defense. However, the feminist movement and
feminist legal actors have worked to provide a wider variety of options for abused women.
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The ARC’s official Appalachian region stretches from New York to Mississippi and
includes parts of Ohio and Pennsylvania. Within this large expanse of land, a variety of
difference is collapsed into the created region of Appalachia. The Appalachian Studies literature,
while emphasizing the cultural diversity of the region, highlights the contributions of popular
culture and ethnography to the broader national idea of Appalachia. Thus, the Appalachian
region has yielded a powerful social imaginary. Taylor (2004) defines a social imaginary as “the
ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others…and the deeper
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (23). Social imaginaries are
imagined connections within one’s own community, but they are also imagined narratives of the
Other. As Cameron (2002) notes, groups imagine “who we are,” and “more importantly
perhaps…who and what we are not” (411). Appalachia is a region of “who and what we are not.”
Discussing Appalachia and the American narrative of modernity, Cameron writes,
“othered places like these have long defined a particular kind of rupture in American
narratives of modernity and progress…If stories of place accentuate regional differences,
the poetics of othered places underscore the shared legacy of America's unassimilated
regions whose unquiet images hang like phantasmagoric dream spaces over American
narratives of self and other, center and margin, ‘in here’ and ‘out there.’” (412).
Appalachia as an imagined space ruptures the understanding of the US as an unparalleled land of
progress and wealth. Appalachians are frequently described as both quintessentially American
and different, monstrous others.
Early local color14 stories discussed Appalachians as permanent pioneers. The people
of the region were supposedly English and Scottish settlers whose isolation from modernity in
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Local color refers to a type of American regional literature popular in the late 19th and early
20th centuries. Journalists and writers of fiction produced work that supposedly captured the
traditional cultures of specific areas. Authors such as John Fox Jr. and Muriel Earley Sheppard
produced such stories about Appalachia, helping to make public a specific notion of the region
and its cultural traits.
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the mountains made their lives more reflective of colonial American culture than contemporary
times. These hillbillies were trapped in the past, but they were often portrayed as harmless,
honest, hardworking, and simple (Billings, Norman, and Ledford 2000; Harkins 2004; McNeil
1995; Pudup, Billings, and Waller 1995). Local color literature did not present Appalachians
purely negatively, but it constructed Appalachians in a patronizing manner—they were somehow
both the ancestors and the children of the nation, in dire need of intervention to bring them up to
speed with modern life. Will Wallace Harney ([1873] 1995) emphasized Appalachians’ “marked
peculiarities of the anatomical frame” (48) and their strange bastardization of the English
language. James Lane Allen ([1892] 1995) characterized the people of Appalachian Kentucky as
trapped in the past, though very hospitable. In a famous description of the region, William
Goodell Frost ([1899] 1995) claimed that Appalachia featured “a contemporary survival of that
pioneer life which has been such a striking feature in American history” (93). Though his speech
depicts Appalachians as good-natured and hardworking, he also emphasizes their need to learn
about modern ways. Missionaries and progressive reformers attempted to do just that, moving
South and into the mountains in order to educate Appalachians about religion, sanitation, and
“proper” diet, (Billings, Norman, and Ledford 2000; Engelhardt 2005, 2011) and to provide
formal schooling (Pudup, Billings, and Waller 1995). Over time, the imaginary of a redeemable
Appalachia transformed into a larger problem: Appalachia could not be saved.
Beginning in the early 20th century and intensifying over the following decades, the
image of the Appalachian fool began to acquire to new set of features. No longer were
Appalachians a curious link to colonial America—instead they were violent, lazy, and inbred.
The hillbilly character in popular culture became more fearsome, frequently drunk and violent
(Ballard 2000; Harkins 2004). Stories of the supposed tradition of feuding became popular, and
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the wider American public imagined Hatfields and McCoys populating every mountain hillside
(Blee and Billings 2000; Waller 1995), in spite of the fact that feuds remained rare and isolated,
hardly a feature of Appalachian culture.
By the 1960s and following decades, popular culture presented Appalachians as
backwards, stupid, and comedic at the best of times (for example, The Beverly Hillbillies), and
violent and sexually deviant at worst (Scott 2010). Films such as Deliverance and Wrong Turn
made clear that Appalachia was a profoundly “other” region, one that ordinary suburban
Americans should fear (Scott 2010). Harkins (2004) argues that the figure of the “hillbilly”
solidifies in the 1940s and onward, and that by the 1970s and 1980s it merges with terms like
“redneck” in the creation of a fictitious, united Southern region. Appalachia became much larger,
engulfing the entire US South. During the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, cartoons portrayed Clinton
as an Ozarkian hillbilly, associating his purported sexual deviance with the same traits
traditionally applied to Appalachians (Harkins 2004). McElya (2001) documents a similar trend
in which Clinton’s sexual proclivities, rendered deviant, are subsumed into the figure of the
lower-class white Southerner. The imaginary of Appalachia and its residents had not only spread,
it had solidified its place culturally as an area beyond the reach of modernity and civilization.
In addition to the broader social imaginary I have just described, other Appalachian
imaginaries are more closely focused. Gender and race in particular shape notions of the region
on a national scale. Appalachia is continually imagined as a wholly white region, erasing the
native residents of the area as well as the role that slavery played in many Appalachian
communities (Inscoe 1995). Appalachian women have also been the locus of specific
representations at least since the local color writers began to chronicle the region.
Kephart ([1913] 1976), a travel writer who lived for years in the Great Smoky Mountains
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of North Carolina, described mountain women in a manner that became part of the Appalachian
social imaginary. He writes,
“Many of the women are pretty in youth; but hard toil in house and field, early marriage,
frequent child-bearing with shockingly poor attention, and ignorance or defiance of the plainest
necessities of hygiene, soon warp and age them. At thirty or thirty-five a mountain woman is apt
to have a worn and faded look, with form prematurely bent…” ([1913] 1976, 288-289).
Appalachian women seemed to be either buxom and blooming or withered grannies. Kephart
notes their “frequent child-bearing” and “early marriage,” two purported features of mountain
women that other authors described as child marriage and extreme fecundity. James Lane Allen
([1892] 1995) noted, “Marriages take place early, and they are a most fecund race…There is
among the people a low standard of morality in their domestic relations” (69). John Fox, Jr.
([1901] 1995) gives a similar description, writing, “I can say that in the Kentucky
mountains…pretty girls are, however, rare; for usually the women are stoop-shouldered and
large waisted from working in the fields and lifting heavy weights” (134). Mountain women are
largely portrayed as tough and as victims of circumstance—the harsh wilderness and their lazy
husbands create work for them that differentiates them from the middle and upper class white
women of other regions.
Engelhardt (2005) relates this portrayal of Appalachian women to later popular culture.
She notes that we see the same dynamic mirrored in characters from The Beverly Hillbillies,
where mountain women can fit into two related prototypes: the young, attractive Elly May or the
elderly, withered Granny Clampett. Engelhardt argues that these two characters are essentially
the same woman, writing that Elly May is “the one with illusory sexual power who married
early, had too many children, got old before her time, and turned into Granny” (2005, 3).
Engelhardt further notes that contemporary images of Appalachian women do not hinge solely
on looks; rather, they also proscribe particular behavioral patterns. Appalachian women’s
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association with child marriage and large families shifts into an implication of promiscuity and
sexual deviance, and they are typically shown as engaging in violence, emphasizing their
inability to conduct themselves as proper white women. White womanhood in the South has
traditionally been juxtaposed to black womanhood, with white women imagined as pure,
delicate, and moral, and black women as loose, bawdy, and aggressive, (Ammons 2003; Bogle
2001; Glymph 2008; White 1999). However, when we draw Appalachian white womanhood into
the same picture, it becomes clear that these white women are also held up as contrasts to proper
white womanhood. Engelhardt notes this similarity, writing, “Without flattening difference, and
without denying the violence that could accompany African American stereotypes but rarely
accompanied Appalachian ones, are there historical comparisons and analogies between…the
language used to describe Mammy and Granny, Jezebel and Elly May?” (2005, 15). It is clear
that these two types of deviant womanhood are analogous, yet the construction of Appalachian
womanhood as exclusively white also performs an erasure of the existence of black Appalachian
women, mirroring the relationship between stories of Betsy and Frankie Silver.
An integral part of the imaginary of Appalachia is the region’s perceived whiteness. This
whiteness has been key to the political discourse surrounding Appalachia that constructs it as a
space simultaneously redeemable and damned. Whether Appalachia and its residents can be
helped or should be shunned depends largely on the anxieties of the broader population of white
Americans, and whether Frankie Silver is a violent hillbilly woman, a sympathetic, victimized
Southern “lady,” or both, depends on her whiteness.
In Harkins’ (2004) history of the formation of the hillbilly stereotype, he notes that “The
hillbilly image’s duality grew out of and was inextricably linked to its white racial
status…middle-class white Americans could see these people as a fascinating and exotic ‘other’
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akin to Native Americans or Blacks, while at the same time sympathize with them as poorer and
less modern versions of themselves” (7). Appalachia is synonymous with this notion of its
residents as white “others.” Because Appalachia is imagined as the domain of the white hillbilly,
the presence of communities of color in the region are erased in the national imagination.
Engelhardt (2005) argues that when confronting Appalachian stereotypes, many claim that “They
couldn’t make a joke like that about black people” (2). This sentiment relies on the assumption
that there are no black Appalachians. This also performs an erasure of the native residents of
Appalachia, tribes such as the Cherokee that remain in the region. Appalachia imagined as
always-already white simultaneously covers the history of the region’s colonization, the forced
migration of Native peoples, and the fact of slavery’s existence.
Local color writers contributed to the notion that the mountain South was a space that had
not known slavery and was free of black residents. Kephart ([1913] 1976) writes that “The
mountains proper are free… from negroes as well…Our mountaineers never had to compete with
slavery” (453-454). Frost ([1899] 1995) makes a similar claim, writing, “The ‘mountain whites’
had little contact with slavery and retained that independent spirit which everywhere belongs to
the owners of land” (102). Allen ([1892] 1995) also hints at the lack of racial inter-mixing in the
region, writing “In some counties one is struck by the purity of the Saxon type” (69). Nearly
three decades later, William Faulkner would reiterate the myth that Appalachians were white,
had not engaged in slavery, and had rarely encountered black people. Faulkner characterized
white Appalachians as “innocent” of slavery—like Kephart he still painted them as suspicious
and likely to engage in racist behavior, but this racism did not emerge from the history of slavery
common to the lowland South (Inscoe 1999). The literary myth of Appalachia as wholly white
both mirrored and strengthened the public imaginary, continually erasing the presence of black
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Appalachians.
Though the imaginary of Appalachia does not permit such a line of thought, the fact
cannot be avoided that “hillbillies” engaged in slavery. As Inscoe (1995) notes, in 1860 every
county in the Appalachian region participated in slavery, and at least 175,000 black residents,
both enslaved and free, lived in the region at the time. Though Appalachia never economically
relied on slavery to the same extent as the lowland South, to proclaim the region “innocent” is
misguided. Yet, as Appalachians began to re-articulate the region’s image in an attempt to draw
tourism to the area, they too emphasized the area’s purported whiteness, staging it is a space for
white Americans to explore their Anglo-Celtic roots (Martin 2000). The only nod to people of
color in the region was the publicity attached to the Eastern Band of Cherokee, who were
portrayed as still “savage,” and presented in clothing traditional to the plains peoples in order to
better fit the outsider image of “real” Native Americans (Martin 2000). The hillbilly, with its
association of ignorance, backwardness, violence, and poverty, remained the mascot of the
Appalachian region in the national imagination.
V. Speech and Silence
Frankie Silver and Betsy do not and did not exist only as individuals, unrelated to one
another. Their stories and their silences are tied together in memory and forgetting to the
Appalachian imaginary. Betsy is a ghost not only because her personhood was legally denied,
but also because she is symptomatic of the blackness that the Appalachian imaginary erases. Her
very presence threatens an understanding of the region as white in origin and innocent of slavery.
Gordon argues that the experience of haunting calls scholars to uncover; Betsy calls us to
uncover the regional erasure of Appalachians’ participation in the legal and personal violence of
slavery. Compared to Betsy, it seems that Frankie Silver garners nothing but speech. The
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fascination with Frankie is also tied in part to the Appalachian imaginary. Frankie fits perfectly.
She is white and she can be construed as either a violent hillbilly or a noble but impoverished
mountain woman. In both of the most common versions of Frankie’s story, the gendered and
raced Appalachian imaginary looms large. Frankie is either the jealous wife whose irrational,
violent behavior is reminiscent of depictions of Appalachian feuds (Waller 1995), or she is the
victimized mountain woman who is at the mercy of her drunken, abusive husband. While
Frankie’s story is not hidden by silence like Betsy’s, Frankie remains silenced by both the law
and by folklore that forces her story into the mold of the Appalachian imaginary. As I analyze
the most popular and longstanding version of Frankie’s story, “The Ballad of Frankie Silver,” I
include Betsy’s silence in order to recognize that Betsy and Frankie are part of what Tara
McPherson (2003) calls a “lenticular logic.” McPherson writes, “a lenticular logic is monocular
logic, a schema by which histories or images that are actually copresent get presented…so that
only one of the images can be seen at a time” (7). Lenticular logics are raced and gendered,
specifically in representations of Deep South women such as the white plantation lady whose
existence is tied to the figure of the Mammy. In my use of this term, Betsy and Frankie form a
lenticular logic in conventional tellings (or forgettings) of their stories because Frankie’s status
as the first woman executed by the state of North Carolina depends on the erasure of Betsy’s
case; furthermore, Frankie’s perfect fit with the Appalachian imaginary requires Betsy’s
disappearance. Betsy and Frankie are forever linked by the violence of the law, but they are
continually presented in a manner that makes their relationship invisible.
“The Ballad of Frankie Silver,” though popularly attributed to Frankie herself, was not
published until the 1860s. It is a piece of folklore in the tradition of English gallows ballads, not
a truthful confession from Frankie Silver. However, the ballad has always been presented as the
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confession of Frankie Silver, supposedly recited by her before her hanging. The ballad remains
popular with Western North Carolina musicians, serving as a means of transmitting local
memory about the case.
The opening lines of the ballad present Frankie Silver as frightened of her sentencing.
She is further constructed as fearing the law, which she conflates with moral laws, stating,
“Judge Donnell my sentence has passed,
These prison walls I leave at last;
But Oh! That awful judge I fear.
Shall I that awful sentence hear:
‘Depart, ye cursed, down to Hell
And forever there to dwell.’”
The ballad leaves no doubt that Frankie Silver was guilty of murder. She is presented not only as
remorseful, but her motives also invoke notions of traditional gendered understandings of
women as capricious and overly emotional. Frankie Silver’s motive in her ballad is jealousy over
a possible affair, ignoring the possibility of self-defense. The ballad continues,

“The jealous thought that first gave strife
To make me take my husband's life,
For months and days I spent my time
Thinking how to commit this crime.”
We see Frankie Silver constructed as a wife whose jealousy leads to violence. Popular
understandings of the law are present in the ballad just as popular understandings of self-defense
and premeditation are present in the folklore surrounding Silver’s case. The line above
specifically mentions that Frankie spent “months and days” determining how to murder Charlie,
clearly following the notion of premeditated murder. The ballad also quotes Frankie as worrying
that once in hell she will “there attended be for murder in the first degree,” a reference to legal
language.
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The ballad also contains details of the crime, giving it the specificity I apply to the term
representational fiction. During one portion of the ballad, Frankie sings that “I put his body out
of sight, with flames I tried him to consume.” This describes Frankie’s attempt to dispose of
Charlie’s body, primarily through burning it in the fireplace of her cabin. This spectacular aspect
of the crime is highlighted in the ballad and adds to the deviance attributed to Frankie. She is
made even more unnatural by her method of concealing her crime.
The ballad ultimately serves as a cautionary tale, ending with the lines:

“Be careful how you spend your days;
And never commit this awful crime,
But try to serve your God in time.
…
Farewell, good people, you all now see
What my bad conduct's brought on me;
To die of shame and disgrace”

The ballad lays Frankie Silver’s legal disciplining bare. She warns others against
committing similar crimes—a warning to wives against challenging patriarchal authority within
the home. Note that the ballad passes no judgment on whether Charlie was actually committing
adultery. The blame is thrown onto Frankie for her anger, mirroring the traditional legal
treatment of “hot-blooded” murder as a category reserved for jealous husbands. Frankie Silver,
as a deviant woman, is reconstructed in the ballad as aware of her crime and as disturbed by it.
Her deviance in the form of resistance to violence she experienced within her home is reduced to
petty jealousy. Both the legal system and the ballad silence the possibilities of her articulating
her true motives for killing her husband. Furthermore, her conduct is described as shameful, as
she admonishes the listener to “be careful how you spend your days.” We see that the ballad
gives listeners a very specific rendering of Silver herself and her crime. She is the deviant
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woman who has abandoned respectable white femininity in favor of a shameful existence, all
through her need to commit violence in the name of jealousy. Frankie is the prototypical
Appalachian woman, one who warrants legal regulation for her actions, not only to correct past
wrongs but also to punish her deviance from a white, middle class norm of femininity—in other
words, true Southern “ladies” do not murder their husbands.
What is striking about “The Ballad of Frankie Silver” as a representational fiction is that
it demonstrates a type of speech-through-silence. Frankie Silver, as a maker of her own world
and story, is not really present in this ballad. Instead, the ballad demonstrates proscribed gender
and class roles, and a conventional understanding of the law as a moral code rather than the
product of social actors. From this ballad, the newer “reality” of Frankie’s story is born, however
little it may resemble any of the facts of her real life. Frankie was silent on the day she was
executed, yet she has not stopped singing for the past 178 years.
The representational fiction of “The Ballad of Frankie Silver” stands in contrast to the
silence of Betsy. Not only is there no testimony by Betsy in the legal record, there is also
virtually no local oral tradition to fill in gaps. There is no way of knowing what the relationship
between Betsy and Jerry was, or why precisely they chose to murder John McTaggart, if in fact
they did. No one speaks for Betsy, even after she is gone. If silence itself can be a form of
fiction, what does it say? In Betsy’s case, the representational fiction of silence allows several
inferences: Appalachia is reconstructed as a space without slavery and slavery is constructed as a
system lacking violence. If we are to believe that Frankie Silver is the first woman executed by
the state of North Carolina, Betsy is no longer a person, nor a woman. She was neither under the
law when she was tried, and the lack of memory surrounding her case continues this tradition.
Frankie’s ballad made many North Carolinians sympathetic to the case once they uncovered
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more about it, yet silence ensures that no one will petition for Betsy’s pardon. Listeners do not
need to be told that Betsy is deviant, or to avoid her crimes; enslaved women knew all too well
that the law offered them only property status rather than protection. Because Betsy’s existence
has not been remembered popularly, other fictions, such as Frankie’s, are allowed to persist, and
other histories are allowed to remain ignored.
VI. Conclusion: Betsy Talks, Frankie Walks
Frankie Silver and Betsy are bound together by multiple ties. They (likely) both killed or
aided in killing individuals who had power over them, they inhabited the same physical space,
and they both experienced legal disciplining. In this chapter, I have delved into the ties between
Frankie Silver and Betsy to demonstrate how both “real” and fictional readings of the law’s
silencing power reveal law’s violence. For each of these women, their gender, race, and class
made them non-persons under the laws of their time; for both of them, systems of abuse were
tacitly or expressly legal. For Frankie Silver, there was no option of legal protection from
domestic abuse. Frankie could only protect herself from personal abuse, not legal violence. For
Betsy, the national and regional reliance on systems of slavery made legal any abuse she
experienced—not only abuse against her body, but also the broader abuse of being rendered
property rather than a person. A reading of the folklore tradition and ballad version of Frankie’s
story alongside the silence surrounding Betsy brings to the forefront how law and fiction are
intertwined. In the folklore tradition, we see that stories of the Silver case involve discussions of
legal notions of self-defense and premeditated murder. Even the creative tradition of
Appalachian balladry cannot break free of the narrative power of law, and it confines Frankie’s
story to the law’s structure. Even as Frankie’s story as representational fiction presents
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problematic views of deviant femininity, it silences any possible speech surrounding Betsy’s
case.
In this chapter, I have also linked Frankie and Betsy’s specific cases to the larger notion
of an Appalachian imaginary. In order to understand the political stakes of the silence on Betsy’s
case, we must understand the position of Appalachia in the national imagination. The lack of
speech or folklore about Betsy is a form of representational fiction—it makes invisible the
experiences of African-American populations in Appalachia and the fact that Appalachia has
never been “innocent” of slavery. To analyze silence is to practice Gordon’s method of
“haunting,” to ask why there is invisibility. For Betsy, there is invisibility because visibility
requires confronting a violent history, one that was enacted upon black women’s bodies.
Finally, I have introduced Betsy and Frankie Silver together in this chapter to stress that
their stories cannot be considered separately. These two women are linked because they are part
of a lenticular logic through which they represent the legal creation of whiteness. Frankie Silver
cannot exist as a fascinating, redeemable, white Appalachian woman without the presence of a
black woman believed to be utterly beyond redemption. Black women, both during the era of
slavery and afterwards, made white “ladies” (McPherson 2003). Frankie Silver, due to region
and class, could not be a lady in her own time, but she has become one in some memories.
Efforts to redefine her case do so by rewriting Frankie as frail, delicate, and incapable of
committing murder. In my next chapter, I move this argument forward by analyzing the cases of
Margaret Garner and Edith Maxwell. Maxwell, a white Appalachian woman accused of murder
in 1935, does what Frankie Silver could not—she benefits from the racial politics of her period
and escapes legal disciplining by becoming a “lady,” a paradigm of white womanhood deserving
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of protection. However, like Frankie Silver, Maxwell’s ladyhood cannot be understood without
examining the legal treatment and social representation of black women like Margaret Garner.
In Sharyn McCrumb’s (1999) novel The Ballad of Frankie Silver, one character, when
asked about the legend of Frankie Silver, replies, “I have heard she walks…They say that those
who die by violence often walk” (248). In Western North Carolina, many claim to have seen or
heard the ghost of Frankie Silver (Patterson 2000). Some speak of her walking as giving
testimony to the injustice she suffered at the hands of the law (Patterson 2000). Frankie’s trial
and death have been reconfigured in contemporary folklore and fiction as forms of violence. Yet,
even in these more sympathetic portrayals, it is clear that Frankie remains silenced by the law.
That a similar reimagining has not occurred for Betsy speaks to the power of the Appalachian
imaginary and the continued covering of the stories of enslaved women. Frankie and Betsy’s
stories are a starting point for theorizing how fiction conveys the violence of the law, but they are
by no means the ends of the story that they begin.
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Chapter 3: Property and the Private Sphere in Two Acts: the Cases of Margaret Garner
and Edith Maxwell
I. Geographies of Violence
Frankie Silver was executed in July of 1833. That same year, Margaret Garner was born.
To reach Garner, we must first come down from Kona in the Appalachian mountains that
Frankie Silver called home, and head north and west into Kentucky. Just below the OhioKentucky border lies Maplewood farm, a small property held by the Gaines family, where
Garner lived most of her life. Garner was born below the arbitrary property line that separated
Ohio and Kentucky, one free state and one slave holding, and because of this, she was born
property. The early 1830s were themselves years of revolution—during this period, many
enslaved persons revolted against legal and social systems of slavery.15 In 1856, Garner would
challenge her status by using property lines against the Gaines family—she would steal herself,
and she would attempt to steal “property” in the form of her own children. When a group of men
attempted to recapture Garner, she killed her daughter. Garner’s eventual trial for her escape
became the subject of numerous fictional accounts, such as abolitionist literature in the 1850s,
paintings, novels, and one contemporary opera. Garner’s actions, which were lauded as noble by
abolitionists during her time, became deviant in fictional portrayals just as reconstruction-era
ideologies began to construct black women as unfit mothers deserving of violence.
As we travel east from Kentucky and 79 years into the future, Edith Maxwell made a
series of decisions that challenged legal notions of property and self-defense. Maxwell, a
schoolteacher in the rural, Appalachian town of Pound, Virginia, killed her father after he
became angry with her for returning home late one night. Maxwell’s arrest and trial instigated a
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For example, Denmark Vesey planned what would have been the largest slave rebellion in
history in Charleston, SC in 1822, and Nat Turner’s well-known rebellion occurred in 1831.
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national conversation about women’s new roles outside the home as citizens and workers, a
conversation that juxtaposed Maxwell as a progressive figure against a national image of a
regressive, patriarchal South. Journalists who visited Pound and profiled Maxwell, as well as
women’s rights advocates who took up her case, portrayed the crime as primarily concerning
new notions of (white) women’s independence in conflict with “old” notions of fathers as heads
of households and women as private property. Simultaneously, Maxwell was transformed from
deviant Appalachian woman into cause célèbre, a white Southern woman who needed “saving”
from locals. Maxwell’s case coincides with the rise of Jim Crow and de facto legal lynching in
the South, events themselves closely connected with an ideology positing white women as
constantly needing protection. I argue that Maxwell’s place within the Appalachian imaginary is
transformed in part because of this ideology. Journalists who covered Maxwell’s case portray her
as an innocent white “lady,” incapable of murder and devoid of deviance, a portrayal in keeping
with the Southern and national gender ideology of delicate white womanhood (McPherson 2003)
that required protection from supposedly violent black men (Davis 1983).
This chapter takes up the central argument that representational fiction has a profound
effect on views of violence in the private sphere. Fictions following the cases of Margaret Garner
and Edith Maxwell present differing attitudes toward private violence. For Garner, the fact that
her legal case inspired a public discussion about sexual violence under systems of slavery is
deflected or subsumed to other issues in fictional representations of the case. For Edith Maxwell,
media narratives about Appalachians’ supposed propensity for domestic violence cast Maxwell
as an appropriately feminine victim, serving to legitimate Maxwell’s claim to self-defense but
also locating the problem of domestic violence onto an “othered” space. In this chapter, I first
give account of the history and legal cases of Margaret Garner and Edith Maxwell. In Garner’s

65
case, legal silencing similar to that experienced by Betsy and Frankie Silver is present—not only
did a series of fires in Cincinnati destroy all court documents associated with the case, but more
importantly, Garner was arrested under the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, which barred suspected
slaves from testifying in their own defense. In Maxwell’s case, record-keeping and media
attention has preserved the legal record, enabling better access to the narratives that the law itself
sets forth as the “real” story of the case. In each, fiction not only developed to fill gaps in the
legal record, but also merged with imaginaries of race and gender in the South. Before moving
into a discussion of specific representational fictions associated with each case, I delve into the
themes of property, sexual violence, and self-defense that emerge in Garner’s and Maxwell’s
cases. I then discuss the representations of blackness, whiteness, and deviant motherhood in John
Satterwhite Noble’s painting, “The Modern Medea,” the opera Margaret Garner, and the themes
of race, gender, and region that emerged in newspaper accounts that branded Edith Maxwell as
“the Hillbilly Girl.”
I argue that in both cases, representational fictions point to the importance of the private
sphere in the violence that women experienced. For Margaret Garner, the violence of slavery
primarily occurred in the private sphere and the national discourse questioning the paternity of
her children also hinted at the sexual violence targeted against enslaved women. Early
representational fictions such as Noble’s “The Modern Medea” jettison the facts of Garner’s case
that initiated these conversations, effectively positioning Garner as an irrationally violent mother
and covering other possible motives for the killing of her daughter. The contemporary opera,
Margaret Garner, attempts to explore how Margaret experienced private violence, but does so in
a manner that still offers no space to Margaret’s voice. The opera attempts to insert a wide array
of symbolism in Garner’s life and also opts to speak through Margaret’s character. In the Edith
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Maxwell case, the journalism and photography that brought the murder trial to a national
audience initiated a conversation about patriarchal authority in the home and violence in the
private sphere. Rather than covering said violence, the press instead used the Appalachian
imaginary to displace it, constructing domestic violence as a problem faced by “backwards”
cultures in the mountains rather than a national issue. Representational fictions of the Maxwell
trial also depict Edith as a foil for her community. The national press portrayed Edith Maxwell as
a modern white “lady” who, by virtue of her appropriate gender performance, was not capable of
premeditated violence and did not deserve legal disciplining.
II.

A Modern Philomela and the “Hillbilly Girl”

Margaret Garner
During and shortly after Margaret Garner’s lifetime, she was popularly deemed the
Modern Medea, a reference to the Greek myth in which Medea kills her children as a means of
punishing her husband. However, under the law she may be more properly called a modern
Philomela. In this Greek myth, Philomela is raped by a spurned suitor who also cuts out her
tongue, rendering her unable to identify her attacker or tell her story. Garner’s case instigated a
public discussion about the rape of enslaved women, and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
rendered her legally speechless, disallowing any court testimony she may have sought to offer on
the subject.
Margaret Garner’s life was a life of borders. Her very existence straddled the border
between personhood, citizenship, and property. Born in Kentucky, Garner was born property and
ineligible for citizenship, a legal non-person. The moment that Garner crossed the border into
Ohio in 1856, her status changed, briefly making her legally free and a potential citizen, until the
law determined otherwise. She was, at different times, property, a person, a producer of property,
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a thief, and a killer. She was born near a border, where the state line between Kentucky’s rolling
green hills and the city of Cincinnati had the ability to determine who exactly Garner was. The
Kentucky-Ohio border is itself a social construct—it exists only because of politics and the need
to create determinable spaces for the operation of law and the holding of property. The border
itself must be given meaning. For some it is nothing more than a boundary between two states,
but for Garner and her family it was the dividing line between slavery and freedom. Garner’s
capture under the Fugitive Slave Act, much like North Carolina’s defense testimony laws in the
cases of Betsy and Frankie Silver, enforced legal silence and limits what is knowable about her
case and her life. We know that Garner was born into slavery in 1833 and that she lived most of
her life, save the few days she escaped, in the possession of the Gaines family.16 The Gaines
family was prominent politically in Kentucky and possessed considerable wealth in their
community. Garner’s mother was also born into slavery to the same family, and when Garner
herself had children, they were as well. Garner married Robert Garner, a slave on a nearby farm,
though there are no records of the date that this occurred and of course marriages between the
enslaved were not truly legal. There are no records that preserve Margaret’s views about her life
at Maplewood, no writing or narrative that gives voice to her time in slavery. At some point,
however, Margaret and her husband decided that the borders of Kentucky could no longer
contain them. It was winter, and the Ohio River had frozen. Margaret Garner crossed that river
with her family in tow. She was a fugitive from justice. She stole herself.

16

Scholars have speculated over which Gaines family member or members owned Margaret
Garner. Reinhardt (2010) notes that in the brief testimony Garner was allowed to give, she stated
that she believed “Old” Mrs. Gaines owned her. In my own research into the Boone County
deeds and records, I could find no record of her sale to indicate if Archibald Gaines or another
Gaines family member was the legal owner of Margaret.
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Ohio newspapers remain the surviving primary sources for accounts of Garner’s escape.
They indicate that on January 27, 1856, Margaret and Robert Garner, Robert Garner’s parents
(Simon and Mary Garner), and Margaret and Robert’s children, Tom (6 years old), Sam (4 years
old), Mary (3 years old), and Cilla (9 months old), fled across the frozen Ohio River. Once in the
free territory of Ohio, they sought shelter with Margaret’s cousin, Joe Kite. The next day, a
group of federal marshals accompanied by Archibald Gaines and James Marshall (who enslaved
Robert Garner and his parents) surrounded the Kite house and demanded that the Garner families
be returned to Kentucky. Eventually, the marshals, along with Marshall and Gaines, were able to
enter the Kite house to recapture the Garner families. As they did so, they found Mary
(Margaret’s oldest daughter) on the floor, her throat cut to the point of near decapitation. When
word of the killing spread, a white mob also surrounded the Kite house, resulting in armed
guards having to escort the Garners to the police station. The intention was that a coroner’s
investigation could uncover evidence to pinpoint the murderer of Mary Garner; authorities
suspected that either Robert or Margaret was responsible. By January 30, 1856, both major
Cincinnati newspapers reported that Margaret Garner confessed to the murder, a story that
someone must have related to the coroner. The coroner was quoted as reporting, “Her
determination was to have killed all the children and then destroy herself rather than return to
slavery” (Cincinnati Gazette Jan 30 1856 in Reinhardt 2010). It is not clear to whom Margaret
Garner initially related this information, assuming that she did at all. If indeed Garner was
responsible for this confession, it would be both the first and the last time that she was allowed to
speak about her role in Mary’s death in public.
Garner’s arrest and trial posed considerable problems for the legal system of the state of
Ohio and had broader impacts for the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. The Fugitive Slave Act did not

69
contain provisions governing how escaped slaves should be tried if they committed crimes on
free soil. Because the act was primarily concerned with returning fugitive slaves to their
enslavers,17 18 its provisions largely focused on penalizing individuals and law enforcement
officials who did not return known escaped slaves to slaveholding states. The act also deprived
slaves of the right to trial by jury and the right to testify in their own defense at trial. Garner’s act
of killing Mary meant that she had stepped into legally liminal territory—under the Fugitive
Slave Act, the state of Ohio was required to return her to the Gaines family in Kentucky, but as
an alleged murderer in the free state of Ohio, she potentially possessed rights to a trial. On
February 1, 1856, the state of Ohio initiated a trial that would decide much more than whether or
not Margaret Garner was a murderer—it would also decide whether or not she was a person.
Garner’s trial proved to be a testing ground for many unconsidered aspects of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. First, the case would require a decision over whether the federal law
trumped Ohio’s designated status as a free state.19 Second, the enforcement of the act hinged (at
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It is also important to note that one consequence of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was that all
black persons, even those legally free and living in free states, could be suspected of being
escaped slaves and taken to slave states. Financially speaking, this provided an incentive for
some whites to capture free blacks and effectively sell them into slavery under the guise of
returning fugitive slaves. It was not only escaped slaves whose lives and freedom were in peril
under the act.
18
Federal marshals who did not arrest escaped slaves faced fines of $1,000, and any other
individuals who helped escaped slaves by providing food, shelter, or aid could be punished by
six months in prison and a $1,000 fine.
19
Throughout Garner’s trial, abolitionists who supported her attempted to argue that the Fugitive
Slave Act violated Ohio’s right to remain a free state. Though the Garners were originally in the
custody of the federal marshals as required under the act, their lawyers appealed to a known antislavery judge, John Burgoyne, to seek a writ of habeas corpus. Judge Burgoyne issued the writ,
and the Garners were removed from federal custody and held in the county jail. This act on the
part of Judge Burgoyne initiated a set of conflicts over state and federal sovereignty, all written
onto the body of Margaret Garner through the use of habeas corpus. However, the Circuit Court
swiftly invalidated Judge Burgoyne’s decision (Case No. 11,934 Circuit Court S.D. Ohio), with
District Judge Leavitt arguing that the Garners were legally held under the custody of the federal
marshals and US law, making the writ of habeas corpus unnecessary. Judge Leavitt also noted
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least ostensibly) on the fact that the individual in question was a fugitive slave, a status that the
state of Ohio contested in Garner’s case.20 Third, the act allowed states to waive the rights of
testimony and trial by jury for fugitive slaves, but this provision became problematic for both
potential legal scenarios in Garner’s case (i.e., trial for murder or trial for destruction of
property).21
Garner’s case, in addition to causing a great deal of legal controversy, also brought to
light a taboo topic—the rape of enslaved women by white men. Lucy Stone Blackwell, the noted
abolitionist, gave a speech in the courtroom in Margaret Garner’s favor. Blackwell’s testimony
was powerful in part because she made reference to the parentage of Garner’s younger
children—many in the audience believed that Margaret Garner’s children appeared to be of
mixed race, most likely fathered by Archibald Gaines and the product of rape. The Cincinnati

that “the act referred to [the Fugitive Slave Act] is valid and constitutional law, and as such must
be respected and enforced” (Case No. 11,934 Circuit Court S.D. Ohio). Thus the Garners would
be tried by Commissioner Pendery as the Fugitive Slave Act required.
20
The second problem Garner’s trial posed for the Fugitive Slave Act occurred when John
Jolliffe, an attorney and abolitionist serving as counsel for the Garners, argued that the Garners
had been allowed to travel to Cincinnati on several occasions in the past. Joliffe made this
argument before Commissioner Pendery’s court as part of the claim that the Garners’ previous
time on free soil granted them status as free. Joliffe would make the same argument regarding a
trip Margaret Garner took to Cincinnati as a child. The Commissioner decided to postpone
judgment on the Garners’ case and to hear Margaret Garner’s as well. For Margaret, the case of
her legal status was more complicated than that of the Garner family. Jolliffe noted that Margaret
had been brought to Cincinnati at the age of seven to serve as a nurse while still under the
ownership of John P. Gaines, the brother of Archibald Gaines. Jolliffe claimed that Margaret’s
time spent in a free state granted her freedom, and furthermore granted her children freedom, as
their status would follow that of their mother. Though the commissioner rejected this argument,
it was Joliffe’s only means to claim that Margaret Garner and the Garner family were not
actually fugitive slaves.
21
When Joliffe introduced his argument about the Garner’s past travel, he also highlighted an
additional problem posed by the Fugitive Slave Act: the fact that it did not allow slaves to testify
in their own defense. Joliffe’s claim about Margaret Garner’s previous trips to Ohio required the
commission to allow Margaret to speak in the courtroom. Though the Fugitive Slave Act barred
Margaret from testifying in her own defense, she was allowed to testify to her previous time in
Cincinnati in order to substantiate the claim that her children were not legally enslaved.
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Daily Gazette had also made a similar report, noting that Margaret Garner was “a mulatto,
showing from one-fourth to one-third white blood,” that her infant daughter was “much lighter in
color than herself—light enough to show a red tinge in its cheeks,” and that “the murdered child
was almost white—and was a little girl of rare beauty” (February 11, 1856 in Reinhardt 2010).
Blackwell made the connection more clearly, stating in her speech to the press and public that
“The faded faces of the negro children tell too plainly to what degradation female slaves submit.
Rather than give her little daughter to that life, she killed it” (Weisenberger 1998, 112). Though
Blackwell’s argument was not officially part of the commissioner’s proceedings, her reference to
the sexual violence inherit in systems of slavery became part of the symbolic legacy of the
Garner case.22
On February 27, 1856, the efforts by Jolliffe, Judge Burgoyne, and others attempting to
keep the Garners in Ohio were put to an end. Commissioner Pendery gave his decision on the
cases of both the Garner family and Margaret Garner and her children. All were discharged into
the custody of US marshals and were to be returned to Kentucky, to slavery. A county court had
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Because we have no testimony on the matter from anyone directly involved, the questions over
the paternity of Garner’s children have persisted. Weisenburger reasons that the children’s lightskinned appearance, along with a timeline of Margaret’s pregnancies, suggest that Archibald
Gaines fathered Margaret’s children while his own wife was heavily pregnant. However,
Weisenburger appears to be relying on incorrect birthdates for Gaines’ children in this argument.
To further complicate this issue, there is of course always the possibility that Archibald Gaines
could have impregnated Margaret at any time during his tenure at Maplewood; that is to say, the
birthdates of his children with his wife may suggest nothing at all. The public discourse on the
Garner children’s appearance also represents notions of scientific racism popular at the time—
there was a general lack of understanding the connection of the social category of race to
phenotype, and even less understanding of the variability of genetics and environment
influencing skin phenotypes. It would certainly have been possible for the children to be lightskinned in appearance yet still be the children of Robert Garner. It is unlikely that the paternity
of Margaret Garner’s children will ever be known, as no living Garner descendants have been
located and no testimony from Garner herself is available on the topic. The issue of the
children’s parentage is best discussed on a symbolic and discursive level, as there is no disputing
that the children’s appearance took on significant meaning in the public discourse.
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already indicted the Garners on murder charges, hoping that this would force them to remain in
Ohio. However, Commission Pendery simply noted that he found “no law to warrant us in
making such an order” (Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Feb 27 1856 in Reinhardt 2010). While
Commissioner Pendery expounded on this issue for some time in reference to the cases of
Simon, Mary, and Robert Garner, his ruling on Margaret and her children was much shorter. The
commissioner simply declared that the question was the same, and that Margaret and her
children remained the legal property of Archibald Gaines, to whom they would be returned. At
the same time, the Circuit Court ruled again on the custody dispute, finding that the
commissioner’s order must be put into effect and that the Garners must be removed from Ohio in
the custody of the US marshals. However, Judge Leavitt also noted that the Garners should be
returned to Ohio when requested in order to be tried for murder, writing, “I trust that nothing
would be hazarded by the prediction, that up on demand properly made upon the Governor of
Kentucky, we would order them to be surrendered to the authorities of Ohio, to answer its
violated law” (Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Feb 29 1856 in Reinhardt 2010). While Judge Leavitt
allowed the Garners to be removed at Pendery’s ordering, he also seemed to expect that the
Garners would eventually face trial in Ohio; any other situation would violate Ohio’s sovereignty
and interest in enforcing its own laws against murder. Other politicians and legal actors in Ohio
also clearly expected that the Garners would be returned upon request, as the attorney general of
Ohio requested this much on March 6, 1856. Archibald Gaines had reportedly agreed to comply
with any extradition proceedings, yet by the time Ohio requested Margaret’s return, she was no
longer in Kentucky.
It appears that Archibald Gaines attempted to keep Margaret Garner from facing trial in
Ohio and to rid himself of the potential that she might attempt to escape again. On March 6,
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1856, Ohio’s Governor Chase had his attorney general request the Garners’ return to Ohio to
face trial; Kentucky’s Governor Moorehead found that Gaines had already sent Margaret Garner
down the Ohio River, hoping to sell her. However, the ship carrying Garner collided with
another and threw many overboard. Whether by accident or by her own agency, Garner and her
youngest daughter, Cilla, went overboard. Margaret was saved, but Cilla drowned. The
Louisville Courier reported on March 19, 1856, that Garner rejoiced that yet another of her
children was safe from the violence of slavery. Governor Chase sought Margaret once more,
upon hearing that she had been returned to Kentucky after the ship collision. However, when he
sent an officer to retrieve her he found that Gaines had removed her from the jail the night
before. Gaines would later insist that he had done his duty by making Garner available for
extradition, but that Governor Chase had not collected her in a timely manner (Cincinnati Daily
Commercial April 16, 1856 in Reinhardt 2010). Gaines successfully sold Margaret Garner after
transporting her South. An interview with her husband years later revealed that she died of
illness in 1858 on a plantation in the Mississippi basin, and that she begged her husband never to
marry again in slavery but to “live in hope of freedom” (Reinhardt 2010). The man to whom
Gaines sold Margaret was Judge Dewitt Clinton Bonham, and Margaret spent the last years of
her life as property belonging to a representative of the law, mirroring her betrayal of the hands
of the law during her attempt at freedom.
Edith Maxwell
The further west one travels in Virginia, the more the rolling hills gradually become
steeper, eventually appearing to jut upward drastically, signaling the entrance into Appalachia.
Even the current highway leading to Pound, US Route 23, invokes the Appalachian imaginary by
bearing the official label of “Trail of the Lonesome Pine” when it winds through the Virginia
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mountains. This label refers to John Fox, Jr.’s 1908 novel of the same name. The novel was not
only highly influential in shaping Americans’ views of Appalachians, but national media
repeatedly used it to provide narrative structure for the life of Edith Maxwell. Within the hills of
western Virginia lies the small town of Pound, in Wise County, home to Edith Maxwell in 1935.
Maxwell was 21 years old in 1935; she had recently returned from her time at a state teacher’s
college and was working at Pound’s local school. Her family was not wealthy, with her father,
Trigg Maxwell, working as a blacksmith and coal miner. Edith Maxwell’s income as a teacher
was imperative to the support of the Maxwell family, which included her mother, and two
younger sisters.23 On the night of July 20 and early morning of July 21, 1935, Edith and Trigg
fought in the Maxwell home on Pound’s Main Street. By the time the fight was over, Trigg
Maxwell was dead on his front porch, and Edith was on her way to becoming “The Hillbilly
Girl.”
By all accounts, Edith Maxwell spent the evening of July 20, 1935, out with friends.
Though her father had asked her not to leave, one of her cousins took her for a drive, after which
the two spent the evening at a bar and restaurant. Edith returned home after midnight, which
earned her father’s wrath. According to Mary Katherine Maxwell, Edith’s 11-year-old sister,
Trigg Maxwell was drunk when Edith returned and began to berate her for staying out late and
disobeying him. Edith argued with her father, and a physical fight ensued, though in the bedroom
where Mary Katherine could not see it (Commonwealth v. Maxwell). Both Mary Katherine and
Ann Maxwell, Edith’s mother, insisted that Trigg Maxwell did not appear injured after the fight
with Edith, and that both calmed down and went to bed. Only later, mother and sister stated, did
Trigg awake again and seem unwell. Ann urged him back to bed, but he eventually walked out
23

Edith also had three older siblings, two sisters and brother, none of whom lived at home at the
time. Edith’s younger sister Anna Ruth was also away from home at the time of Trigg’s death.
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onto the porch and tumbled to the ground, seemingly unconscious. The Maxwell women called
for the help of their neighbor, Chant Kelly, as well as the local doctor, who also lived on Main
Street. Kelly and the physician attempted to revive Trigg Maxwell, but were unsuccessful.
It was not long before Trigg Maxwell’s death attracted suspicion. Ann, Edith, and Mary
Katherine all speculated that Trigg tripped on the butcher block on the porch of their home and
died from a head wound. Maxwell relatives, who had arrived at the home by the early morning
of July 21, instead suspected that Ann and Edith were somehow behind Trigg’s death. By 6 a.m.,
July 21, arrangements were made for an autopsy to be conducted on Trigg Maxwell, though first
a funeral home was allowed to take Trigg’s body. Before there was a chance for the autopsy to
occur, the undertaker began the embalming process. Trigg’s body was fully embalmed two hours
later. He had scarcely been dead for nine hours before Wise County’s Sheriff, J. Preston Adams,
arrived at the Maxwell home with a warrant for the arrest of Ann and Edith on the charge of
murder. While Ann was able to post bond, Edith Maxwell was confined to the county jail on
Sunday afternoon. This space would become familiar to her. Within a few days she was
interrogated about Trigg’s death again, and this time she abandoned the “meat block” account.
Instead, Edith claimed that her father was beating her Sunday morning and that she found only
one way to fend off the attack—she reached for a nearby shoe and used it to strike her father on
the head. With this admission, Edith became the primary focus of the murder investigation. She
would have to go before the law.
On November 18, 1935, Edith Maxwell’s trial began in Norton, Wise County. The trial
opened with the examination of Chant Kelly, the neighbor who first arrived at the scene when
Trigg Maxwell died. Kelly testified that he had heard a scuffle in the house and attempted to
check on Trigg, but that Edith had initially turned him away. Later, Mary Katherine allowed him
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into the apartment to help because she thought Trigg was dying. Kelly’s wife, sister-in-law, and
several boarders also testified that they had heard some argument or fight in the Maxwell home,
but none reported hearing anything as clearly as Kelly himself, who purportedly heard Trigg yell
out “Oh Lordy” several times. Kelly also testified that he had heard Trigg and Edith argue
before. The attorney for the Commonwealth, Fred Greear, called several witnesses who all
testified that Edith Maxwell appeared to have an uncommon dislike for her father. Several
witnesses, including Edith’s roommate from teacher’s college, Ruth Baker, claimed that Edith
had said she would kill her father. Conrad Bolling, another acquaintance, said that once Edith
responded to the statement that her father would whip her by saying “I would just like for him to
try it. I would just kill him” (Commonwealth v Maxwell, 48). Everett Holyfield reported that
“she said if she seen him laid out dead, she couldn’t keep from laughing at him”
(Commonwealth v Maxwell, 46). Though Greear asked each time if Edith had given a reason for
these comments, the witnesses all replied that she had not. Later in the trial, Ann Maxwell and
Mary Katherine would testify that Trigg Maxwell was an alcoholic and both physically and
verbally abusive when drunk. Ann Maxwell’s testimony implies that she bore the brunt of
Trigg’s abuse, but that he also targeted Edith and occasionally Mary Katherine. Indeed, Edith’s
older brother had left home at a young age in part to escape Trigg after he beat the boy severely
one day (Hatfield 2005). Though Trigg had previously stopped drinking for about 10 months,
Ann told the court that he had been drinking again for the past six months. If Edith did make
frequent comments about hoping for her father’s death, it seems that it may have occurred
because of her past experience with his abusive nature and her additional wish to protect her
mother and sister. However, this explanation was never directly addressed during her trial.
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Edith Maxwell was able to testify in her own defense at her trial. In many ways this act
represents the intersection of privilege and oppression—unlike Betsy, Frankie Silver, and
Margaret Garner, Edith was not subject to any laws barring her testimony. As a white woman in
1935, albeit a poor one, Edith was the beneficiary of both social movements demanding rights
for women and an ideology that prized white womanhood in order to discipline black bodies
(Hale 1998). However, Edith was still legally and socially rendered deviant by the dismissal of
the seriousness of private, family violence during in her trial.
Edith’s account of Trigg’s death matches those given by her mother and sister. Edith
claimed that she returned home after midnight, on the early morning of July 21, and that her
father appeared drunk. Trigg was angry with Edith for going out, and angrier still that she had
returned late. He began to threaten both Edith and Ann, saying that he was going to “run [Ann]
off” because he “was running this house” (Commonwealth v Maxwell, 120). He also threatened
to whip Edith, and then picked up a butcher knife and came after her with it. Trigg then chased
Edith, eventually catching her and pulling her by the hair into a bedroom. Edith reported that he
“began pushing [her] back and shaking [her]” (Commonwealth v Maxwell, 120) and shoved her
into a chair. Edith said he then began to choke her, yelling, “Edith, I am going to finish you”
(Commonwealth v Maxwell, 121). At this point, Edith claims she felt a shoe near the chair. She
grasped the shoe and began to strike her father with it, saying that she did not recall how many
times she hit him. Edith testified that she hit Trigg enough times for him to release her, but that
he was still alive and said “I’m going to kill her” (Commonwealth v Maxwell, 121). Once free,
Edith ran out of the house to hide from her father. Ann urged Edith to return to the house, and
Edith did, continuing to argue with her father and saying to him, “Poppy, I have threatened to
leave a million times, but this is one time I am leaving…when you are sober, I will let you whip
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me anytime, but when you are drunk, don’t try to whip me—you try to kill me!”
(Commonwealth v Maxwell, 121). Edith testified that she then went to find some belongings and
leave, and at this time she heard Trigg fall. Though the family tried to revive him, it was already
too late.
When Prosecutor Greear cross-examined Edith Maxwell, he played on potential doubts
about her claims of self-defense. He questioned why Edith did not run away from her father
when he tried to beat her, and also accused both Edith and her mother of beating Trigg in the
past. Greear also insinuated that when Edith initially sent inquiring neighbor Chant Kelly away,
that she did so in order to cover up Trigg’s murder. Edith replied, “I didn’t think it was any
honor to tell him we had a family racket” (Commonwealth v Maxwell, 141). Greear replied,
“Didn’t think it was any honor to tell them you had killed him, did you?” (Commonwealth v
Maxwell, 141). Greear’s narrative, which portrayed Edith, Ann, and even Mary Katherine as
disrespectful women who bullied their patriarch, proved convincing. Judge Skeen instructed the
jury that if they were to find Edith Maxwell guilty, they must find her guilty of first-degree
murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, sentencing Edith to 25 years in prison.
Edith’s attorneys appealed, and eventually she was granted a new trial. The defense
attorneys’ argument centered on the fact that Judge Skeen only advised the jury about
convictions of first degree murder without mentioning the possibility of second degree murder or
manslaughter. Transcripts for the second trial are unavailable. However, newspaper accounts
make clear several points. First, Edith garnered the attention of the National Woman’s Party,
who sent attorney Gail Laughlin to argue that Edith was not tried by a jury of her peers as
women were not allowed to serve on juries in Virginia. Judge Carter disregarded this argument,
and the trial went on much as the first had done. Prosecutor Greear made virtually the same case
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as he had during the first trial—that Edith had planned to kill her father, that she had threatened
him many times before, and the women of the Maxwell family had never treated Trigg Maxwell
respectfully. Edith’s new defense attorneys argued that the state could not prove that Trigg
Maxwell had been murdered at all—it appeared that his death could have also resulted from
blood clots or a heart attack. Again, they emphasized self-defense, arguing that Edith hit her
father with a shoe in order to stop him from beating and potentially killing her in a drunken rage.
In the end, Edith’s second trial did her very little good. She maintained the nation’s sympathy, as
evidenced by the large file of angry letters about her case directed to Virginia’s Governor Peery
(Governor’s Papers, Library of Virginia), but she lacked the trust of the jury. Edith was
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 20 years in prison, beginning in 1937. Yet,
unlike the previous cases of Betsy, Frankie Silver, and Margaret Garner, the law eventually
smiled on Edith Maxwell. By the early 1940s, public efforts to free Edith had not ceased.
Virginia’s new Governor, James H. Price, was still receiving letters from all over the country
asking for a pardon for Edith. In 1941, he received an especially notable letter from Eleanor
Roosevelt asking him to look into the case yet again. Price contacted Edith’s attorneys, who
submitted a pardon application on her behalf. Edith was given credit for her time served in the
county jail during her trials, and by 1941 had served four years in prison. In December 1941,
Edith’s 20-year sentence was washed away. She was pardoned by Governor Price, and released.
III. Violence in the Home
Perhaps there is a way of reading Edith Maxwell’s story as having a happy ending. This
is possible in part because her predecessors were unable to use the law to their own advantage in
any way, and because in the cases of Betsy and Frankie Silver, the law was the final arbiter of
their deaths. Though Edith Maxwell was released, she was still legally disciplined, and her case
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still represents a national discomfort with regulating violence within the home. In spite of Edith’s
defense attorneys making repeated, clear self-defense claims which were supported by Edith’s
mother and sister, the jury seemed unconvinced that women had a right to defend themselves
against domestic violence. Edith’s case, occurring 102 years after Frankie Silver’s, demonstrates
an unchanged attitude concerning patriarchal authority and violence in the home. In addition,
Edith Maxwell is not alone in her experience of private violence; that is, the term “domestic
violence” is typically imagined as referring to partner violence or perhaps child abuse, but not
the violence experienced by women under slavery. However, tracing notions of property,
personhood, and the private sphere show that the violence of slavery was also very much a
private violence, one that can be theoretically connected to domestic violence.
To discuss domestic violence as “private” violence invokes the long-standing feminist
interrogation of the role of the private sphere in free women’s oppression. Early feminists argued
that the liberal state relied on a division between the public spheres of work and politics and the
private sphere of the home (Grimké 1838; Wollstonecraft [1792] 2001). These spheres were
gendered, with free, white women cast as domestic angels who were confined to the private
sphere for their safety and comfort (Grimké 1838). Yet separate spheres ideology masked a
troubling historical lineage—women were relegated to the home because of their legal status as
being under the authority of a father or husband, legal non-entities who were allowed no control
over their lives. They were, for the most part, a form of private property, which husbands and
fathers could legally punish physically (Grimké 1838). Feminists writing in the early 19th century
claimed “chastisement” laws as one of their chief concerns for reform; these laws, which varied
from state to state, allowed women’s husbands the power to administer physical punishment
(Rife 2002). Violence in the home was not only legally condoned, but also socially accepted. The
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saliency of the public-private divide was intricately connected to liberalism, resulting in a strong
social and legal discomfort with regulating any behavior occurring in the home. Here men could
maintain little fiefdoms with few restrictions on violent behavior. Feminist legal theorists in the
1960s and 1970s drew on this history when they began to argue that domestic violence should
become a criminal offense (Bumiller 2008; M. Fineman and R. Mykituik 1994; Kelly 2002;
MacKinnon 1989; Okin 1991; Rhode 1989). The term “domestic” became attached to violence in
order to signify that though this violence took place within the private sphere, it was a form of
violence nonetheless, one that warranted public intrusions in the form of legal regulation (Okin
1991).
What is missing from the discourse on domestic violence is the connection between the
status of free women as private property in the home and the legal status of enslaved men and
women. Much of the violence of slavery was also private violence. Narratives such as that of
Harriet Jacobs ([1861] 2004) relate the commonality of sexual harassment, rape, and physical
punishment under systems of slavery—all forms of violence that the enslaved would have
experienced within the private sphere. For the enslaved, their space of “work” was not public,
but subsumed into the private, unregulated sphere of the plantation “home.” Enslaved women
were furthermore legally private property who could be transferred from owner to owner. As
Hartman (1997, 1999) notes, sexual violence against enslaved women was not only common, but
was legally sanctioned precisely because of their status as property—property was considered
unrapeable, and certainly the public-private divide would not be breached to regulate violence
against the enslaved. Even absent the more obvious forms of physical and sexual violence
endured by the enslaved, there remains the legal violence that comes with being considered
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chattel. It is itself a form of violence to be made private property, to be made a “thing,” as Sarah
Grimké (1836) would argue, when one is in fact a person.
If we think of slavery as a form of private, legal violence, we are able to more clearly see
the connections between Margaret Garner and Edith Maxwell. The two women are separated by
landscape, by state lines, by time, and by their races, but they both nonetheless experienced
violence in their homes. For Garner, tracing this violence is difficult. As noted before, the
paternity of Garner’s children was the subject of considerable public debate. If the children were
indeed Archibald Gaines’, then the relationship between the two was inherently coercive to the
extent that, as slave narratives and scholars note (Davis 1998; Jacobs [1861] 2004), enslaved
women could not freely consent to relationships with those who legally owned them and held
immense power over them. However, the evidence surrounding the parentage of Garner’s
children is scant, and Garner left no records and made no statements concerning her relationship
with Gaines. There is evidence suggesting that Garner experienced some physical violence while
enslaved. Abolitionist Levi Coffin wrote that during Garner’s trial, she was asked about a scar on
her face, to which she replied that a “White man struck [her]” (Coffin 1876). Beyond this sign of
physical violence, Garner’s continued, life-long status as private property was also violent.
While scholars have attempted to illuminate specific reasons for Garner’s escape (Weisenburger
1998), we have no first-hand narratives of Garner’s own voice to substantiate these claims.
Garner’s escape from private violence could have included many grievances, but it certainly was
a form of revolt against being property. Margaret fled the legal violence of being made private
property, a form of violence that would have been just as “domestic” to her as any form of
intimate partner violence.
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Edith Maxwell’s experience is more in keeping with traditional feminist discourses
surrounding domestic violence. Trigg Maxwell subjected all of the members of his family to
violence. This violence was physical in nature (Commonwealth v Maxwell; Hatfield 2005) and
stemmed from Trigg Maxwell’s conviction that he should and could use beatings to control his
family (Hatfield 2005). What is most striking about Edith Maxwell’s case is its demonstration of
the acceptability of domestic violence as well as the growing public discourse questioning and
defending it. First, there is no disputing in Maxwell’s trial that Trigg Maxwell was sometimes
physically abusive to his wife and daughters. Ann, Mary Katherine, and Edith Maxwell all testify
to this in court, and Prosecutor Greear makes no attempt to argue that Trigg was not at all
abusive. Rather, Greear redirects the focus, insisting that Trigg was not always violent, that Edith
provoked him, and that the women of his family treated him poorly in general. Second, during
Maxwell’s trial it becomes evident that domestic violence is in the process of acquiring legal
status and attention. While Maxwell’s attorneys do attempt to portray her actions as self-defense,
they never explicitly discuss violence in the home as an unacceptable and potentially illegal form
of assault. The public outcry in Maxwell’s favor demonstrates growing public attention to the
family, undoubtedly spurred by feminists, that calls attention to the family as a space that should
not be beyond the reach of the law. Third, Edith’s case and the broader discussion about the
private sphere relates again to the importance of imagined borders.
First, Edith Maxwell’s experiences and Trigg Maxwell’s abuse demonstrate traditional
notions of domestic violence as a tool of patriarchal power. Within the traditional liberal theory
that influenced legal understandings of the private sphere, it is understood that parents, and
fathers in particular, must maintain authority over their children and power in the home (Kelly
2002). Though Edith was an adult at the time of Trigg’s death, she was also a woman, one who
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returned to her childhood home and whom her father expected would continue to live there as a
child with subordinate status. Throughout Edith’s trial, it appears that most of the residents of
Pound, VA, knew that Trigg Maxwell was sometimes physically abusive, yet this behavior was
not considered abhorrent or even problematic. It was accepted as the right of men within their
homes to administer physical discipline to wives and children. Rather, it was Edith whose
behavior was suspect, as witness after witness reported that she “didn’t have any respect”
(Commonwealth v Maxwell, 41) for her father. Other witness reports make it seem that Trigg’s
physical abuse was well-known within the community, for example, Everett Holyfield testified
that he once remarked to Edith that her father “would whip [her] when [she] came back”
(Commonwealth v Maxwell, 47) from an outing he did not approve of. Anne Maxwell reported
that Trigg “wasn’t good to [her] when he was drinking” (Commonwealth v Maxwell, 75), a
statement that was not questioned during cross-examination and appears to have been acceptable
even to the prosecutor. Edith herself testified that her “daddy was good to [her]”
(Commonwealth v Maxwell, 124), but also later stated that “when he was drunk he come
in…[and] always wanted to pick a fight or kick one of the children or do something to mother”
(Commonwealth v Maxwell, 126). Edith’s admission that her father was often violent when
drunk was not a primary concern for Prosecutor Greear, who instead later asked, “Wasn’t he
[Trigg] forced to go into the mines without any lunch packed for him?” (Commonwealth v
Maxwell, 127). Edith’s testimony implies that she perceived her father’s abuse as somewhat
normal. Greear’s statement implies that lacking a pre-packed lunch is more abusive than being
physically harmed.
Second, at the same time, Edith’s case emerged just as feminists were mobilizing around
political change. Private or domestic violence had been an issue of concern for early feminists,
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and the National Woman’s Party (NWP) was hoping to change public sentiment about the
acceptability of violence in the home. The NWP and other women’s clubs were very interested in
Edith’s case and offered a variety of potential aid—local women’s clubs initially offered to help
pay for Edith’s defense, and the NWP organized drives to petition for Edith’s pardon and sent an
attorney to her second trial. As the discourse problematizing domestic violence emerged, it is
possible that some of the public saw “traditional” family relations as under attack. This concern
has been a persistent trend in the public discourse surrounding domestic violence. As Fineman
(1994) writes, “Submerged barely below the surface in these debates are fears about the future of
families and the direction of relations between the sexes in a world in which feminists argue that
intimacy is potentially lethal to women” (xiii). In keeping with this sentiment, Edith’s case
became a flash point for a larger national conversation about women and violence in the home.
Many of the letters sent to Governor Peery protesting her conviction argued that Appalachia was
backwards in its view of domestic violence and that the region desperately needed to catch up to
the rest of the nation. A New Jersey woman wrote to Peery that Edith was a victim of “the
traditional ‘dark age psychology’ of the jury that convicted her, [which] requires a child to bow
to the father as ‘master of the home’…even though the child be of legal age” (Dec. 7, 1935,
Governor’s Papers, Library of VA). Another group wrote, “We think Edith Maxwell had an
unfair trial. She stood no chance with the jury of mountaineers who are far behind the times in
their ideas of right and wrong, and who still feel that women are mere slaves to the commands of
men” (Dec. 4, 1935, Governor’s Papers, Library of VA). Kathleen Norris, a nationally
syndicated columnist, wrote an article sympathetic to Edith under the headline “Edith Maxwell
case brings to light tyranny existing in many homes even today,” a clipping of which was mailed

86
to Governor Peery with the note “Kindly mail this to the girl’s father” (Governor’s Papers,
Library of VA).
Simultaneously, a close reading of the case shows that the narrative advanced by
Prosecutor Greear and many of the witnesses was that Edith’s behavior, in addition to that of her
immediate family, challenged patriarchal authority in an unacceptable way. Greear’s comments
about Trigg’s attending work without a lunch, and his frequent implications that Edith, Ann, and
even Mary Katherine terrorized Trigg, provide a picture of a home in which women are breaking
away from their traditional roles as domestic caregivers, makers of meals, obedient to rules. It
was this, Greear suggested, that made Edith suspicious. Trigg was a good provider, Greear
argued, saying that he gave his family “plenty to eat, and some clothes and shelter”
(Commonwealth v Maxwell, 126). But Edith and Ann were not remaining within conventional
gender roles—Edith was staying out late at night and talking back to her father. She was deviant,
and Greear argued that this deviance extended far enough to indicate that she has plotted the
murder of her father. Edith’s case represents the central tension between attempts to hold on to
traditional, patriarchal family structures and efforts to move toward regulating private violence.
This tension is also tinged with the Appalachian imaginary and with a cultural shift toward
“new” womanhood, which I will discuss later in this chapter.
Third, an additional commonality between Margaret Garner and Edith Maxwell’s cases is
the centrality of imaginary borders to the larger notion of the private sphere and who belongs in
it. McKittrick defines geography as “space, place, and location in their physical materiality and
imaginative configurations” (2006, x), noting that black women’s lives are often “displaced,
rendered ungeographic” (2006, x). For McKittrick and other critical geographers, geography
becomes a means of understanding lived experience and social construction. McKittrick argues
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that “we produce space, we produce meanings, we work very hard to make geography what is it”
(2006, xi). For Edith Maxwell and Margaret Garner, geography had great meaning on multiple
levels, meaning that was inherently connected to the notion of the private sphere as a space of
legitimate violence.
For Margaret Garner, geography meant the difference between slavery and freedom,
between a law that rendered her and her children property, and one that considered them persons.
The mark of that geography was the border, the state boundary between Kentucky and Ohio. As
Gloria Anzaldúa writes, “Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to
distinguish us from them” ([1987] 2007, 25). Borders are set up, they are made, and they are
imaginary but meaningful. There is no true border, no true geographical distinction between
Kentucky and Ohio, other than that the imaginary line that the law recognizes as real. When
Margaret Garner and her family crossed that line, they attempted to use the law in their favor in
order to become an us rather than a them.
Borders circumscribe not only states, but also spheres. For Edith Maxwell, the relevant
border would not be drawn between two states, but instead would be drawn around her home.
The private sphere as theoretical entity depends on an invisible border between itself and the
public sphere. Feminist theorists have long recognized the arbitrariness and imaginary nature of
the border between the public and the private—that is, the private sphere is socially constructed
and can be restructured. In order to construct the private sphere, the public-private divide and
separate spheres ideology required reinforcement via law and social acceptance. In the 1970s,
feminists would challenge the notion of the private sphere with limited success, resulting in legal
acceptance of incursions into the private for the purpose of regulating domestic violence (Okin
1991). For lower-class women of color, the private sphere would be opened to a different sort of
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public regulation—that of the state disciplining attached to welfare (Roberts 1998). For Edith,
however, the line between public and private was still considered bright, and her trial and
conviction indicate that the public was not yet ready to blur the boundaries between public and
private. The border around Edith’s home made the violence inside of it legally acceptable, even
unremarkable, as long as it was a woman on the receiving end. The mountains of Appalachia and
the sphere of the home mark Edith’s geography, like Frankie Silver’s. Both Edith Maxwell and
Margaret Garner felt and experienced the tensions of imagined borders, making this concept yet
another commonality between their cases.
V. Violent Fictions
Margaret Garner’s case was not only spectacular at the time it occurred, but also it
inspired numerous fictional representations. In this section, I analyze one historical
representation of Garner’s case, the painting “The Modern Medea,” by Thomas Satterwhite
Noble, and one contemporary depiction, the opera Margaret Garner. Each representational
fiction reflects the norms of the times in which they were created, with Noble’s painting
presenting a deviant, dark Garner, and with the Garner opera altering the case in order to make it
representative of a variety of African-American experiences. Both fictions invoke symbolism of
legal violence, though Noble’s painting is subtler in its representation.
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Figure 1: “The Modern Medea,” Thomas Satterwhite Noble, 1867
Noble did not produce his painting of the Margaret Garner’s capture and the killing of her
child until over 10 years after Garner’s case had occurred. Noble himself did not begin painting
slaves as subjects until 1865; this timing has bemused some scholars (Morgan 2007), who
question his motives for beginning a career as a painter focusing primarily on slavery. Noble was
a former Confederate soldier who had lived in the border state of Kentucky, and he was also the
son of a slave-owner. In general, Noble’s paintings of slaves, which typically include depictions
of enslaved women, have been interpreted as sympathetic pieces intended to show the violence
of slavery (Morgan 2007). Scholars such as Weisenburger (2007) have interpreted Noble’s
“Modern Medea” painting in light of his other paintings, also perceiving it as presenting the
horrors of slavery. However, considering the painting in the context of narratives about “bad”
slave mothers and violent, deviant, black women shifts this interpretation. I argue that Noble’s
representational fiction of Margaret Garner highlights her deviance and violence rather than a
sympathetic or anti-slavery view. More recent scholarship on the painting (Furth 1998; Morgan
2007) supports the claim that both historical and contemporary viewers would have recognized
Noble’s depiction as monstrous rather than heroic.
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When analyzing Noble’s painting, I first want to call attention to what the image obscures
about the case. Noble departs from the known “facts” of the case at many points. The most
obvious example is his depiction of the murdered Garner children. Margaret Garner killed one of
her children, young Mary Garner, who was described frequently as being “nearly white” in
appearance. In Noble’s painting, we see not one dead child but two, both boys, and both dark in
color. Two more boys plead with Garner by pulling at her skirts. Garner had only two sons, and
she did not kill either of them. Noble’s depiction of two clearly black sons as Garner’s victims
moves away from the public discourse which posited that Margaret targeted Mary specifically
because of her concern about the violence that women faced under slavery, and particularly
sexual violence. The depiction of the children in the painting as black avoids the additional
question that Mary’s death brought about—the public discussion of Mary’s possible parentage
and the use of Garner’s case to instigate a conversation about the rape of enslaved women. If the
viewer of the painting is not familiar with the specifics of Garner’s case, he or she may suppose
that Garner killed two healthy enslaved children who were potentially lucrative property; no
discussion of sexual violence would follow. Noble also takes liberties with his depiction of
Margaret Garner. She was often described in newspaper accounts as “mulatto” and as attractive,
yet in Noble’s painting she is darker-skinned and fearsome in her facial expression. While
abolitionist fiction presented Margaret as a grieving mother forced to kill her child (see for
example Chapter 12 in Reinhardt 2010), Noble’s Garner appears to be overtaken with anger. Her
mouth is shaped into a grimace as she gestures at her children’s bodies and confronts the posse
before her. It is difficult to pinpoint the source of her rage. Is she angrily accusing the posse of
forcing her to kill, or is she to be interpreted as crazed and irrationally violent? The members of
the posse appear more horrified than Garner does, showing facial expressions of dismay or even
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sadness in contrast to Garner’s wild-eyed rage. If Noble indeed intended the painting as a
damning comment on the cruelty of slavery, it does not appear that he accomplished that task.
Some scholarship suggests that Noble’s supposedly benevolent intentions are suspect.
Leslie Furth’s (1998) analysis of Noble’s early sketches of the painting complicates the notion
that Noble intended a fully sympathetic portrayal of Garner. Though Furth outlines the
symbolism of the painting that could mark it as celebrating Garner’s heroism, she also notes that
Noble’s positioning and depiction of Garner and the crime scene is remarkably similar to the
images in Gothic horror narratives and newspaper true crime accounts in the 19th century. Furth
writes, “In its sensationalism, the picture ceases to function as a commemoration of Garner,
seeking to thrill rather than to edify by noble example” (41). She also notes that “Garner’s image
falls within the lexicon of contemporary representations that crudely lampooned and grotesquely
exaggerated the black body and physiognomy in minstrel shows and in popular illustration” (42).
Morgan (2007) emphasizes Noble’s darkening of Garner and her children, noting that this
presents Garner differently than the typical “mulatto” subject of Noble’s paintings. In addition,
it obscures the politics of sexual violence and miscegenation that were part of the public
discourse surrounding Garner’s case. Morgan argues that Noble’s depiction of Garner must be
read through the lens of the post-Civil War South, when racial separation and eventually
segregation was the response to emancipation. Morgan notes that Noble’s painting appears to
depict Garner in keeping with contemporary trends in phrenology, particularly the common
belief that Africans were physiologically similar to lower primates. Even the title of the painting,
“The Modern Medea,” suggests that Garner was not an innocent victim of slavery. Morgan
argues that title invokes the possibility that Garner was complicit in a sexual relationship with
Gaines (as Medea was with her husband Jason) and that Garner murdered her children in
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vengeful spite. This narrative places Garner squarely into the role of Jezebel, the common
stereotype of enslaved women who were sexually tempting toward white men and whose image
was part and parcel of the notion that enslaved women were overly sexual and unrapeable
(Burrell 1993; Hartman 1999).24 Morgan’s interpretation of the painting is that “Noble had
exposed the monster that southern apologists warned lurked within the mulatto, presaging the
need, many could reason, for policies of segregating black from white soon to be enacted” (2007,
114). Both Furth and Morgan agree that Noble’s “Modern Medea” departs from his pattern of
portraying enslaved mulatto women as a means of drawing attention to the injustice of slavery.
In addition to the doubts of more recent scholarship on “The Modern Medea,” I also
contextualize the painting as a commentary on Garner’s deviance as a mother. The most striking
feature of the Garner case at the time of the trial was the notion that slavery could drive a mother
to kill her child. It was Garner’s killing of Mary that made this case stand out amongst other
fugitive slave cases—it was not simply the legal issue of deciding how to treat crimes committed
by fugitive slaves, but the spectacle of a mother killing a child, that drew public attention to
Garner. Abolitionists quickly pounced on Garner as a cause, emphasizing the tragic nature of her
case. They appealed to public sentiment that was highly favorable to mothers to argue that only a
truly horrible practice could have driven Garner to kill her own daughter. Abolitionists used
narratives of the enslaved family, and especially the image of the tragic enslaved mother, to
depict the mutual humanity of the enslaved and to call attention to the private violence of
slavery. Sarah Grimké (1836) frequently describes the breaking up of enslaved families, writing
that parents must know that “tomorrow [their] master may tear my darling from my arms” (13).
Garner was posited as an inspiration for Eliza in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s
24

However, Morgan’s argument seems contradictory at this point. If Noble intended to imply that Garner
engaged in a sexual relationship with Gaines, why would he also change the skin color of her children in a
manner that avoids discussion of potential white paternity?
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Cabin,25and was also the subject of a published poem that depicts Garner as thinking, “If Ohio
cannot save, I will do a deed for freedom, shalt find each child a grave” (Watkins in Reinhardt
2010, 250).
Cases like Garner’s, as well as other images of noble enslaved mothers, allowed
abolitionists to prey on public notions of motherhood as sacred and the private sphere as
normatively benign. By arguing that the private sphere was a space of violence for enslaved
women and that slavery tore mothers away from their children, abolitionists used traditional
gender expectations as a means of challenging ideas about race. Abolitionists involved in
Garner’s case, such as Lucy Stone and Levi Coffin, were drawn to the case not necessarily
because of Garner’s great need, but because her sensational act provided the perfect platform
from which to argue that slavery disrupted “natural,” benign familial relations. This was the
discourse that abolitionists wanted to use Garner’s case to promote. However, Noble’s painting
gives the viewer little sense of any public discussion of the private violence of slavery. His
menacing, angry image of Garner leans more toward conventional narratives of enslaved
mothers as incapable of properly caring for their children, as prototypical “bad” black mothers
who are violent, irresponsible, and not to be trusted (Ammons 2003; Bogle 2001; Carby 1987;
White 1999). Further, Noble’s change in the appearance, gender, and number of victims
sidesteps any hints at the legacy of sexual violence under slavery. Garner’s choosing to first kill
one of her daughters, and a “nearly white,” pretty daughter at that, spurred general public
discourse that made her case symbolic of what was largely known but unspoken: that enslaved
black women were considered the sexual property of their enslavers, that the children they bore
were often these men’s children, and that the rape of enslaved women was common as well as
25

Strictly speaking, this could not have been true. Uncle Tom’s Cabin was published in 1852,
four years prior to the Garner case.

94
legally and socially accepted. Abolitionists cast Garner’s killing of Mary as both noble and
rational—she chose to kill a daughter first because she suspected that she might grow up to
experience sexual violence. When Noble choose to depict Garner as killing two clearly darkerskinned boys rather than a light-skinned girl, he instead points to a notion of Garner as
destroying valuable property in the form of future workers. Thus, in Noble’s painting Garner’s
killing of her children appears to be a case of revenge against Archibald Gaines (by depriving
him of property) rather than the act of a woman desperate for her own freedom and that of her
children. The painting covers the legal and the private violence of slavery in favor of an image in
which Garner commits a personal, deviant act of revenge.
In 2005, a very different representational fiction again took up the case of Margaret
Garner. Garner’s case returned to the public spotlight with the 1987 publication of Toni
Morrison’s novel Beloved, which was loosely based on the case. Morrison and composer Richard
Danielpour began work on an opera also based on Margaret Garner’s case in 1998. The
Margaret Garner opera is a significant representational fiction for a number of reasons: first, the
opera was one means of restoring the memory of the nearly forgotten case; second, the opera
also contains changes similar in some ways to those in Noble’s painting; and third, the events of
the case are profoundly altered in this fiction in order to speak not to Garner specifically but
instead to a larger experience of slavery and Jim Crow. The opera creates a conundrum—what
does it mean to remember a case like Garner’s, to bring it into the public discourse again, while
so significantly altering the events of the case? In an attempt to write onto Garner’s life a variety
of different experiences of slavery and racialized violence, Danielpour and Morrison created a
representational fiction that calls attention to private, sexual violence but also takes considerable
liberties with both Garner’s legal case and her own voice.
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While Noble’s “Modern Medea” changes some details of the case, Margaret Garner, the
opera, bears little resemblance to Garner’s life and escape. The opera begins with the transition
of ownership of Maplewood Farm, though it changes Archibald Gaines’ name to Edward. In this
narrative, Edward Gaines acquires not only Margaret Garner along with Maplewood, but also the
entire Garner family, though in reality the Gaines family did not enslave Robert Garner and his
parents. A further source of tension is introduced into the story in the form of Caroline Gaines,
Edward’s daughter, who is revealed as an anti-slavery advocate and foil for Edward. In the
opening scene of the opera, the main plotline of Margaret’s rape is established. First, Margaret
discovers that her husband Robert is being sent away to another plantation, and Margaret is
suddenly requested to work inside the house. Later in the first act, it is made clear that Edward
lusts after Margaret. This culminates in his attacking Margaret and dragging her off stage.
Depicting the violent rape of Margaret relates to the initial public discourse surrounding the
case—rather than introducing speculation, the opera represents the sexual violence against
Garner as a means of touching the larger issue of the rape of enslaved women. However, the
opera does depart from the notion that Gaines was the father of Margaret’s children—in the
narrative presented, Margaret’s children are all already born before Gaines claims the farm and
rapes her.
In the next act, a disturbed Margaret makes her way back to her family and cabin and
learns that her husband is planning to help them escape the farm. While Margaret is packing, an
overseer from the farm bursts into the cabin, and begins to fight with Robert Garner. Robert
strangles the man, and he, Margaret, and the children escape Maplewood together. Robert and
Margaret are shown fleeing to Ohio and living in an underground shed. At this point, Edward
Gaines finds them and attempts to bring them back to Maplewood. The Garners resist, and a mob
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lynches Robert. Seeing this, Margaret kills the daughter and son who have escaped with her.
Rather than the complex fugitive slave trial in Ohio, Margaret is taken back to Kentucky, tried
for theft, and found guilty. She is sentenced to death by hanging. Edward Gaines, swayed by his
daughter’s views about slavery, attempts to stop the execution. He arrives at Margaret’s hanging
with a grant of clemency from a judge. However, he fails when Margaret decides to hang herself,
seeking freedom in death.
The changes to the narrative of the Garner case in Margaret Garner represent not a deviant
Margaret Garner but a deep one. Margaret’s character is given voice through song, where the
audience hears her discuss the nature of love, of freedom, and of equality. However, this process
of giving voice to Garner feels eerily like the “politics of ventriloquism” that Reinhardt argues
motivated abolitionists during her case. Reinhardt writes, “there is often something proprietary
and appropriating about accounts of her intentions and aspirations. In seeking to grasp the
particularities of her experiences and how she understood the meaning of her struggles, one
finds, instead, a version of those experiences scripted by others” (2002, 84). The audience also
views a variety of acts of violence against Margaret and her family that represent the multiple
violences of slavery and Reconstruction in the US. Edward Gaines attempts to split up
Margaret’s family, he rapes Margaret, and later a mob lynches Robert Garner. Rolling these acts
into one narrative depiction has the impact of using Margaret Garner’s story to bring light and
voice to a much larger set of experiences than her own. Rather than attempting to write the law
or deviance onto Garner’s body and narrative, the plot of Margaret Garner attempts to write her
story as one that is representative of African-American life across time and space, collapsing
multiple historical events into the opera. While Noble’s “Modern Medea” largely obscures the
private violence of Margaret Garner’s life under slavery, Margaret Garner makes explicit many
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forms of private violence—most strikingly, the depiction of Margaret’s rape, the lynching of
Robert Garner, and Margaret’s eventual decision to hang herself. However, of these three
representations, only Margaret’s rape, itself still a source of speculation amongst scholars, is
drawn from the historical public discourse or legal record of the case. The other two
representations of private violence did not occur in Garner’s case and instead serve to repurpose
Garner’s story, providing additional social, legal, and political commentary.
Private violence within the home is one of the central foci of Margaret Garner. The
opera opens with Margaret learning that her husband is being sent away. Here the opera shifts
from a more accurate portrayal of Garner’s marriage to a man enslaved by a different family to a
representation of how slavery separated families. Hearkening back to the same narrative devices
used by abolitionists, the opera depicts slavery as a system that disrupts the “natural” nuclear
family and denies the love and care that enslaved parents had for their children and spouses. This
type of violence, though different in many ways from private domestic violence, can be classed
as private violence nonetheless. The separation of enslaved families was clearly considered
outside of the sphere of public regulation. However, the clearest form of private violence shown
in Margaret Garner occurs in Act I, when Edward Gaines rapes Margaret. Here the opera
clarifies into one narrative strain a series of speculations that have occurred since Garner’s case
first gained public attention. Margaret Garner’s “nearly white” children prompted abolitionists as
well as the general public to question the children’s paternity, which for abolitionists opened
space for a public discourse about rape. The rape of enslaved women by white men was not only
rampant but also legal (Davis 1998; Hartman 1997, 1999), and given the insinuations that
Archibald Gaines fathered some of Margaret’s children, Margaret Garner takes the opportunity
to represent a common historical reality. Margaret’s rape is also shown in the manner most clear
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to the viewer—that is, Edward Gaines obviously physically assaults Margaret. In reality, many
enslaved women were pressured into sexual relationships with their enslavers through other
means—threats to sell away the woman’s family, or simply the knowledge that she had no legal
basis to refuse and no expectation of meaningful consent (Jacobs 2004). This type of rape, itself
the product of social and legal systems that denied the humanity of the enslaved, is more difficult
to portray precisely because it relies on the viewer to understand the extreme pressures faced by
enslaved women and the fact that meaningful consent is not possible in situations of slavery. By
depicting a physically violent assault, Margaret Garner makes clear Margaret’s resistance
without addressing the more mundane situations in which enslaved women found themselves
victims of sexual violence.
A further departure from the Garner case is the lynching in the opera’s Act II. The
lynching of Robert Garner by a white mob serves to enrage Margaret, who only then kills her
children. This depiction avoids Noble’s portrayal of Margaret Garner as vengeful, and instead
implies that Margaret killed her children because she legitimately feared not only for their
suffering under slavery, but also possibly for their lives. However, the inclusion of a lynching is
meaningful in part because it is somewhat anachronistic. Lynching was primarily a means of
violence used against the African American community after Reconstruction. Ida B. WellsBarnett (1997) argued that white anxiety about black economic and political power was the
ultimate impetus for lynching, making lynching unnecessary under a system of legalized slavery,
when the enslaved could not claim any form of official public power. Robert and Margaret
Garner’s escape was, however, a form of resistance to slavery, and the opera’s inclusion of a
lynching hints at the violence that will come after emancipation. While scholars typically use
Margaret Garner’s case to focus on the sexual violence enslaved women experienced, the opera’s
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use of lynching shows its attempt to include depictions of violence more commonly deployed
against black men (Apel 2004).
The opera’s final scene, in which Margaret hangs herself despite the clemency grant, also
speaks to legal, private violence. Initially, the law is no friend to Margaret Garner. The opera sets
her trial in Kentucky rather than Ohio, and focuses on the charges of theft and destruction of
property (for the killing of her children) rather than the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. The law
orders Margaret’s disciplining, and the word of the law insultingly denies her humanity and her
children’s at the same time. However, Edward Gaines is able to procure a grant of clemency for
Margaret in hopes of winning his daughter’s respect. In spite of the grant, Margaret chooses to
go through with her hanging, ending her own life on the scaffold. The opera implies that
Margaret has finally found freedom through this act. Death becomes the only means for
Margaret to truly escape slavery, and it also becomes her means of resisting the law. She kills
herself, joining her family in death, and deprives Edward Gaines of the last of his remaining
property in the Garner family. Margaret uses suicide as escape and as revenge. The law will not
grant her remedies for private violence—it will not recognize her rape, the separation of her
family, and the system that makes her property as a system necessitating justice. Margaret’s
suicide in defiance of the law allows her a form of personal, private justice in which she makes
her own decision over how she will (cease to) live her life.
Though Margaret Garner may bring to life private violence in a manner that “The
Modern Medea” does not, the opera remains problematic. Catherine Kodat (2008) notes that the
opera has one glaring similarity with abolitionists’ depictions of Garner: the work displays
“surprising thoughtlessness in its approach to ventriloquizing its subject” (161). Kodat raises the
issue of how one can responsibly retell the story of someone like Margaret, when the subject has
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been so successfully silenced during her own time. Rather than attempting to use narrative to
explore this central problem, the opera “is being made to do a lot of work for a lot of people”
(Kodat 2008, 164). The opera’s collapsing multiple narratives of slavery and Reconstruction into
one story has the effect not of complicating what we know about Margaret Garner’s life and her
legal case, but instead of simplifying these questions into a linear portrayal that silences aspects
of the case. Though the opera depicts a rape, it avoids the topic of the Garner children’s
paternity, implying that Margaret killed her children solely out concern for their safety. Kodat
argues, “it might further be possible…that Garner acted out of both motherly love and rebellious
rage” (165). The view of Margaret’s killing her children as an act of resistance or rage is not
explored in the opera, in spite of its being a major theme during public discourse at the time of
her case and its indelible imprint in public memory as Noble’s painting represents. In its attempt
to make Margaret Garner a proper motherly figure, Margaret Garner deprives its subject of
voice just as other representational fictions have.
VI. Fictions of Self Defense and Private Violence
In the days after Trigg Maxwell’s death in 1935, Edith Maxwell went from being a smalltown schoolteacher to a nationally known name, a representation of the “new woman” who
challenged Southern backwardness and patriarchy in the home. The story of Edith Maxwell’s
murder trials came not through paintings but through photographs and newspaper articles.26 The
town of Pound, Virginia, became the physical site for a public discourse about men’s authority in
the home, regional attitudes about appropriate femininity and women’s liberation, and the
26

It is possible to conceive of the newspaper coverage of Maxwell’s case as representational
fiction because the coverage is excessively speculative and narrative-driven. My analysis of the
coverage demonstrates that most newspapers covering Maxwell’s case, especially those writing
for a national audience, were more concerned with weaving an interesting tale than in reporting
the basic events surrounding the case. The coverage is also obviously inaccurate in its portrayal
of the Pound community and influenced by the Appalachian imaginary.
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fairness of local justice systems. Representational fictions of the Maxwell case are different from
those of the Garner case in many ways—as a white woman, Edith’s representation does not carry
with it the same history or narratives, and Edith killed her father rather than a child, invoking
images of challenges to patriarchal authority that avoid implicating notions of the deviant
mother. However, representational fictions of both Edith Maxwell and Margaret Garner speak
(often in their silence) to cultural attitudes about legal interventions into private violence. For
Edith, representational fictions emphasize three key factors: first, media sources presented Edith
Maxwell as a force of modernity contrasted with an otherwise violent, backwards Appalachia;
second, Edith is portrayed as the victim of a biased justice system, raising questions of both local
influence in trials and constitutional questions about women’s legal treatment; third, Edith’s
potential deviance as a violent woman is negated by media’s emphasis on her position as an
educated white woman, a figure requiring protection from men rather than a fierce killer of them.
In this section, I trace how newspaper narratives and photographs use these depictions of the
Maxwell case to produce a complex discourse on gender and violence in the home, one that calls
out for social change while also insisting that domestic violence is a cultural problem only for
poor, Appalachian folks or other “others.”
Newspaper accounts of the Maxwell trial juxtapose Edith and her surrounding
community. While they consistently portray Edith Maxwell as modern, educated, and justified in
her actions, they depict her family and the broader community of Pound, VA in a manner
invoking the Appalachian imaginary. Journalists christened Edith Maxwell the “Hillbilly Girl” in
their articles, but it was not Edith who was truly represented as the “hillbilly.” Reporters
described Pound as a town untouched by time—its position as a rural, mountain, coal-mining
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community made it an exotic location; furthermore, the emphasis on associating Appalachian
values with patriarchal backwardness is evident in national media coverage.
In one newspaper clipping, reporter Edward B. Lockett argued that Maxwell was being
persecuted because she “stayed out too late” in a “community that has lived for decades in a
patriarchal state where the head of the family can do no wrong” (Governor’s Papers, Library of
VA, 44654). The same article describes Maxwell as “pretty” and emphasizes her background as
a teacher, while attributing to Judge Skeen a mock-Appalachian dialect to associate him with the
mountain town and its people rather than educated Edith. Lockett writes, “Judge H.A.W. Skeen
asked ‘Air any of ye a kin of the defendant?’ a chorus of ayes that attest to the close relationships
of the people who live in the mountains here on the ‘Trail of the Lonesome Pine.’” (Governor’s
Papers, Library of VA, 44654). Edith’s “staying out late” becomes a point of resistance—
reporters represent this act as her means of showing a tendency toward independence and
effectively challenging a society she knew to be behind the times. A similar article asserts that
“A jury of mountaineers, who looked with disfavor on her conduct—like that of city girls—has
doomed pretty Edith Maxwell, 21, to spend 25 years in prison” (Governor’s Papers, Library of
VA, 44654). The article includes several anonymous quotes, attributed to mountain spectators of
the trial, that indicate general community approval of men’s “right” to beat children and wives,
as well as approval of the Maxwell trial verdict. Another article, accompanied by a picture of a
smiling, well-dressed Edith, states that “Twenty-five years in prison faces Edith Maxwell, 21,
because a hill folk jury in Wise, Va., upholding the law that a girl cannot be away from her
fireside after 9 p.m., convicted her of the murder of her father” (Governor’s Papers, Library of
VA, 41534). A nationally-syndicated column written under the pseudonym “Mrs. West”
described Edith as “one ambitious girl, who sought a higher education for her own advancement”
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and noted the injustice of imprisoning her for “defend[ing] herself against the violence of a
drunken father” (Governor’s Papers, Library of VA, 44654). Mrs. West further wrote that “Edith
Maxwell broke no moral law. Her father resented the fact that she accepted the fashion of today”
(Governor’s Papers, Library of VA, 44654). Edith is viewed as knowing better the ways of the
world than her small community, and the killing of her father is clearly portrayed as self-defense.
National readers are meant to empathize with Edith, a young woman who represents their own
values and who is depicted as attempting to bring them to a community that simply could not
abandon its old, patriarchal ways.
There is a clear irony in the use of Edith Maxwell to represent the supposed clash
between Appalachian backwardness and national progression on women’s rights and private
violence. Edith Maxwell’s murder trial occurs only fifteen years after the long and hard-fought
national battle to ratify the 19th amendment. The Equal Rights Amendment, favored by women’s
rights advocates in the 1920s and 1930s, still had not passed either house of Congress. The term
“domestic violence” did not yet exist, and the second wave of the feminist movement would
arise roughly thirty years after Maxwell’s trial in opposition to the continuing legal oppression of
women, particularly in the realm of private violence. Just as Leti Volpp (2000) notes in her
comparison of the legal and social reactions to forced marriage, it is only in some instances that
“culture” is blamed for bad behavior. Usually these instances involve a member of a minority
racial, ethnic, or cultural group, whose identity is contrasted with that of mainstream white
Americans, envisioned as a cultureless group. Volpp argues that issues of patriarchal power are
foisted onto these “other” groups while similar tendencies in broader American culture are
ignored. Pound, VA, became the Appalachian other in Edith Maxwell’s case, and the nation
entered into a discourse that allowed for a conversation about private violence and patriarchal
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authority while simultaneously silencing or avoiding any implication of broader national
attitudes and laws that still largely found this violence acceptable. The narrative of “modern”
Edith versus “backwards” Trigg and Pound, VA, ignored the legal underpinnings of the private
sphere that made domestic violence possible and socially acceptable on a national scale. Private
violence could be represented in the national spotlight, but never in a manner that might call into
question the broader precepts of legal liberalism or suggest the problem was more widespread
than Pound, VA, or Appalachia as a region.
Just as the notion of the acceptability of domestic violence was localized onto Appalachia
during the Maxwell trial, so was the idea that local control of the criminal justice system could
result in bias. Journalists and the public focused on potential jury bias in Edith Maxwell’s case
by asserting that both juries were tainted by their loyalty to “mountain justice,” the old ways, and
patriarchy, but also made clear that an additional problem was the state of Virginia’s laws that
barred women from jury service. One petitioner for Maxwell’s pardon wrote to Governor Peery
of the jury: “From what I have heard of Cumberland Mountaineers, I can understand the verdict
reached. Probably they believe in wife-beating, child-labor, and other medieval and antiquated
customs” (Governor’s Papers, Library of VA, 44654). This opinion was likely influenced by the
national coverage of the case, which cast Edith as the persecuted victim of a jury composed of
men with beliefs exactly like those of Trigg Maxwell, beliefs attributed to mountain culture. A
national petition for pardon, circulated by Voice of Experience magazine, described Edith as
“Tried, condemned, and jailed by a jury of bigoted mountaineers…languishing in prison for
many months with her own uncle as jailer…scorned and reviled by her community” (Governor’s
Papers, Library of VA, 44654). The Hollywood Citizen-News reported on March 12, 1936 that
“Edith Maxwell was convicted of murder in the first degree by a jury of backwoodsmen, each
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and every man of whom felt that he had a “divine” right to whip his womenfolks” (Governor’s
Papers, Library
ibrary of VA, 44654). The author of the article urged readers to bombard the office of
the governor of West Virginia with petitions for Edith, revealing an ignorance of the basic facts
and geography of the case.
Emphasis on the composition of the jury is represented in photographs and other accounts
of the trial that later appeared in national newspapers. Not only did reporters suggest that the jury
was biased because of its members’ ties to mountain culture, but they also highlighted the
problem of an all-male
male jury deciding a case such as Maxwell’s. Arthur E. Scott, noted political
photojournalist, was one of the first to capture widely used images of Edith Maxwell’s trial. His
photographs show a courtroom filled with white men, with Edith appearing almost surrounded
by them.

Figure 2: The jury in Edith Maxwell’s Second Trial, 1936; Arthur E. Scott Photograph
Collections, Special Collections and Archives at George Mason University.
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Figure 3: The jury in Maxwell’s second trial eating dinner, 1936; Arthu
Arthurr E. Scott Photograph
Collections, Special Collections and Archives at George Mason University.

Figure 4: Another view of the jury in Maxwell’s second trial, 1936; Arthur E. Scott Photograph
Collections, Special Collections and Archives at George Mason University.
The photograph in Figure 2 appeared in a December 26, 1936 issue of Newsweek with the
caption, “A mountaineer jury listened to Charles Smith, ‘foreign’ defense counsel, then gave
Edith Maxwell twenty years.” Several of Scott’s other photograp
photographs
hs show a jovial, old-boys-club
old
style atmosphere as he follows the jury through their daily lives during the trial. Figures 3 and 4
show the jury members dining together and happily playing cards. Again, the men of the jury are
wearing suits, looking perfectly
ctly “modern.” And “modern” they may have been, but for women’s
rights activists throughout the US, journalism surrounding the Maxwell case provided them with
an opportunity to challenge states that barred women from jury service. In 1935 and 1936, the
state
te of Virginia officially refused to allow women to serve as jurors, and many other states
retained laws that effectively discouraged women’s jury service by making it more difficult for
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them to register or by allowing them additional exemptions not available to men.27 Though Judge
Carter found in Edith’s second trial that Virginia’s jury service laws and the presence of an allmale jury did not violate Edith’s rights, the case remained compelling to women’s clubs and
other groups invested in formal legal equality for women. Much like the women petitioners on
Frankie Silver’s behalf, many women and women’s groups sent letters to Governor Peery noting
that men who killed family members were treated more leniently than Edith Maxwell had been,
and many insisted that the all-male jury rejected Edith’s self-defense claim because of their own
bias. One even wrote, “She should have been given a medal for getting rid of that old brute”
(Governor’s Papers, Library of VA, 44654). The NWP sent the Governor a resolution stating,
“the said Edith Maxwell was tried by a jury composed entirely of men according to the laws of
the State of Virginia, and no woman allowed to serve, the said Edith Maxwell was therefore
denied the right of a trial by her peers, a clear violation of her rights as a citizen under the
Constitution of these United States” (Governor’s Papers, Library of VA, 44654). Though Edith
Maxwell’s trial did not result in significant change to jury laws or other aspects of criminal law
with respect to gender, her case did initiate a national discourse about women’s treatment under
the law. Much of this discourse was cloaked in the Appalachian imaginary, displacing broader
gender issues onto a specific region. However, photographs, newspaper accounts, and public
reaction to the jury composition may have raised awareness about similar laws in other states and

27

The Supreme Court did not issue an opinion fully invalidating such laws until the 1975 case,
Taylor v. Louisiana, in which it struck down Louisiana’s laws that required women to submit a
request in writing before being allowed to serve on a jury. This case overruled Hoyt v. Florida
(1961), in which the Court upheld a similar law in Florida. Justice Harlan’s opinion in the case
indicated that women were better suited to remain in the private sphere. He wrote, “[d]espite the
enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and
their entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved for men,
woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.”
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did bring about a discussion of how women’s violence was often judged more harshly in
criminal trials.
The final narrative of the Maxwell trial is that of Edith Maxwell as sympathetic white
lady. It was not enough that media sources portrayed Edith as better educated and more cultured
than her Appalachian peers. Journalists and photographers presented Edith Maxwell as a proper
lady, which allowed her to more forcefully make claims to legitimate self-defense. Edith
Maxwell’s trial took place in a South that was in the process of solidifying its new racial
ideology. Under slavery, black and white women had been separated by their clear legal status as
either property or person, and, as Margaret Garner’s case indicates, the law allowed any
disciplining of enslaved black bodies to occur within the private sphere. However, postemancipation Southern politics had to adapt to a new landscape in which all African Americans,
not simply a small minority, were free and, at least ostensibly, legally recognized as citizens.
White Southerners began campaigns of social terrorism in the form of lynching and legal
violence in the passage of Jim Crow laws (Apel 2004). By 1935, both forms of violence were
firmly entrenched in the South, and ideologies of race had shifted to incorporate the notion that
Southern white women required special protection from black men (Davis 1983). In order to
bolster Southern Jim Crow laws and to protect the de facto legality of lynching, Southern whites
constructed what Davis terms “the myth of the black male rapist” (1983). Black male sexuality
was made monstrous, and Southern white women were the supposed targets (Davis 1983). The
only way to “protect” white women was to maintain white supremacy in the South, and this
maintenance inherently relied on violent practices (Hale 1998). Even lower-class white women
were incorporated into the new vision of Southern ladyhood—women who in the past may have
been considered unworthy of special consideration because of their class status acquired new

109
claims to protection because such claims legitimated racial violence (Hale 1998). During the
1930s, the white South was still clearly looking back to an idealized version of plantation
society.28 Rather than the intense private violence of the life of women like Margaret Garner,
cultural work such as the novel Gone With the Wind (published in 1936) reflected a racial
ideology that reified the Southern white lady figure and juxtaposed her with both the rapacious
black man and the servile, Mammy
Mammy-esque black woman (McPherson 2003).

Figure 5: A newspaper photo Edith Maxwell teaching inmates to read. Arthur E. Scott
Photograph Collections, Special Collections and Archives at G
George
eorge Mason University.
Edith Maxwell unintentionally benefitted from the new 20th century discourse on South
womanhood. In spite of her being an Appalachian woman who the national public could easily
view as a backwards, violent, and deviant, she was ab
able
le to claim modernity and ladyhood, which
gave her a self to defend. Many of Arthur E. Scott’s photographs depict Edith Maxwell as
graciously ministering to the other women in the county jail. They were uncultured
Appalachians, but Edith is somehow an ange
angelic
lic young lady, shown in Figure 5 teaching other
inmates to read. Another caption to the same photo in the Washington Herald read “Still a
28

The Southern “lost cause” ideology originates in the Reconstruction era as a response to white
anxieties about black emancipation. The early 20th century is rich with cultural work glorifying
“old South” mores, indicating that “lost cause” ideology maintained its strength. Indeed,
Eichstedt and Small (2002) argue that it is still pervasive in both the national imagination and the
US South.
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schoolmarm: Edith Maxwell…is shown above teaching two of her jail mates their three ‘R’s’.
Many of the mountain girls can’t read, write or spell” (Governor’s Papers, Library of VA,
44654). Perhaps Edith Maxwell did indeed spend her time teaching her jail mates, but the
decision to highlight this as a photo opportunity speaks to the effort to fit Edith’s story into a
national
onal and regional narrative that portrayed her as a likeable, charitable, white woman, not
someone who fit into the jail population.

Figure 6: A newspaper photo spread of Edith Maxwell in jail. Arthur E. Scott Photograph
Collections, Special Collections and Archives at George Mason University.
Figure 6 presents a typical image of Edith Maxwell in jail. She is often shown wearing
neat, fashionable clothes, and smiling at the camera. Journalists made much of Edith’s physical
attractiveness, and in her posed,
ed, styled photographs she displays proper femininity and attention
to her looks, appearing for all intents and purposes as a normal middle
middle-class
class young woman. In
fact, Edith’s brother likely paid for her new clothes, as her own accounts of her life suggest that
her family was quite poor and she could rarely afford new or fashionable clothing (Best 1994).
The media’s presentation
tion of Edith clearly appealed to a national audience and a regional
one. Many of the letters petitioning for her pardon come from residents of Southern states, while
over 300 signed petitions come from outside the region ("Commonwealth
"Commonwealth v. Maxwell" 1935)
1935
(Governor’s Papers, Library of VA, 44654). A petition for Edith Maxwell’s pardon containing
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eight signatures from New Jersey plainly states that “From all accounts, the young woman
[Edith] is a lady; towers above her neighbors” (Governors’ Papers, Library of VA, 44654). The
nation seemed ready to accept that Edith Maxwell was indeed a proper young lady whose crime
could be nothing other than self-defense; she was deserving of legal protection and leniency, not
legal disciplining. It was this shift in racial and gender ideologies that allowed for a narrative
extricating Edith Maxwell from the more traditional role of women as paternal/patriarchal
property within the private sphere.29 The general public took Edith’s self-defense claims
seriously because of the narrative of her life and trial that portrayed her as modern, a foil to the
Appalachian imaginary, a “lady,” and a victim of legal bias.
VII. Conclusion
Margaret Garner and Edith Maxwell’s cases speak in different ways about the centrality
of private violence to an understanding of law, race, and gender. Garner’s case invokes
discussions of sexual violence under systems of slavery and highlights the extent to which the
violence of slavery often occurred in the so-called private sphere. The representational fictions of
Margaret Garner address private violence first by silencing, as seen in Noble’s “The Modern
Medea.” Margaret Garner takes a different approach, but in attempting to make Garner’s life
and trial symbolic of a larger set of experiences, the opera uses Garner in a manner approaching
puppetry, making simplistic a complex occurrence.
Representational fictions of Edith Maxwell directly address the problem of private
violence, but they do so most often by displacing the problem and invoking the Appalachian
29

The extent to which we can say that Edith Maxwell displayed agency in her case and the
media depictions of it is unclear. Edith’s brother, Earl, returned to Pound to help her during her
case; he scheduled all of her media appearances and met with her legal team. Earl Maxwell also
helped Edith secure a contract with Hearst industries that gave them exclusive rights to publish
her version of her story. Edith did write several columns for Hearst, but this mostly occurred
after her second conviction.
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imaginary. Rather than viewing the case as an opportunity to initiate a national discussion about
violence in the home, Maxwell’s case became a spectacle in which private violence was made a
distinctly Appalachian cultural artifact, a problem magically absent from broader American
society. Furthermore, coverage of Maxwell relied on portrayals that minimized any potential
deviance or patriarchal rebellion on her part. Maxwell became a modern lady, one who justly
defended herself and required legal protection from a biased jury. While journalists wrote that
Maxwell did rebel in some ways, she was depicted as making a stand against Appalachian
backwardness, not against the overall acceptance of patriarchal authority within the home or
men’s violence against women.
What Maxwell’s and Garner’s cases show is that representational fictions can both reflect
and deflect the law’s violence in their depictions of the private sphere. Representational fiction
holds the power to displace discourses about private violence, and also the power to highlight
those discourses. Whether private violence is addressed or ignored in fictions is linked to issues
of race, gender, and geography. For Edith Maxwell, white privilege and Appalachian geography
combined to create a representational fiction that was sympathetic to the violence she
experienced at the hands of Trigg Maxwell but also problematic in its need to cast Edith as a
“lady” in order to engage in a dialog about private violence. For Margaret Garner, narratives that
presumed black women capable of violence and incapable of mothering are present in Noble’s
representational fiction, and even later fictions attempting to “clear” Garner’s name rely on
tropes that do not fully explore the complexity of her case. The private sphere is itself a very real
type of fiction, with porous borders that can be legally challenged. In the end, those borders
remain contentious but real, just as they were for Frankie Silver, just as they were for Margaret
Garner, just as they were for Edith Maxwell.
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Chapter IV: Symbols of Deviance from Joan Little to Duke lacrosse

“I never liked being a symbol” Joan Little, August 1975
I. Closing Cases
Though this chapter does not close this dissertation, it does bring about its final encounter
with two women rendered deviant by the law. Joan Little, who killed a jailer in 1974 to defend
herself from rape, and Crystal Mangum, the alleged victim of the 2006 Duke lacrosse case, are
the final pairings. To close with their cases brings this work full circle, not only to the case of
Frankie Silver, but also to the intellectual impetus of this project. In 2010, I was writing a thesis
on the Duke lacrosse case while also completing a paper on Frankie Silver. As I contemplated
the respective cases of Crystal Mangum and Frankie Silver, I felt the tug of familiarity between
them. The two cases called me to question their perceived differences and to interrogate why
they seemed similar. The answer, I realized, was fiction and space. Frankie Silver, a white
woman from Appalachian North Carolina, hanged in 1833, was kindred to Crystal Mangum, a
black woman who accused three lacrosse players of rape in 2006. Both women were located in
the US South, and national imaginaries about race, gender, and the South were mapped onto their
cases. Both cases spawned representational fictions, both cases centered on deviant women, both
cases required an interrogation of race and class dynamics. However, to better trace the patterns
of representational fictions over time, it was necessary to fill the temporal space between Frankie
Silver and Crystal Mangum, which led me to the cases of Betsy, Margaret Garner, Edith
Maxwell, and Joan Little. There is much about these women that is different and specific to each,
but there is much about them that is the same. Each experienced some form of violence, be it
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domestic violence, slavery, or rape.30 Each found herself under the eyes of the law. Each case
created a story, a story told through multiple media, distorted, and preserved.
In this chapter, I focus on the final space that the women in this dissertation hold in
common: the space of the courtroom. I have previously discussed the representational fictions
inspired by Betsy and Frankie Silver’s deaths at the gallows and ties to the private sphere found
in cases like Margaret Garner’s and Edith Maxwell’s. Like the women before them, Joan Little
and Crystal Mangum’s cases made their way into the hallowed space of the law that is the
courtroom. I argue that their cases are evocative of the courtroom as venue for representational
fiction. While the previous fictions have come in the form of ballads, operas, and newspaper
accounts, we should not be surprised to find that even the most “purely” legal space is also a
creative one. Joan Little’s case shows that even within the courtroom, representational fictions
reign—Little’s defense attorney was only able to secure an acquittal after constructing a strong
counter-narrative that not only accounted for Little’s killing of her jailer, but also challenged
Southern notions about black women’s sexuality. Crystal Mangum and the Duke lacrosse case
provide yet another angle on the connection between the courtroom, representational fiction, and
violence. The Duke case resulted in a series of journalistic publications that shifted legal
histories and language, invoking the space of courtroom while applying to it a series of elisions.
These texts often invoke much earlier cases involving race and gender, such as the Scottsboro
nine, but twist the case such that Crystal Mangum becomes the oppressor while the white

30

As I note frequently, Crystal Mangum is the exception to this pattern. Her case is complicated,
as this chapter will make clear. While legal actors in North Carolina declared innocent the men
she accused of raping her, she maintains that she was raped on the night she worked at a party for
the Duke lacrosse team.
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lacrosse players stand in as the “Scottsboro boys.”31 Journalistic texts about the Duke case show
how easily the “truth” in the courtroom becomes translated and then remembered as
representational fiction.
In addition to the link of the common space of the courtroom, Joan Little and Crystal
Mangum’s cases also share the common thread of what many scholars term “the politics of
respectability” (Higginbotham 1992; McGuire 2004, 2010). While the politics of respectability
can apply to a wide range of cases, the term has been of interest particularly to scholars studying
the legal treatment of women of color, especially in cases involving sexual violence. Given the
history of the legal and social acceptability of white men’s rape of black women, scholars like
Danielle McGuire argue that the key to black women’s legal success in such cases often hinged
on social ideas about sexual purity and respectable living (McGuire 2004, 2010). If a black
woman could fit herself into the mold of a middle-class, sexually “pure” woman, i.e.,
successfully navigate the politics of respectability (McGuire 2004), her attackers would be more
likely to face conviction. However, because the patterns of sexual violence against black women
are also shaped by racial and sexual stereotypes that posit black women as unrapeable, sexually
insatiable, and undeserving of legal protection, the hurdle of respectability was one that was
nearly impossible for them to overcome. Regardless of whether the woman in question actually
lived her life as a sexual deviant or a “respectable” woman, in the courtroom she would likely be
31

Journalists used the term “Scottsboro Boys” to refer to nine young, African American men
tried for the rape of two white women in 1931. The case was originally heard in Scottsboro,
Alabama, and became a lasting example of the unfair and unfounded criminalization of black
men for alleged sexual violence against white women. After multiple trials and appeals, most of
the defendants were found guilty and served prison time. Later, the alleged victims recanted and
charges were dropped against four of the six defendants, but only after they had all served time
in prison. The case also brought national attention to the issue lynching in the South, as a lynch
mod threatened the young men after their arrests. The case has become broadly symbolic of the
legal injustices common to Southern states, perpetrated against black defendants during the Jim
Crow era.
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deemed untrustworthy and promiscuous, implying wholesale consent to all sexual encounters,
especially with white men. Joan Little’s case is one of the first in which attorneys attempted to
challenge the politics of respectability. Little had already served jail time and spawned rumors
about her sexual activity in her small town; she would not be able to use respectability to her
advantage. Instead, her case represents the use of counter-narrative in an attempt to drive the
politics of respectability out of the courtroom, at least for her individual case. Crystal Mangum
faced a similar situation—her lower-class background, drug use, and work within the sex
industry meant that casting herself as a respectable woman would be difficult. If anything, the
Duke case demonstrates the ease with which the politics of respectability can re-emerge in public
and legal discourse.
This chapter proceeds in six parts. First, I offer brief summaries of both the Joan Little
case and the Duke lacrosse case. Next, I outline my argument about the courtroom as a space that
invites and relies upon theater, narrative, and fiction, as well as a space that inspires fictions
about the law. Third, I analyze the defense narrative in the Little case, with attention to how this
narrative is a form of representational fiction in its attempt to secure an acquittal for Little and to
change popular discourses circulating about black women’s sexuality. Fourth, I present an
analysis of several journalistic texts on the Duke case, with specific attention to how these texts
re-invoke and shift the meaning of well-known past legal cases involving racial and gender
discrimination. Finally, I conclude by bringing the Little case and the Duke case together again,
using each to offer insight into how representational fiction flourishes in and about the
courtroom.
II. Joan Little and the Duke lacrosse case
Joan Little
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Unlike the previous cases of Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner, and Edith Maxwell,
Joan Little’s encounter with representational fiction begins within the space of the jail cell. Joan
Little was 20-years-old in 1974, but her run-ins with the law had begun years before. Little was
born and reared in rural coastal North Carolina, near the small town of Washington. She had
been the primary caregiver for most of her five younger siblings since she was a young teenager,
but her mother, Jessie Williams, was unhappy with Little’s habit of skipping school. Williams
had Little committed to a training school,32 from which she escaped after a week. Throughout
her adolescence, Jessie Williams sent Joan Little from one state to another to live with different
family members. By the age of 20, Little had been arrested for theft, breaking and entering,
possession of stolen property, and illegal shotgun possession. As a young, black woman in North
Carolina, Joan Little quickly became yet another criminalized black body committed to the
county jail.
In August, 1974, Little was serving a sentence after being convicted of breaking and
entering and larceny. She was supposed to remain in the Beaufort County Jail while carrying out
her sentence. However, a series of violent events ensured that Little would not be remaining in
the county jail after all. Three months into her sentence, on August 27, a police officer escorting
a new prisoner into the jail discovered the body of a white jailer, Clarence Alligood, dead in the
cell that Joan Little previously occupied. Alligood’s body hinted at the cause of his death. The
body was nude from the waist down, with semen present on one leg. There were clear wounds on
both the heart and the temple. Next to Alligood’s hand lay an icepick. Joan Little was nowhere to
be found—she had escaped.
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The training school in question was essentially a boarding school for “delinquent” youth,
operated by the state of North Carolina.
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Joan Little and several other female inmates of the county jail would later tell
investigators that Alligood was known as a sexual harasser. Both Rosa Roberson and Annie
Marie Gardner, also black women, had complained to jailers that Alligood made sexual advances
toward them, with Gardner complaining that Alligood had fondled her on multiple occasions
(Reston 1977).33 Joan Little told a similar but more frightening story. She said that Alligood
pressured her for sexual favors many times, and that on August 27 he came to her cell wielding
an ice pick and forced her to perform oral sex. During the attack, Little found a way to take the
icepick from Alligood. She stabbed him multiple times in an attempt to defend herself from
further sexual assault.
Little remained missing for over a week. During this time, she hid at the house of a
neighborhood friend, Ernest (Paps) Barnes. Though the police searched Barnes’ house many
times after Little’s escape, they were not able to locate her there (Reston 1977). Little eventually
decided to turn herself in to the police, telling officers that she had killed Alligood in selfdefense against sexual assault. There was one problem: Joan Little would have to counter over
200 year’s worth of social and legal intimations that black women could not be sexually
assaulted. She would have to prove to a legal system that protected the interests of whites that
she had a self to defend. Rumors already swirled around the small town of Washington, North
Carolina. Little had an extensive criminal record and was viewed by many local whites as
deviant (Reston 1977). Furthermore, many in Washington felt that Joan Little was simply “no
good”—one used car dealer claimed “I’ll tell you one thing, she didn’t lose her honor in that cell,
she’d lost that years ago at Camp Lejeune” (Reston 1977, 6). Residents of Washington implied
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Joan Little also related a story during her testimony in court, saying that Annie Gardner told
her that a “young girl” in the jail had exchanged sexual favors with several of the guards in order
to gain favorable treatment and release (State v. Joan Little, p 190).
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that Little had at some point engaged in prostitution or was at the least a “loose” woman, classing
her as somehow unrapeable because of previous decisions to defy local sexual mores. Little’s
status as a black woman furthered this speculation; the same car dealer quoted above said of
black women, “Hell, to them fucking is like saying good morning or having a Pepsi-Cola”
(Reston 1977, 6). It mattered little to many that Alligood brought an icepick into a cell, or that he
abused his privilege and power as a jailer to demand sex from an inmate. The prevalent attitude
seemed to be that black women, especially black women who were criminals, were nothing more
than Jezebels,34 women whose compromised sexual morals made their bodies undefendable.
After Little’s re-arrest, she was charged with first-degree murder for the killing of
Alligood. At the time, North Carolina’s laws mandated that all first-degree murder charges
automatically warrant the death penalty. Little would be fighting not only for the recognition that
self-defense against rape was a legitimate legal argument, but also for her life.
Joan Little would not be alone in that fight. Her case garnered the attention of local
leaders who had connections to the Civil Rights movement. Golden Frinks was one of the few
members of Washington’s black community who had taken a leadership position within Civil
Rights groups. Frinks often lamented that on the whole, Washington lacked the numbers of black
leadership common to other towns in North Carolina (Reston 1977). When Frinks, along with
local activist Margie Wright, heard information about the Little case spreading through the
community, they notified members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),
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The Jezebel stereotype dates to the era of slavery in the US. “Jezebel” became a discursive
rendering of the purported oversexuality of black woman—they were cast as sexually
indiscriminate, hyper fertile, and always in pursuit of white men. The Jezebel was usually an
enslaved woman who used her sexuality to manipulate white men into giving her preferential
treatment. The stereotype survived past slavery and Jim Crow, remaining embedded in the
national psyche as a statement on black women sexuality. See Bogle (2001), Burrell (1993), and
Collins (2004) for further discussions of the Jezebel.
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arguing that Little’s plight could spark a movement opposing sexual violence against black
women, the death penalty, and broader issues surrounding the treatment of prisoners. Friends of
Little’s contacted Frinks, asking if the SCLC could provide Joan Little with a lawyer. Jerry Paul,
a lawyer for the SCLC, was their preference, and was engaged for the trial. Paul helped hide Joan
in Chapel Hill briefly, before she had turned herself in to the police in Washington, and he
convinced her that he could help her get a fair trial.
From the moment that Wright, Frinks, and Paul were alerted to Little’s case, it was clear
that her murder case would be used to force larger political points. Frinks saw Little’s case as a
possible locus for changing the politics of incarceration in the South, where prison conditions for
black inmates were notoriously bad, and where there were disproportionately more black inmates
than white (Harwell 1979). Paul viewed the case as one that would spark a regional and national
conversation about civil rights and black women’s long history as victims of sexual assault at the
hands of white men (Harwell 1979). Either way, the case was no longer simply about Joan Little
herself. Little, a woman who was a far cry for those typically chosen for representational civil
rights cases, was to become a public figure and symbol, not simply a woman hoping to overcome
a murder charge. It was Paul who convinced Little to turn herself in to the police, and who
negotiated the terms of her return. Joan Little escaped jail in part to reclaim her own agency, but
her escape appeared to offer her little in the way of control over her own life. Little sacrificed her
agency to the law yet again, but this time she did so in order to win her trial.
Washington prosecutor William Griffin chose to charge Little with first-degree murder
under the hypothesis that she had deliberately planned to murder Alligood to orchestrate an
escape from jail. A grand jury quickly indicted Little on charges of first-degree murder, and it
appeared that she would be facing trial for a capital offense in Beaufort County. However, Paul
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acted quickly as well. He first requested that Little’s trial be moved to a location outside of
eastern North Carolina. He also requested funds to hire a sociological team that could best
determine which North Carolina county could provide Little with an “impartial trial” (Harwell
1979, 124).35 As Little’s trial stalled, the movement surrounding her gained speed and strength.
Paul and Frinks were beginning to drift apart, with Paul administering the Joan Little Defense
Fund and Frinks heading the Free Joan Little Committee (Harwell 1979). The two men disagreed
over strategy, from whom to seek funding, and how pre-trial publicity should be conducted
(Harwell 1980). Paul’s defense fund was raising more money and becoming more successful,
eventually garnering the support of Morris Dees, founder of the Southern Poverty Law Center
(SPLC). Dees used the SPLC to solicit money, sending out letters all over the country that
focused on Little’s case. Harwell (1979) critiques the SPLC letters as containing numerous errors
and presenting biased information in Little’s favor—they claimed that Alligood and other jailers
were known sexual harassers, that Little’s previous breaking and entering charge was
“questionable,” and that the state medical examiner was supportive of Little’s version of events.
In contrast, no other jailers besides Alligood were ever accused of sexual harassment, Little’s
breaking and entering charge was well supported, and the state medical examiner had not even
yet been forwarded a report about the case (Harwell 1979). Mirroring the language of national
petitions for Edith Maxwell’s pardon, the SPLC letters stressed the urgency and injustice of
Little’s case, and placed particular emphasis on the possibility that Little could be executed. One
letter’s first sentence read, “Joan Little may be put to death because she defended herself against
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Initially, Paul’s request for a change of trial venue was denied, but he was granted a special
venire of jurors drawn from another county. Paul continued filing motions to delay the trial, and
the special venire expired during that time
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the male guard who tried to rape her” (Harwell 1979, 135). On a national stage, Little’s case was
now symbolic of the injustices of racism, sexual violence, and the death penalty.
While Little was to be a symbol from that point onward, her case was on the verge of a
major shift. Paul remained convinced that a change of trial venue was necessary, and with the
money raised in support of Little, he was able to fund a $30,000 survey by the Fair Jury Project.
The survey found that attitudes amongst potential jurors in eastern North Carolina were such that
levels of prejudice against black people in general were very high; furthermore, attitudes about
black women were especially problematic. Paul’s motion for a venue change was granted—the
Little trial would be moved to Raleigh, where, Paul insisted, levels of racism were much lower.
Judge McKinnon did not claim to grant the change of venue for this reason—rather, he argued,
that extensive pretrial publicity made it “almost impossible to select an impartial jury” (in
McGuire 2011, 264).36
For weeks, Paul and prosecutor Griffin argued over jury selection in Raleigh. Paul
attempted to convene a jury with equal racial representation, particularly amongst black women.
Griffin seemed to concentrate on selecting jury members favorable to the death penalty
(McGuire 2011). Anytime Griffin or assistant prosecutor Chalmers dismissed potential jurors
who were black, Paul objected, accusing them of being racist and pointing out Chalmers’
connections to the Ku Klux Klan.37 Once the jury had finally been selected, it was evenly split
between white and black members. Of 12 jurors, 9 were women, and for the most part the jury
was young, with only 5 members over the age of 40. Paul had succeeded in selecting a jury that
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McKinnon was suggesting that the abundance of media reports had already saturated the
relatively small town of Washington, creating a situation in which Little was already presumed
guilty.
37
Lester Chalmers was the attorney responsible for defending the Imperial Wizard of the KKK
before the House Un-American Activities Committee some years prior.
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would likely be very favorable to Little, with the presence of women of color as well as white
women and black men, all of whom Paul felt would be more aware of issues of sexual violence
and race.
It became clear throughout Little’s trial that her image would shift between that of the
Jezebel and the respectable, defendable woman. Griffin not only sought the death penalty for
Little, but he heavily implied throughout the trial that Little engaged in a deliberate seduction of
Alligood, meant to gain favors and to lure him to his death so that she could escape jail. Griffin
attempted to introduce speculation about Little’s sexual past at many points throughout the trial.
He argued that Little had, at one point, engaged in sexual activity to secure a bail bond (State v.
Little, 126) and that she had engaged in sexual acts with men at bars (State v. Little, 146). Griffin
painted Little as “loose” black woman, a trope that would have been familiar to the jury
members. He even questioned whether the sexual violence Little said she experienced at the
hands of Alligood was truly nonconsensual. When questioning Little on the stand, Griffin asked
multiple times why she did not scream, fight, or otherwise resist the sexual attack by Alligood
(State v. Little, 0002, 228, 232, 245). The direct implication that Little engaged in sexual activity
to gain favorable treatment harkens back to the Jezebel narrative, in which enslaved women were
thought to have carried on sexual relationships with white men, usually the master of a
plantation, in order to receive better treatment and favors (Bogle 2001; Burrell 1993; HarrisPerry 2011; Tarpley 1996). I will return to a more detailed account of the history and influence
of the Jezebel stereotype later in this chapter.
While the Jezebel narrative was both pervasive and recognizable in the trial record, Jerry
Paul had anticipated that it would become an issue at trial. His presentation of Little, both during
the pretrial publicity and throughout the trial, was calculated to counter prevailing narratives of
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black women’s sexuality. Even before the trial, Paul represented Little as “a poor but brave black
woman who had defended her dignity from a lecherous racist and was being railroaded into the
gas chamber by a Jim Crow justice system” (McGuire 2011, 260). While Little’s respectability
had been a concern even amongst her supports in Washington, Paul decided to craft a new
narrative that distanced her from her suspect past and instead associated her with other women
already deemed more presentable. Paul was aided by attorney Karen Galloway, a black woman.
Galloway was the paradigm of respectability—she was highly educated and fit into upper-middle
class ideals. Jurors responded positively to her poised attitude. Paul and Galloway coached Little
on how to present herself on the stand (McGuire 2011, 269), helping Little to craft an image that
would counter any of Griffin’s references to her sexual past.
Little was calm and quiet on the stand, occasionally crying as she recounted the night that
Alligood sexually assaulted her. Her voice was so quiet that the judge had to ask her to speak up
several times. When Griffin accused Little of somehow consenting to the assault, Little stated
that he simply did not understand the complexities of race and gender. At one point Little
countered, “If you had been a woman, you wouldn’t have known what to do either, you probably
wouldn’t have screamed either because you wouldn’t have known what he would have done to
you” (State v. Little, 0002, 152), and “Coming up as a black woman, it’s a difficult thing…it’s a
question of your word against a white person” (State v Little, 0002, 152). Whenever Griffin
attacked, Little’s responses served to highlight his reliance on the common narratives of race and
gender that posited black women as appropriate targets for rape. In many ways, his attempts to
discredit Little backfired, instead indicating to the jury that Paul’s narrative was correct—Joan
Little was an innocent, dignified woman with a difficult past who was now at the mercy of a
racist, sexist legal system. As Galloway stated when describing Little’s assault, “white men in
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the South could do anything to a black woman and get away with it” (State v. Little, 0009, 16).
The onus was on the jury, who were presented as having the opportunity to finally do something
about the long history of legal and social acceptability of black women’s rape by white men.
The jury did indeed do something for Joan Little. After a 78-minute deliberation, they
voted unanimously to acquit Little of all charges. Little emerged from the courtroom into a
cheering crowd consisting of social justice activists and reporters. The acquittal was reported
nationally as a victory for black women, and specifically as a case that aired the grievances of
people of color against a legal system that still relied on racialized, sexualized narratives and
harshly disciplined African-Americans (McGuire 2011). While Little appeared relieved and
cheerful at the verdict, it is important to remember that in many ways, her legal case and her
body became means through which others could speak. Little became more symbol than person,
with her defense necessitating not simply a “true” story of Alligood’s killing, but also larger
narrative that presented Little as a respectable woman who “earned” the right to defend herself.
Little would still be required to serve out the time for larceny that she had earlier been sentenced
to, but she had escaped both the death penalty and a murder charge.
Crystal Mangum and the Duke lacrosse case
Long after Joan Little’s trial had faded from the forefront of North Carolina’s political
and legal discourse, another case involving sexual assault, a black woman, and white alleged
assailants would force the state to entertain many of the same issues that Little’s case engaged.
On the night of March 13, 2006, Crystal Mangum was asked to dance at a private party for the
Duke University lacrosse team. Mangum was a mother of two and a 27-year-old student at North
Carolina Central University (NCCU). She worked part-time as an exotic dancer to support
herself as a student at the historically black university, where she majored in psychology. When

126
Mangum arrived at the off-campus residence of the lacrosse team members, a controversial case
was set in motion. After lacrosse players used racial slurs against her and another dancer,
Mangum claimed that three of the players raped her. Media attention to the story was nearly
instant, portraying the case as a local university sports scandal. The local scandal soon became
national in scale, and in the process multiple meanings emerged. That the case occurred in
Durham, where both Duke University and NCCU are located, brought to the surface the deep
racial and gendered tensions existing between the universities as well as in the region as a whole.
The Durham community was strained by the case as it brought to the surface long-standing racial
tensions between the mostly white students at Duke University and the African-American
population of Durham. Duke University and Durham form their own specific political
geography—Duke remains 51% white at the undergraduate level, and 10% of undergraduates
students are African American, while Durham is roughly 45% white and 43% African American.
Duke is a private institution with tuition currently costing $45,376 per year, which is nearly as
high as the median income in Durham ($47,384 for a household). It is no surprise that long
before the lacrosse case broke, Durham residents viewed Duke University as a space of privilege
and its students as primarily wealthy, white outsiders (only 15% of Duke students are North
Carolina residents). Many in the Durham community viewed the Duke case as the culmination of
long-standing tensions between the university and the city, especially around issues of race,
wealth, and student behavior. Mangum asserted that the lacrosse players who had raped her had
all been white, and most members of Duke University’s lacrosse team were white, upper-class
men.
The alleged assailants in the Duke lacrosse case did not stand trial, making this case
different from many of the controversial cases that I have analyzed in this thesis. Though three
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men were indicted on charges of rape and kidnapping, the North Carolina attorney general
dropped the charges over a year later in April 2007. However, the events that occurred before
the charges were dropped constitute an unofficial trial, one in which public opinion, narrative
tropes, and actual legal procedures overlap. While the Duke case did not involve a narrative set
within the courtroom, it did inspire a series of narratives about the courtroom that became
symbolic of larger anxieties surrounding legal changes.
None of the parties in the case dispute that the Duke lacrosse team hired two exotic
dancers through an outcall service on March 13, 2006. They knew little about which women
would be sent to the party, with many accounts stressing that they requested white women. Two
dancers arrived separately at the off-campus residence used by the lacrosse players—Crystal
Mangum and Kim Roberts. Upon arrival, both women claim that the lacrosse players treated
them rudely, made violent sexual remarks toward them,38 and used a racial slur against them.39 40
Mangum claims to have left the party once, but states that Roberts convinced her to return. After
Mangum returned to the party, she told police that several men locked her in a bathroom in the
house and raped her. Mangum described fighting with the three young men and also claimed that
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Roberts, Mangum, and members of the lacrosse team recalled a particular remark that both
Roberts and Mangum perceived as a threat. At one point during the show, a dancer asked if there
were any sex toys at the party they could use. Roberts then joked that the lacrosse players present
wouldn’t do and insulted one player’s penis size. Another player responded that they could just
use a broomstick as a sex toy. While the lacrosse players presented this exchange as crude
banter, Roberts and Mangum argued that they felt threatened by the suggestion.
39
The racial slur occurred when Mangum and Roberts attempted to leave the party. They had not
finished their set, but were angry with the overall tone of the event. As they were leaving the
residence, Roberts reportedly called the lacrosse players “short dick white boys,” and one
responded that “we asked for whites not niggers.” Another attendee told the women to “thank
your grandpa for my cotton shirt.”
40
In addition to the racial slurs and broomstick comment, an email sent shortly after the party by
Ryan McFayden, another member of the lacrosse team, contained violent language. In the email,
McFayden described a violent sexual fantasy about torturing and killing two strippers.
McFayden claimed the email was meant as a humorous reference to the novel American Psycho.
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they used racial slurs against her during the attack. When she was released from the bathroom,
she left with Roberts.
Roberts and Mangum left the party with a driver. The driver took them to a grocery store
parking lot, where Roberts notified a security officer that Mangum was acting oddly and would
not leave the vehicle. The security officer notified police, and Mangum was taken to a local
hospital. Only after police repeatedly questioned Mangum at the hospital did she report the rape
(Dopart and Stevenson 2006; Neff 2006).
By April 18, two lacrosse players, Collin Finnerty and Reade Seligmann, were arrested
and charged with rape and kidnapping. Nearly a month later David Evans, another lacrosse
player, was arrested on the same charges. Though all three were indicted by a grand jury, their
DNA could not be connected to the crime (Neff 2006). Both Evans and Seligmann produced
alibis, and a second DNA test also failed to connect them to the crime. Nearly a year later, the
NC attorney general declared all three “innocent” (Blythe 2007). In the meantime, the defense
attorneys and the parents of the alleged assailants were given considerable local and national
press access (Kenney 2006); in particular the defense team repeatedly introduced doubt about
Mangum’s allegations to local media.41 Even the faculty of Duke weighed in on the issue, with
the “Group of 88,” made up of 88 faculty members, placing an ad in the university newspaper
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For examples, see the following local North Carolina newspaper articles: Blythe, "Nifong cites
attacker ID, says more tests pending," The News & Observer, April 12, 2006, Gronberg,
"Defense team wants rape evidence quickly," The Herald-Sun, May 16, 2006, Neff, Niolet and
Blythe, "Accuser in Duke lacrosse case wanted money, man says," The News & Observer,
November 4, 2006, Neff, Niolet and Blythe, "Lab chief: Nifong said don't report all DNA data,"
The News & Observer, December 16, 2006, Stevenson, "Nifong sticks with lacrosse case; Some
are asking that he dismiss rape charges," The Herald-Sun, June 20, 2006, Stevenson, "Officer's
'omissions' targeted in lacrosse motion; Seligmann attorneys question police findings," The
Herald-Sun, June 9, 2006.
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The Chronicle denouncing racism, sexism, and violence on campus (Chen 2007).42 Other faculty
members showed support for the lacrosse players, while a member of the lacrosse team has
subsequently sued one member of the “Group of 88.”43
Another layer in the Duke case concerns the conduct of Mike Nifong, the District
Attorney who pursued charges against the lacrosse players. Local media, politicians, and the
lacrosse players’ attorneys accused Nifong of having a political motive for so quickly pursuing
what they believed to be unsubstantiated charges. Nifong was running for reelection and some
claim he wished to use the case to appeal to the African-American population of Durham (Blythe
2006; Blythe and Niolet 2007; Editorial 2007; Neff, Blythe, and Niolet 2006; Niolet 2006).
Nifong waited several months to interview Mangum in spite of the fact that he was already
charging members of the lacrosse team for the rape. He also had DNA results tested twice, by
two different labs, after the first set of results did not match any of the lacrosse players. Local
media, politicians, and the alleged assailants’ attorneys began to accuse Nifong of prosecutorial
misconduct, and Nifong was disbarred on June 16, 2007 (Blythe and Niolet 2007). The North
Carolina state bar charged Nifong with making prejudicial comments about the Duke case,
dishonest conduct, and abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Nifong’s early statements to media
outlets and his ordering of two different DNA tests, along with his refusal to drop charges
42

The discourses surrounding the case on the Duke campus relate back to my discussion of
knowledge production, academia, and social subordination. While the faculty in the “Group of
88” used the case as an opening to discuss what they saw as pervasive racialized and gendered
violence on campus, their ability to frame the case in this way was limited by students and
administration who wanted faculty to remain “neutral” on the case. Duke administration and
attorneys for the lacrosse players posited the Group of 88’s intervention as illegitimate, shutting
down the possibility that academics who were directly affected by the case could or should play
a role in producing understandings of it.
43
Kim Curtis, a member of the Group of 88 and a professor of one lacrosse player, has settled
this suit out of court. The suit claims that she unfairly failed the lacrosse player in her class as
retaliation for the attack on Mangum. The terms of the settlement included a monetary settlement
in addition to a change of grade.
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against the lacrosse players, were at the center of the state bar’s charges. Though supporters of
the lacrosse players launched many of the critiques against Nifong, it also important to note that
Nifong’s lack of contact with Mangum displays a disregard for her and diminishes her agency as
an alleged sexual assault victim. Nifong’s conduct made it clear that he was willing to pursue the
case regardless of Mangum’s wishes or the details of her version of events; this does not indicate
a prosecutor who is trying to secure justice for a rape victim, but rather one who is primarily
motivated by self-serving objectives.
The Duke case fell apart slowly, and after a year of frequent media coverage it became
clear that Mangum’s allegations could not be proven. In addition, the alleged assailants had
produced solid alibis, and the failure of DNA evidence to match any members of the lacrosse
team further weakened the state’s case. However, the decline of the case in the legal venue did
not result in a lack of social memory concerning the case. The Duke case remains controversial
and is the subject of many local disputes. Duke University is still embroiled in lawsuits on behalf
of the lacrosse players, who allege that they were provided with insufficient legal council by the
school during the early proceedings of the case. At least one faculty member has been sued for
allegedly unfairly grading lacrosse players in her class, though the suit was recently thrown out
of court. Journalists and other media actors have become the primary means of advancing the
Duke story, and most have used it is an example of how not to conduct a rape case—in addition
to the assumption that Mangum’s allegations should not have been taken seriously, the case has
become symbolic of public and media “rushes to judgment” that ruin the reputations of innocent
men. In the discourse surrounding the Duke case, Crystal Mangum has became an entirely
unsympathetic figure. Little attention is given to the overall lack of agency she seemed to
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experience once the wheels of the case began to turn, and instead she is frequently portrayed as a
drug-addled prostitute at best and a party to a grand conspiracy at worst.
III. Stories in and about the Courtroom
The Courtroom can be both temple and theater. It is a space sanctified, in which learned
individuals (typically men) deliberate over questions of law, handing down “objective” or
“neutral” opinions, the word of law. As Cover (1983) argues, judges take on an almost priest-like
appearances and the law itself a religious connotation, especially within mainstream views of the
legal world as bereft of the prejudices and pettiness of the outer world that created it. But this is
in itself performance, for the law is a narrative that always demands more narrative, or, as Cover
(1983) argues, “law and narrative are inescapably related” (5). Though Cover refers to reading
the law, I argue that law and narrative are also inherently linked in the acting out of the law in
the space of the courtroom and in the way in which stories about the courtroom are constructed.
The adversarial model of the legal system requires narrative and roles. The prosecutor and the
defense attorney must each weave a tale about a crime, about the defendant and victim, and
possibly about others involved in the case (Maynard 1988; Snedaker 1986). The hope is that the
“best” argument, the one that represents the truth, will be the most convincing, and thus justice
will prevail. Throughout this struggle, legal actors will rely on images, myths, and narrative to
construct meaning (Aristodemou 2000) and that meaning will eventually “place bodies on the
line” (Cover 1986).
In addition to the narrative work seen within the courtroom, the space of the courtroom
becomes one that narrative refers to, or that inspires stories about the law. One need only look as
far as the popularity of television series such as Law and Order, iconic courtroom movies, true
crime novels, and purely fictional novels by John Grisham, to see that Americans rely on the

132
courtroom as a setting for fiction that sends messages about the law. As Sherwin (2000) notes,
popular culture about the law and specifically about trials and legal cases creates cultural
meaning. Even when forms of legal storytelling are divorced from reality (i.e., they make no
references to actual cases), they are often used to explore issues of racism, sexual violence, and
how the legal system fails to confront these issues.44 If the courtroom itself is built on narrative,
it appears that stories about the courtroom can also transmit narratives about the law. As Richard
Delgado (1989) suggests, both marginalized and dominant groups tell stories and construct
narratives about the law as a means of sustaining (and challenging) the status quo.
The narratives told within the courtroom, and the roles of legal actors that require such
narratives to be told, prove familiar. As Ewick and Silbey (1998 ) note, “legal actors respond to
situations and cases on the basis of recurrent features of social interactions, rather than from
criteria provided in law or policy” (18). In other words, the types of narratives that we should
expect to see in the courtroom are part of the mutually constitutive relationship between law and
society—familiar narratives in society will appear in the courtroom, and those narratives both
already stem from past legal understandings and continue to inform future law. They can be said
to be “extralegal” only to the extent that the line between “legal” and “non-legal” is configured
more brightly than it exists in reality. The courtroom provides social entertainment—it informs
popular culture and can be observed, in some cases, with the excitement normally reserved for a
movie or a sporting event. Even within the courtroom, theater, entertainment, and narrative come
together in the very system that enables the courtroom to function as a space which arbitrates
truth. Haltom and McCann (2004) write, “In short, the law is inherently distorted—twisted,
44

Two well-known examples of popular culture linking law and identity would be the films and
novels To Kill a Mockingbird and A Time to Kill. Both texts, as films and as novels, address the
legal system’s history of racism and its tendency to protect white women’s sexual purity at all
costs.
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manipulated, reshaped—into multiple forms by ordinary practical activity” (11). This distortion,
which Haltom and McCann observe in media coverage, can occur within the courtroom as well.
While the courtroom may initially spawn fictitious imitations of legal processes, we can also
observe the power of narrative and fiction within the courtroom.
A primary source of narrative within the courtroom comes through the necessity of storybuilding on the part of attorneys. In legal cases concerning gendered violence, such as domestic
or sexual violence, it is narratives of appropriate victimhood that become most relevant. The
prosecutor is most likely to succeed if the crime can be shaped into a story familiar to the jury
and society at large (Bumiller 2008). In cases of sexual violence like Joan Little’s or the
allegations in the Duke lacrosse case, this narrative construction becomes difficult, if not
impossible, if the alleged victim strays from the script of being “innocent, white, and/or angelic”
(Bumiller 2008, 9). Conversely, the alleged perpetrators must be easily identifiable as
pathologically violent men, preferably men of color or lower-class men (Bumiller 2008). It is
clear that this narrative requirement not only excludes many very real rape victims, but also that
it bears a relationship to legal history. Traditionally, only upper-middle class white women
received the utmost in legal protection from rape—their status as the sexual private property of
powerful men meant that the legal system deemed them worthy of some degree of protection
(Berry 2000). Because respectable white women were socially presumed to be pure, innocent,
and without blame (Berry 2000; Burrell 1993; Davis 1998; Glymph 2008; Hartman 1999; Hodes
1997), they were more likely to receive social and legal benefits, not excluding some semblance
of justice if they were raped by an attacker who also fit into the correct narrative.45 The legal
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I do not mean to imply that upper and middle class white women have always been privy to
legal and social benefits in every case of domestic violence. Certainly women of privilege were
also victims of sexual violence and certainly many were not able to use the legal system to their
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system requires such work of the prosecutor. The prosecutor must construct a believable social
narrative that explains the crime, and of course to appeal to a jury the narrative should also be
relatable in terms of social views about gender, race, class, sexuality, and violence.
The relationship between narrative and the courtroom extends further than the example of
the prosecutorial narrative. It is part of the foundation of social understandings of law. Berry
(2000) writes, “Stories provide a frame of reference that determines what each of us believes is
truth about the law. They also shape law and how it is enforced…The stories of the powerful are
the only ones that count” (4). Hartman (1999) echoes this sentiment in her description of the
1855 trial of Celia, an enslaved young woman charged with the murder of the man who enslaved
and raped her. The powerful and already popular narrative about black women’s sexuality
merged with their legal status as property, and the court decided to make legal “fact” of the
notion that enslaved women could not be raped. Williams (1992) locates the same powerful legal
narrative over 100 years later in the speculation surrounding the Tawana Brawley case.46
Williams writes, “were she [Brawley] to have come out of hiding and pursued trial in the
conventional manner, she would no doubt have undergone exactly what she did undergo, in the
courts and the media” (174). Williams is referring to the persistent and perennial doubt about
black women’s claims of rape, especially if they identify their attacker as a white man. Indeed, it
benefit. However, these women were vastly more likely to have access to the legal system and to
reap its results in cases in which they were raped, especially if the perpetrator was a man of
lower social status. This is particularly true if the responses to the rapes of upper and middle
class women are compared to the extreme legal and social disregard (and, at times, outright
sanction) for the sexual violence against black women and other women of color.
46
Brawley was 15 years old in 1987, when she claimed that six white police officers had raped
her. Brawley had been missing from home for four days and was later found near an apartment
she previously lived in, wearing torn clothing and covered in feces. A New York grand jury
heard the initial evidence in the case and concluded that Brawley had not been a victim of sexual
assault or kidnapping, and that she had fabricated her claims. Brawley’s family maintains that the
allegations are truth. The case has been frequently linked with the Duke Lacrosse case in popular
culture.
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is this very narrative that becomes the focus of both the Joan Little case and the Duke Lacrosse
case.
To discuss representational fiction in and about the courtroom is to take aim at very
specific instances of courtroom narrative. This may itself be an uncomfortable project—both
socially and in scholarly conventions, it is more obvious and more acceptable to posit that
paintings, ballads, and operas are fictions. However, the notion that representational fictions
occur in the space of the courtroom may be more difficult to accept in part because of the social
and political investment in privileging that very space as objective and truthful. I have argued (as
have others) that narrative within the courtroom is part and parcel of the everyday proceedings of
the law (Berry 2000; Bumiller 2008; Ewick and Silbey 1995, 1998 ). Representational fictions
fall under the broader umbrella of legal narratives, but are more specific in that they transmit
information about individual cases. They move beyond simple legal narrative in that the “story”
in question must carry with it broader social meanings about race, gender, sexuality, and/or class.
While the prosecutor must always offer some narrative that ties the defendant to the crime, the
prosecutor is in no way required to construct this narrative around specific social assumptions
about race or gender.
For the narrative to cross into the category of representational fiction, Hall’s “work of
representation” must take place—the narrative must both reflect and inform contemporary
understandings of identity. This is precisely the move that occurs in Joan Little’s case and in the
Duke Lacrosse case. Both cases speak to representational fiction in and of the courtroom through
the ways in which race, gender, class, and sexuality become part of the cases’ narratives and are
in fact inseparable from discourse surrounding each case. Both cases also inform social
understandings of identity and carry with them symbolic weight that influences a broader range
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of events and social understandings of the law. Joan Little’s case does so when her defense
attorneys and the activists championing her decide to counter conventional narratives about black
women’s sexuality and instead construct a new narrative casting Little as a heroic symbol of the
many intersecting oppressions faced by poor, black women. Little’s case attempted to reinvent
long-established representations within the courtroom. The Duke Lacrosse case shows both how
representations of black women’s sexuality remain pervasive and influential via the Jezebel
stereotype, and also how narratives of black legal disenfranchisement can be co-opted and given
new meaning by white defendants (as seen in the invocation of the Scottsboro case). The Duke
case is an example of stories about the courtroom and the law. The narrative of the case was told
primarily through the journalistic accounts that followed it and remains highly symbolic.
Journalists and legal actors alike used the case to convey broader meanings about race, the
South, purported “liberal” bias in higher education, and the functioning of the justice system.
Invoking the Duke lacrosse case conjures its own complicated representational fiction in the
short utterance of a sentence. Though the Little case and the Duke lacrosse case depart from the
more legible forms of fiction I have analyzed previously, they do not depart from the pattern or
the message of this dissertation—that narrative has vast and traceable implications and that
representational fictions are closely tied to the law.
IV. Trial/theatre
In many ways, Joan Little’s trial is not unique; yet it stands as a representation of the
broader pattern by which trials become spectacular. Little’s trial was considered the “trial of the
decade” in North Carolina, and drew attention from major media sources throughout the US. Her
trial became a convergence of representations of the South, social justice activism, and the
testing grounds for using “scientific” methods to win legal cases. In this section, I examine the
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ways in which Little’s attorneys constructed and deployed counter narratives about race, gender,
and class to challenge the pervasive narratives about black women’s sexuality that they knew
would be present in the prosecutorial narrative. I also explore the conventional narratives of
black women’s sexuality as deviant and “loose” that were used against Little during her trial.
Prosecutors used this particular logic, often personified through the Jezebel stereotype, to create
a specific representational fiction in which Little was a seductive and manipulative murderer.
Little’s attorneys constructed a counter-narrative that directly took aim at the way in which longstanding assumptions about black women’s sexuality were used to discredit rape charges against
white men. I argue that Little’s case is primarily characterized by two competing narratives: first,
the efforts of the prosecutor to shape Little into a well-known Jezebel figure, and second, the
efforts of Little’s attorneys to lay bare the racism and sexism at work in the jail and legal systems
of North Carolina.
The most obvious and conventional narrative at work in the Joan Little case is that of the
Jezebel, the enslaved black woman who is overtly sexual and a source of temptation for white
men (Collins 2000). The same narrative has informed and been informed by larger social and
legal notions of black women’s sexuality, specifically the notion that black women are too
promiscuous to be raped. The Jezebel figure has played such an important role in defining public
attitudes about black women that Patricia Hill Collins (2000) terms it a “controlling image,” one
that minimizes histories of oppression, normalizes the consequences of those histories, and that
makes injustice appear natural. The figure of the Jezebel naturalizes a pervasive social view of
black women’s sexuality, positioning black women as promiscuous and sexually insatiable, and
allowing social and legal institutions to ignore or even condone sexual violence against black
women (Burrell 1993). Essentially, the Jezebel stereotype suggests that black women’s sexuality
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is so uncontrollable and indiscriminate that they cannot be raped (Harris-Perry 2011; Tarpley
1996). While white women may be able to rely at least to some extent on discourses of
respectability while interacting with the legal system as victims of rape, the Jezebel stereotype
places black women at a distinct disadvantage. More recent work has linked the image to broad
distrust of black, female rape victims (Donovan 2007).
Just as the stories surrounding the domestic violence in Frankie Silver’s and Edith
Maxwell’s cases rely on the idea of both women as either deviants or as an appropriate,
sympathetic victims, the narrative of the Jezebel forces Joan Little to either prove her
respectability or be subject to the assumption that she was using her sexuality to gain favors from
white men. This duality, between respectability and sexual deviance, obscures the true issues at
work in the Little case: the racism of the legal system, the power imbalances and racial makeup
of the jail and prison system, and the social acceptability of white men coercing black women
into sex. By presenting Joan Little as caught on the wrong side of the Jezebel/respectable woman
dichotomy, the prosecution focuses the case on Little herself and her personal life and past, not
on the instances of power and state violence at work.
An examination of the materials from Little’s trial in Raleigh shows clearly that
Prosecutor Griffin attempted to use the Jezebel narrative to convince the jury that Little’s
account of the killing of Clarence Alligood was untrustworthy. On multiple occasions, Griffin
implies or outright states that Little’s past sexual encounters have some role to play in the case.
He plays on the rumors about Little that were already circulating around Washington, apparently
with the hope that the jury in Raleigh would understand the coded messages about Little’s past.
At one point, Griffin asks Little if she ever visited the Marine base near Washington with friends.
When Little replies in the affirmative, Griffin asks “You went there to meet some men, didn’t

139
you?” (State v. Joan Little, 0002, 145-146). Though Little answers that this was not the case,
Griffin continues to imply that Little and the other women with her were engaging in prostitution
with men at the base. He later brings several accusations against Little in rapid succession. First,
he asks if she had planned to have sex with a bondsman in exchange for having her fees paid
(State v. Joan Little, 0002, 305). Again, Little responds that this was not the case, and Jerry Paul
objects to the question. Next, Griffin asks if Little is familiar with a woman named Linda Jones.
When Little says no, Griffin asserts that Jones was involved in a sexual relationship with Little
while they were both inmates at a women’s prison (State v. Joan Little, 0002, 306). Over Paul’s
objection, Griffin quickly asks if Little contracted a venereal disease at a young age (though he is
cut off by Paul before fully finishing the question) (State v. Joan Little, 0002, 309). Griffin also
attempts to engage Little in questions about her past criminal trials and convictions, though again
Paul objects and the objection is sustained.
The image that Griffin is constructing during Little’s testimony is clear. Griffin reveals
snippets of Little’s past, rumors about her sexual promiscuity and criminality, to position her as a
Jezebel before the jury. Griffin’s questions come after Little has given testimony about the
attempted rape and forced oral sex that she claimed occurred the night she killed Alligood.
Griffin attempts to cast doubt on her version of events by implying that Little’s sexuality make
her unrapeable. Instead, he implies, Little was likely exchanging sex for favors, as she had been
rumored to do in the past at the Marine base and with the bondsman, Mr. Freeman.
In addition to using Little’s past to construct the Jezebel narrative, Griffin also questioned
Little’s testimony about her actions during the alleged attempted rape. Griffin does not claim at
any point that Alligood did not engage in sexual acts with Little; such a claim would have been
impossible given the state of Alligood’s body when he was found. Instead, Griffin implies that
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something about Little’s account is off. The subtext of Griffin’s question suggests that Little
used sex to lure Alligood into her cell, all part of a larger plan to escape jail. As Little recounts
the attempted rape for the second time on the stand, Griffin asks a series of questions. He
questions why Little did not fight Alligood when he first suggested that she sleep with him (State
v. Joan Little, 0002, 228), he questions whether Alligood truly threatened Little with an ice pick
(0002, 228), and why Little did not pull away from Alligood when he forced her to perform oral
sex (State v. Joan Little, 0002, 245). Griffin’s questions have a number of implications. He is
suggesting that Little did not defend herself strongly enough, which mirrors much older legal
narratives of rape in which women who did not fight back “sufficiently” were determined to
have not been raped at all (Berry 2000; Estrich 1988). Griffin is also implying that Little’s story
is filled with holes, which are present in part because the story is simply a cover-up for premeditated murder. Griffin repeatedly refers to the fact that Alligood was known to bring Little
food in her cell, allowed her to make phone calls, and brought her cigarettes. Again Griffin uses
these statements to imply that Little was already engaging in sex with Alligood, likely in order to
gain these favors. He even notes that in an early letter from jail, Little claims that all of the
guards are nice to her. Griffin attempts to paint a picture of a jailer who is being kind to Little by
giving her special treatment, and who Little takes advantage of via seduction.
In his closing statements to the jury, Griffin again attempts to use common narratives
about black women’s sexuality to cast doubt on Little. He finds it “peculiar” that the jailer asked
Little to perform an “unnatural” sex act (State v. Joan Little, 0008, 13) and says that it’s “strange
to [him] that a man with rape on his mind would go in without an erection” (State v. Joan Little,
0008, 9). Here Griffin implies that Alligood went to the cell simply to perform routine duty, and
that Little seduced him and then used an ice pick she had already stowed away to kill him.
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Griffin then makes the following claim to the jury: “Mr. Rowan said that she acted in repelling a
sexual assault. Is that self-defense? Was she in fear of her life? Was she in fear? Did she
reasonably apprehend death or great bodily injury?” (State v. Joan Little, 0008, 14). Griffin
hedges his bets, and in doing so makes light of the violence and pain of rape. He seems to argue
that even if Little was assaulted, using deadly force in self-defense would be excessive. He also
implies that women who are being sexually assaulted are not “in fear of [their lives]” or in fear of
“great bodily injury.” Griffin instructs the jury not to create a wall of supposed innocence so high
that the state cannot overcome it. He asks, “Are you going to require the State to go to an
impossible end to do it? Are you? Or are you going to call on your experience in life, your
common sense—that’s what you’re here for—and take these facts and make sense out of them?”
(State v. Joan Little, 0008, 13). Griffin uses the term “common sense” in an almost coded
manner (Keeling 2007). “Common sense” at the time, for the wider public, and especially
whites, would dictate that black women were suspect, that white men had unspoken access to
their bodies, that black women were devious seducers and possibly violent. “Common sense”
would dictate that Joan Little, a black woman who had already been involved in crime and who
was rumored to be promiscuous, a woman who committed a crime while already in jail, was
certainly a threat to (white) public safety. “Common sense” would dictate the same type of legal
verdict that had been common to the Southern legal system since its inception.
V. The Ghosts of Scottsboro
Danielle McGuire writes, “The Joan Little case proved that respectability still mattered,
but only to a degree” (2010, 276). If this is the lesson that scholars take away from the Little
case, then the Duke lacrosse case allows us to further interrogate to what degree respectability
matters. It speaks to discourses of respectability that I must acknowledge the controversial nature
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of placing Crystal Mangum at the end of the line of cases I have analyzed throughout this
dissertation. Cases like those of Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner, Edith Maxwell, and
Joan Little have each attracted their share of scholars, local historians, and members of the public
who are committed to researching and maintaining the contemporary memory of each case.
Furthermore, Mangum’s involvement in the Duke case does not follow the same pattern as Silver
et al. While Frankie Silver and the other women I discuss appeared to have used violence to
counter abuse, Mangum did not commit violence in the Duke case in response to the abuse she
claimed to have experienced.
Because the Duke case is widely regarded as a hoax that damaged the credibility of black,
female rape victims, it may seem at the very least odd, and at the worst insulting, that a case
involving Crystal Mangum as alleged victim sits alongside a case like Little’s, which was hailed
as a victory for the Civil Rights movement, or a case like Edith Maxwell’s, which drew the
attention of the early 20th century women’s movement. However, it is worth remembering that
that the differences and temporal distances between Mangum and the previous cases are
meaningful. Frankie Silver, along with the major players in her companion cases, is dead and
gone. It has been over 150 years since Frankie has had the ability to speak for herself. Crystal
Mangum is alive and speaking. Her deviance cannot be displaced by later shifts in
understandings of violence, gender, or race. Her physical presence (including involvement in
criminal activity since the Duke case) and her speech (via legal cases and self-publishing) forces
a social reckoning with all about her that is not respectable. While later discourses have rendered
Frankie Silver tragic, Margaret Garner a martyr, Edith Maxwell a victorious victim, and Joan
Little a heroine of a movement, there is no means of performing the same magic for Crystal
Mangum. The deviance that Mangum represents currently is what ties her to these earlier cases.
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Crystal Mangum is not a heroine; her similarity to Silver, Garner, Maxwell, and Little is instead
related to how these women were viewed at the time that they committed their crimes. Each
woman, at one point during her trial, was thought equally as unrespectable, violent, troubled, and
frightening as Mangum is in contemporary discourses of the Duke case.
In this section, I outline several facets of the Duke case and the discourses that centered
on Mangum and the trial. While the Duke case never moved beyond the indictment stage, it is
still a worthwhile space for analyzing representational fiction about and outside of the
courtroom. I focus on two core aspects of the case: first, I note the frequent comparisons between
the Duke case and the famous Scottsboro case, and illuminate the meanings within this narrative.
Second, I argue that journalistic accounts during and after the case, particularly in their treatment
of Mangum, point to the remaining specter of the politics of respectability. These two facets of
the case are necessarily connected in their re-invocation of racial narratives. My primary sources
include the books and magazine articles that proliferated in the wake of the case, many of which
intended to clear the names of the accused lacrosse players and call attention to the “rush to
judgment” that resulted in their indictment. These texts, mostly meant for popular, non-academic
audiences, are often journalistic in nature but also purport to be non-fiction, uncovering the final
“truth” of the case. They weave complex narratives that re-invoke racially charged criminal cases
from the past, subverting them and presenting a new image of a legal system that symbolically
lynches young, promising white men.
The notion that the Duke case represents a “modern Scottsboro” is rampant within texts
published in the years after the alleged assailants were declared innocent. No text makes this
argument more obvious than Richard Parrish’s 2009 publication, The Duke Lacrosse Case: A
Documentary History and Analysis of the Modern Scottsboro. Parrish takes an unusual step in

144
this text—he places excerpts from the Duke case (including media sources) alongside quotes
from the Scottsboro trial, trusting the reader to understand that the comparison is self-evident.
Parrish’s meaning is abundantly clear: while the 1930s-era South was the land of legal Jim Crow,
the contemporary South has subverted its racial paradigms. The consistent comparison to
Scottsboro serves to emphasize the notion that the lacrosse players were the ultimate victims in
the Duke case. It further implies that the law has shifted its historical biases against women,
people of color, and the lower classes that have been well documented. Now, Parrish alleges, the
law is biased in favor of those individuals, leaving wealthy white men at the mercy of a
distrustful legal system and a vengeful group of others.
The obvious similarities between Scottsboro and Duke that Parrish suggests in his text
come primarily from the fact that both cases involve rape claims. Thus, placing the reports of
Mangum’s assault alongside the written statements of Victoria Price and Ruby Bates (the alleged
victims of the Scottsboro case) initially reads coherently because of basic commonalities that
would likely occur in almost any report of rape. However, Parrish’s side-by-side comparison
invites the reader to find something more ominous, suggesting that at the outset, it should have
been obvious that Mangum’s claims were as false as Price’s and Bates’. Later, Parrish’s excerpts
from Scottsboro become even more suggestive. Eventually, Price and Bates were accused of also
being sexual deviants—they were lower-class women travelling alone, who may have worked as
prostitutes. Parrish quotes the judge from Scottsboro, writing, “History, sacred and profane, and
the common experience of mankind teach us that women of the character shown in this case are
prone for selfish reasons to make false accusations of rape and insult upon the slightest
provocation for ulterior purposes” (58). Indeed, Price and Bates eventually admitted to having
made false allegations, and it appears that Mangum’s identified alleged attackers did not in fact
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attack her. But what Parrish suggests by emphasizing this specific narrative of Scottsboro is that
there is reason to doubt women of a certain “character” (read: prostitutes or otherwise
promiscuous women) when they claim to have been raped. It is not enough that the Duke case
was eventually resolved because of careful consideration of physical evidence. Instead Parrish
compares the cases in order to further emphasize the purported sexual deviance of Mangum,
casting her as the unreliable, scheming stripper (and likely prostitute).
This same implication is common in other texts documenting the case. Mike Pressler,
Duke’s lacrosse coach at the time of the case, co-published an account of the incident with Don
Yaegar, a motivational speaker with connections to Duke University. Their text also bears a
name that casts doubt on the legal system and Mangum’s motives: It’s Not About the Truth.
Though Yaegar and Pressler do not make a direct comparison to the Scottsboro case, their
characterizations of Crystal Mangum make clear that her work as a stripper made her tainted and
suspicious, lacking in virtue much like Price and Bates. In their appendix, Yaegar and Pressler
identify Mangum in a manner that calls attention primarily to her work in the sex industry. The
entry reads: “Crystal Gail Mangum: Stripper hired to perform at the March 13 party. She later
alleged she was beaten, raped, and sodomized by various members of the Duke lacrosse team”
(2008, 319). Mangum is characterized first and foremost by her status as a stripper, and
secondarily as an alleged victim of sexual assault. Yaegar and Pressler, when documenting the
night of the party that led to Mangum’s allegations of rape, are unsurprisingly sympathetic to the
lacrosse players. They note that the players requested white dancers, that they had “visions of
two beautiful, curvy, tanned girls dancing sensually” (2009, 6) and that many of the players had
never before hired or seen strippers. Instead, the dancers who arrive are not what the players
expected—both Kim Roberts and Crystal Mangum were black, Roberts is described as having
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“aged beyond her years” (8) and Mangum as having “noticeably large breasts…enhanced
through surgery” and “bruises and scars” on her body (9). Both women are described not as the
fun, lighthearted entertainment that the lacrosse players expected when they called an escort
service, but instead as women whose lifestyles had rendered them unattractive. The descriptions
imply that early childbearing, promiscuity, and possible drug use can be read on the bodies of
Mangum and Roberts like a map. They are, like the women at the heart of Scottsboro,
untrustworthy within and without.
In the Wall Street Journal, historian John Steele Gordon (2007) also made comparisons
between Duke and Scottsboro. He set out by describing, in loose detail, a rape allegation in
which the defendants are believed guilty in spite of “the women’s limited credibility and evershifting story” (2007). Gordon queries readers, suggesting that we would recognize this as the
Duke lacrosse rape case. Instead, he informs us, it is the Scottsboro case in 1931 to which he
refers. Gordon argues that the lessons from Scottsboro and Duke are the same: that the public
should not rush to judgment and that victims with “limited credibility” are not to be trusted.
Gordon also asserts that the main difference between Scottsboro and the Duke case was not race,
but money. He is effectively denying the longstanding narrative that posited black men as sexual
predators of particular danger to white women, a discursive move used to justify lynching,
segregation, and harsher legal disciplining of black men. No such narrative exists for white men,
who historically were treated leniently if accused of raping black women (if not outright granted
access to their bodies) (Berry 2000; Hartman 1999; McGuire 2010). Gordon implies that the
Scottsboro defendants would have been able to prove their innocence quicker if they had access
to the wealth and legal resources of the lacrosse players. While on the surface this is true,
Gordon’s statement ignores the fact that the Scottsboro defendants faced more than the problem
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of poverty—they also needed to confront a pervasive racial narrative in a court of law, something
that the alleged assailants in the Duke case were not required to do. In addition, Gordon implies
that somehow the Duke players were targeted directly. He writes, “The three Duke boys were
guilty only of being white and affluent.” Gordon may be alluding to the allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct on the part of Mike Nifong, who appeared to use the case as a means of
appealing to black voters in Durham. Gordon’s statement may also be taken as part of the larger
media narrative that accused Crystal Mangum of deliberately fabricating the rape charges in the
hopes of gaining a monetary settlement from the lacrosse players. Either way, Gordon’s
implications are clear—the legal system is now stacked against whites in a manner analogous to
its historical treatment of African Americans.
The pairing of the Duke case and Scottsboro is a means of constructing a new
representational fiction about the legal system and the case itself. By invoking Scottsboro,
discursive actors are shifting a series of narratives about race, gender, and rape. Comparisons
between Duke and Scottsboro suggest that the legal system has not simply changed or become
more fair (“blind” to race), but rather that the pendulum has swung completely in the other
direction. Now the legal system treats wealthy white men in the manner that it used to treat poor
black men. This appears to be part of a larger social anxiety, in which the privileged are worried
about their possible fall to the lower rungs of the racial social hierarchy.47 In addition, the
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Gerda Lerner (1992) has suggested that white backlash against racially progressive politics
stems in part from fears about loss of racial privilege. She argues that particularly for those who
possess racial privilege but not class privilege, changes to discriminatory institutions appears
threatening because it becomes more likely that these individuals will no longer be subject to
unearned yet positive social and legal treatment. Sears and Henry (2003) configure conflicts of
interest and the anxiety over potential loss of privilege into their term “symbolic racism.” They
argue that this form of racism is different from older forms, which often relied on ideas about
biological inferiority. Instead, Sears and Henry suggest that contemporary investments in
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Scottsboro-Duke narrative pushes back against the work of the second wave of the feminist
movement and the Civil Rights movement with regard to the legal treatment of rape. Feminist
and anti-racist activists worked diligently to change the legal system, and specifically to combat
the use of victims’ sexual history and implied promiscuity against them during rape trials
(Bumiller 2008; Eisenstein 1988; Estrich 1988; M. Fineman and R. Mykituik 1994; MacKinnon
1996; McGuire 2004, 2010). Joan Little’s case demonstrates that many within the Civil Rights
movement attempted to change the documented practice of the legal system’s reliance on
stereotypes about women of color, particularly the idea that black women were untrustworthy or
hypersexual and thus not real victims. To link Duke with Scottsboro implies that both
movements were vastly more successful than they actually were. The narrative of Scottsboro is
one in which two women made false accusations to escape the social ramifications of
fraternizing with black men and their own status as possible prostitutes and lower-class women.
Those who invoke this case tend to imply that it is the character of Price and Bates that made
them untrustworthy, not the lack of evidence or the social system that drove them to their
accusations. This further suggests that the public and the legal system should have distrusted
Crystal Mangum simply because she was an exotic dancer with a minor criminal history, not
because her allegations appeared coerced or because of the lack of physical evidence for the
crime. This is the topsy-turvy world of Duke and Scottsboro—one in which women of ill-repute
can make rape allegations free of doubt, and one in which privileged young men must guard
themselves from such schemes as well as the looming specter of a legal system no longer
constructed for their self-interest and protection.

symbolic racism are motivated by the idea that anti-black racism has ended and that African
Americans now receive too much favorable treatment, to the detriment of whites.
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The use of the Scottsboro case in the discourse surrounding Mangum and the Duke case
is but one means of signaling the presence of the politics of respectability. Another is the heavy
focus on Crystal Mangum’s status as a sex worker. Here the facts of the Duke case render
Mangum’s experience different from Joan Little’s—while prosecuting attorneys and some
members of the public implied that Little had participated in the sex industry, they could not
produce any evidence that this was actually the case. Crystal Mangum, however, could neither
deny nor hide that she had worked as an exotic dancer in both clubs and outcall settings. Her
work was pivotal to the Duke case, and the fact that she was dancing on the night that she
claimed to have been assaulted made this aspect of Mangum’s life unavoidable. However, many
involved in the Duke case and its aftermath moved beyond the mere fact of Mangum’s work as a
dancer. They used Mangum’s involvement with one aspect of the sex industry to imply that she
was involved in many more, and construed this to mean that Mangum was of low character and
untrustworthy. In other words, Mangum’s work as a dancer rendered her automatically suspect
and more likely to lie about rape. This implication was compounded by the other intersecting
oppressions and narratives that Mangum already faced as a lower class black woman.
Journalists covering the Duke case focused heavily on any actions Mangum may have
participated in that fit into the pre-existing narrative of the drug-addled, greedy sex worker of
color. One Durham journalist noted that Mangum was “drinking while taking medication that
night” and that she was “alleged[ly] using a vibrator” (Stevenson 2006). Parrish and Yaeger and
Pressler also mention Mangum’s potential drug abuse and her use of sex toys in a previous outcall on the night of alleged assault. While drug use on the night of attack may cast doubt on
Mangum’s version of events, it does not serve to negate the potential for rape. The further focus
on the more salacious aspects of Mangum’s work as a dancer serve little concrete purpose at all,
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other than casting Mangum as a sexually deviant Jezebel, the type of woman who in the past was
deemed socially and legally unrapeable. Another journalist published the rumor that Mangum
was said to have told some colleagues at a club that she “was going to get money from some
white boys” (Neff, Niolet, and Blythe 2006). This report, widely circulated in later publications
like Parrish’s, paints Mangum as having directly identifiable motives for her rape allegation that
align perfectly with the narrative of the Jezebel. Rather than focusing on the first-hand accounts
of Mangum’s initial hospital visit, which suggest a lack of agency on her part in both seeking
medical treatment and reporting the alleged assault, many authors assert that Mangum
deliberately made false claims in order to seek some sort of monetary settlement from the Duke
team. The historical narrative of the Jezebel is that of a black woman, usually enslaved, who
trades sexual favors for better treatment by white men. The Jezebel’s motivation for her
promiscuity is thus twofold: part is the assumption that black woman were “naturally” sexually
indiscriminate, and part is the notion that black women will use their sexuality to satisfy their
greed (Collins 2000). The oft-repeated assertion that Mangum crafted the allegations in order to
profit financially merges both elements of the Jezebel, with Mangum fitting into the narrative
perfectly because of her documented work in the sex industry.
Even letters to the editors of local and national media display significant links between
the Duke case, concerns about race and the legal system, and a distrust of Mangum because of
her work as a dancer. Only a little over a month after the case became public, a letter to the editor
published in the Herald-Sun declared, “I agree that things would have been different had the
accused been African-Americans and the accuser been white. No one could have obtained DNA
samples from 46 black players, excluding one white player, based on the evidence. We'd hear a
chorus of ‘unconstitutional,’ ‘lynch mob,’ ‘witch hunt,’ and rightly so. But since these are white
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guys, we can do that to them, and it isn't racist” (Thornburg 2006). In December, 2006, another
letter-writer stated, “The Duke fiasco has taught me that mob mentality, prejudices and emotions
have no place in our justice system. This case, like many from the past, is an injustice brought
upon by the perfect storm of envy, hatred, and prejudice…The first to accept blame should be the
black community and feminists that demanded someone be charged because of the color, sex and
perceived wealth of the individuals accused” (Turner 2006). After charges against the alleged
assailants were dropped in April 2007, similar sentiments became even more common. An April
12, 2007 editorial in USA Today stated that “The Duke lacrosse case serves as a cautionary tale
about the damage a combustible mix of sex, race, class, politics, and overheated media coverage
can wreak…Too many civil rights leaders seemed to draw the wrong lessons from the days when
young black men in the South were convicted or lynched based on flimsy rape accusations from
white women” (Editorial 2007). A letter to the editor of the Herald-Sun wrote, “I smelled
another Tawana Brawley case” (Williams 2007). Both journalists and the public alike were
quick to compare the Duke case to the Southern history of lynching, eliding the differences
between the wealthy, white, and privileged alleged assailants and the legally disenfranchised
black defendants of times past. The comparison between Mangum and Tawana Brawley is also
telling—not only does the letter’s author state that Mangum deliberately perpetuated a hoax, but
she also draws parallels between the racial politics of the two cases.
The author of another letter to the Herald-Sun seemed fearful that Mangum had suffered
no legal consequences for her involvement in the case. The author implored, “She falsely accuses
three white men of raping her and tears their worlds apart, and nothing is being done about it.
What is going to stop her or another woman from doing the same thing to other men?” (Platt
2007). Here Mangum is a schemer extraordinaire, who may go on to make other highly public
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false accusations. In addition, the author implies that false rape accusations are common and that
some type of legal recourse is necessary to stem their tide, lest more and more women begin to
participate in similar behavior.48 Even as far away as Massachusetts, a letter to the editor of the
Berkshire Eagle called Mangum a “lying escort/stripper” and stated “It may be the stripper is
nuttier than a fruitcake” (Anonymous 2007). An editorial published in The Charleston Daily
Mail (West Virginia) asked, “How long will we in fact survive as a free nation when our leading
universities are annually graduating thousands of students each, steeped in the notion that you
can decide issues of right and wrong, guilt or innocence, by the ‘race, class and gender’ of those
involved?” (Sowell 2007). This editorial makes another common move—the Duke case is
imagined not about only the individuals involved, but is somehow symbolic of a larger problem,
of the shifting sands of privilege and the possibility that identity not only matters, but that it is
being used on its own to determine matters of guilt or innocence. While these letters and
editorials do not directly invoke Scottsboro, they participate in a similar discourse as the authors
who do make the comparison. Not only is Mangum’s credibility determined mostly by her status
as a non-respectable woman, but also the case itself represents a perverted legal and social
system in which women of color, rather than being victims, are using institutional processes to
victimize white men.
While the Duke case, for the most part, did not play out within a courtroom, legal actors
retained important roles in constructing the narrative of the case. For Crystal Mangum, it was the
defense attorneys for the lacrosse players who cast her as deviant by sending information to local
48

The author of this letter suggests that Mangum be charged for filing false police reports. These
types of charges are possible, and may be filed when there is evidence that someone deliberately
and knowingly made false claims. However, the author fails to consider that perhaps Mangum
did not deliberately make false statements, but instead was mistaken or coerced into reporting
while in the hospital. There is no convincing evidence to suggest that Mangum knowingly
planned her allegations.
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journalists and even national media sources. One article noted that Mangum had “had sex with at
least four men” in the days before she performed for the lacrosse players, citing a newly filed
court motion by defense attorneys for Reade Seligmann as a source (Stevenson 2006). The same
article reported that Mangum had used a vibrator during her previous performances, that she was
drinking alcohol and taking other medications on the night of the lacrosse team party, and that
she had changed details of her story multiple times. If the defense attorneys could not cross
examine Mangum and create a narrative for her in the courtroom, they would do so outside of it.
The New York Post, when reporting the same information, used an even more alarming headline:
“Duke Sex Spree: Accuser Bedded Four Guys and a Vibrator Before Party: Lawyer.” Defense
attorneys were releasing information about Mangum’s sexual activities before the alleged assault
not only to cast doubt on the medical report that found physical swelling and bruising in
Mangum’s pelvic area, but also in order to portray Mangum as overly sexualized, potentially a
prostitute, and on the whole someone whose promiscuity made her unlikely to be raped. Two
lacrosse team defense attorneys also released more information in October—they suggested that
Mangum had used ecstasy in the past (though not necessarily on the night of the alleged attack)
(Stevenson 2006), again using allegations of drug use to suggest that Mangum was not credible.
In November, the alleged assailants appeared on “60 Minutes,” insisting on their innocence. The
segment also featured interviews with Kim Roberts and others who worked with Mangum at a
club. All claimed that Mangum had returned to work without mentioning the alleged assault and
that she had frequently displayed signs of drug and alcohol abuse. The “60 Minutes” segment
was an attempt to allow the alleged assailants to use national media to their advantage, and also
became another means of portraying Mangum negatively. Defense attorneys requested a
paternity test when Mangum was pregnant in 2007. Again, they gave local media information,
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sparking multiple articles detailing the court-ordered test and noting that “there are doubts about
links to the defendants” (Niolet 2007; Stevenson 2007), again implying that Mangum was
promiscuous.
The persistence of the figure of the Jezebel and of the racialized, sexualized discourse
surrounding Mangum demonstrates more than simply the presence of a politics of respectability.
Journalists and other commentators on the case continually invoke narratives that stem from
deep national histories of racism. Rather than suggesting that we are living in a “post-racial” era,
the Duke case demonstrates that oppressive narratives about black women’s sexuality re-emerge
during social controversies that give them power and utility. Mangum’s race, her choice of work,
and her life history made her an easy candidate for being subsumed into an iteration of the
contemporary Jezebel. This narrative served not only to cast doubt on Mangum’s allegations of
assault, but also to imply that Mangum’s body was a legitimate, appropriate target for violence
regardless of the truth of her assertions. Given the evidence that emerged and helped to clear the
names of the alleged assailants, there was no true need (legally speaking) for negative narratives
about Mangum to circulate. The accused lacrosse players did not need to use Mangum’s
character to imply her untrustworthiness because they possessed physical evidence and
documentation that made clear their lack of involvement in an assault. In spite of this,
journalistic accounts both during and after the case seem to need Mangum-as-Jezebel to exist in
order to construct their ideal narrative about the law. Casting Mangum as coerced or misguided,
herself a victim of leading questions in the hospital and an overzealous district attorney, does not
fit as handily into the story of a new Scottsboro, complete with victimized white men and a
menacing Jezebel figure. Mangum must be construed as merging the lessons of Scottsboro and
the older figure of Jezebel in order to fully complete a narrative that views law as perverted and
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abused by the same individuals it once oppressed. Mangum begins to represent the fears and
anxieties of the privileged as they worry that their social and legal power is slipping away. She is
rendered symbolic of precisely the sort of monstrous false “victim” who attempts to take
advantage of a legal system that is too trusting. The problem in this narrative is not only that it is
false, or that is presumes bad behavior on Mangum’s part that could just as easily have resulted
from a mistake, but also that the post-Duke discourse implies that, like Scottsboro, the Duke
lacrosse case represents a series of events endemic to the legal system. There is an attempt to
apply the complexities of the Duke case to a variety of past and present cases that lack the local
specificities of Duke. The message is clear—the pendulum of the law must be made to swing
back to its presumably rightful place, on the side of those who have historically held the most
political, social, and economic power in the US. The narrative of Duke suggests that there should
be little social concern about law repeating troubling histories that harm women of color, so long
as whiteness remains symbolic of trust and a valuable form of capital.
VI. Conclusion
The historical structure of the legal system, weighted against women of color and lowerclass white women, remained an undercurrent in the court cases of Frankie Silver, Margaret
Garner, and Edith Maxwell. For Betsy, this issue was not present at all because of the extreme
legal silencing surrounding her case. Joan Little’s case represents one instance in which the
courtroom is used as a space to spotlight these issues, to the ultimate benefit of Little herself.
Little’s case demonstrates a specific historical moment, tied in with social movements, that
forced a national and regional discussion about the social and legal acceptability of sexual
violence against black women. Embedded in this discussion was the larger issue of social
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narratives that treated black women’s bodies as always accessible to white men, enabled by the
construction and maintenance of the figure of the Jezebel.
Little’s case was a successful use of the courtroom as theatrical and discursive space.
Little’s attorneys both confronted narratives about racialized sexual violence and created a
counter-narrative that appealed to jurors—they were now in a position to correct the South’s
historical wrongs. However beneficial this strategy was for Little, it did not come without costs.
Little, unlike the defendants in many of the past cases I discuss, was able to testify in her defense
and lay out her own experiences. However, Little was also required to become a national symbol
in the process. Little and her attorneys needed the civil rights and feminist movements to rally
around her in order to tackle the politics of respectability. When Little mentioned her distaste for
becoming a symbol, she hinted that her own narrative and life became limited. While she could
express much of her own account of the killing of Clarence Alligood on the stand, she implies
that in some ways her speech was also curtailed or silenced. Perhaps Little was simply reluctant
to accept the status of symbolic justice-bringer, but she could not win in court without doing so.
Lest Little’s case be perceived as an endpoint to the power of narrative in and outside of
the courtroom, the Duke lacrosse case and Crystal Mangum also offer a new take. The Duke case
shows that the specter of the politics of respectability was fully capable of rising again; the legal
changes that the Little case sparked may have been progressive, but they were also not static or
permanent. Mangum, like Little, became symbolic over the course of the Duke case, but in a
manner far more negative than Little. The discursive treatment of Duke, especially in the
journalistic accounts published after the case’s end, represents the anxieties of the privileged.
Those who have traditionally received favorable legal and social treatment in the US (and
especially in the US South) used the Duke case to argue that the pendulum of the justice system
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had swung too far. By invoking the past Scottsboro case and using this narrative to defend the
alleged assailants, those documenting the Duke case implied that the courts were now
systematically biased against wealthy, white men. This narrative also served to demonize Crystal
Mangum. By juxtaposing Mangum’s actions with those of the alleged victims of Scottsboro, a
discursive thread connects popular notions of promiscuity, sexual history, and doubt. Introducing
the Duke case as the “modern Scottsboro” means that Crystal Mangum and her ilk (women of
color, lower-class women, sex workers) are not to be trusted by the legal system. While
Mangum’s allegations proved to be mistaken, her status as a symbolic figure of ill repute implies
that social and legal doubt should extend further, beyond simply Mangum as an individual and
outward towards all women like her. This reinvigorates the Jezebel, if indeed the figure of the
Jezebel ever lost power in the popular imagination, and reincorporates narratives of distrust into
the space of the courtroom. The Duke case could have been construed as having localized,
individual meaning, but it has not. Instead, the case has taken on larger proportions that are
intended to teach a social lesson. When we are told that we must “remember the Duke lacrosse
case,” we are being told to disregard histories of sexual violence against women of color and the
legal system that allowed this to occur. Instead, we are to distrust alleged victims (especially if
they are women of color with sexual pasts deemed non-mainstream). The final result of such a
policy would be enforcing the same type of legal and social norms present historically,
particularly in cases like those of Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner, and Edith Maxwell. The
discourse surrounding Duke suggests that the law use social constructions of deviance as a
compass, all the while eliding the precise histories and legal violence that has already done so.
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Chapter V: Southern Intersections
I. Fiction, Imagination, and Geography
In a letter to the Governor of North Carolina, Frankie Silver’s attorney made a final plea
for her pardon. Wilson noted that, after all, Frankie was from “west of the Blue Ridge,” and thus
should be excused her ignorance and violence.49 Proper, “ladylike” behavior, he implied, could
not be expected from such women. Regional expectations such as the one Wilson laid out, and
specifically Southern ones, are present in the cases I have previously analyzed. In this chapter, I
ask how specific expectations about Southern femininity and race shaped the legal experiences
and memories of the cases I have analyzed. For all of the women whose cases I have highlighted
in this text, a fully intersectional account of their experiences and the representational fictions
surrounding them would not be complete without attention to region. In this chapter, I argue that
the previous cases point to the need to take seriously region as a further intersection in the
complex matrix of identity. I argue that women like Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner,
Edith Maxwell, Joan Little, and Crystal Mangum were subject to legal and social expectations
stemming not only from their identities in terms of race, gender, class, and sexuality, but also due
to specific expectations about ideal Southern womanhood. For these women, their racial and
classed identities excluded them from more privileged forms of Southern femininity, further
contributing to their intense legal disciplining. In addition, representational fictions of cases such
as those of Frankie Silver, Edith Maxwell, and Joan Little demonstrate that these women’s
inability to fit into racialized, classed ideals of Southern femininity has continued to shape
discourses around their cases.

49

Maxine McCall holds a copy of Wilson’s letter and had been trying for many years to decipher
Wilson’s handwriting. During a meeting with the author, McCall produced the copy and then
showed examples of Wilson’s other writing to substantiate her interpretation.
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This chapter proceeds in three parts. In part I, I discuss the current intersectionality
scholarship, which calls for continued work on relevant intersecting strands of identity. In Part II,
I argue that the women whose cases I have profiled in the previous chapters were subject not
only to problematic and distressing assumptions about their race, gender, and social class, but
also that these assumptions were explicitly intersectional and regional. That is, cases like those of
Betsy and Frankie Silver, and even the more recent cases of Joan Little and Duke lacrosse, reveal
that there are specific, Southern expectations about race, gender, and class that marginalized
these women; their inability to fit their images and experiences into acceptable social and legal
narratives resulted in their being rendered deviant. In part III, I analyze cultural artifacts that can
be read for images of the US South, including the work of artist Kara Walker. These visual
images serve to illuminate the expectations associated with Southern femininity and also the
relationship between these gendered, raced, and classed norms and the violent histories of the US
South. I argue that while “appropriate,” white Southern femininity is the dominant framework of
acceptable social behavior, it is also one that has its roots and its continued prominence in a
highly racialized, classed social regime. The idealized white Southern woman is inherently the
product of those women she is not like, who have been held in contrast to her (McPherson 2003).
These women are working-class and poor white women like Frankie Silver and Edith Maxwell,
and black women, either free or enslaved, like Margaret Garner, Joan Little, and Crystal
Mangum. I conclude that the intersections of law and Southern identity call for attention to
region in addition to other identity categories within intersectionality scholarship.
II.

Identity—Race, Gender, and Region

When Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” in 1991, she
referred specifically to the overlap of race, gender, and class in the lives of women of color in the
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US. Crenshaw drew from a rich tradition within black feminist theory and women of color
feminism, in which activists and scholars (Collective [1977] 1983; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981;
Wells-Barnett and Royster 1997) had long detailed simultaneous experiences of racism and
sexism. Whereas mainstream US social movements had prioritized one identity only (for
example, gender in the mainstream feminist movement, and race in the Civil Rights movement),
Crenshaw and the black feminist theorists writing before her argued that this division was not
only problematic on an activist level, but also that it ignored the social reality faced by women of
color—that is, women of color did not experience systematic, identity-based forms of oppression
separately. Instead, they noted that there were specific images and forms of oppression
associated with women of color. Crenshaw and Collins documented the images reserved
exclusively for black women within popular culture—images that themselves often drew from
histories of slavery and Jim Crow, such as the Jezebel and the Mammy (Collins 2000, 2004;
Crenshaw 1991; Crenshaw 1994, 1997). Scholars further argued that political decisions often
relied on powerful images associated with race, gender, and class working in conjunction.
Dorothy Roberts (1998) noted that limits to black women’s reproductive rights had been
uniquely shaped by white anxieties about race, class, and reproduction. Ange-Marie Hancock
(2004) documented the saliency of the “Welfare Queen” image to the very real policy-making
decisions of the 1996 Welfare reform act. Julia Jordan-Zachary (2003, 2009) noted that
criminalization efforts focused on black women and their imagined association with drug use and
poor parenting practices contributed to harsher legal treatment. Beyond the specific critiques
associated with black women, women of color feminists have noted that similar images and
legal, social, and institutional treatment exist with respect to women with different racial
identities (Ammons 2003; Anzaldúa 1987; Burrell 1993; Harris 2003; Hong 2006; Lubiano
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2001; McGuire 2004; Roberts 2007; Simien 2011; Williams 1992). Essentialist narratives that
position women of color as different and inferior are clearly common within American society
and culture.
While scholars of intersectionality have traced and illuminated the origins and effects of
raced, classed, and gendered images, little attention has been devoted to region. A group of legal
scholars referring to themselves as Classcrits (Mutua 2008; Pruitt 2008) have advanced some
research on the contribution of rural location to intersectional legal experiences, but beyond this
work, scholars of region and scholars of intersectionality have not combined their lenses of
analysis. In this chapter, I offer a theorization of intersectionality that incorporates the role of
region, specifically that of the US South. The South holds a particular place in the American
national imaginary, usually associated with its unique history of chattel slavery, its legal and
extralegal violence during the era of Jim Crow, and its distinctive cultural practices. While I have
chosen the South as a point of departure for this analysis, I expect that scholars whose work
focuses on other regions within or outside of the US could locate similar patterns. Regions, by
virtue of their distinct laws, cultural practices, and histories, produce specific images that are ripe
for analysis. Much as scholars have already recognized that race, gender, and class can
simultaneously result in unique, overlapping images and expectations, so too can region. By
combining a regional analysis with one that is already attentive to multiple strands of identity, I
hope to introduce a productive addition to intersectionality scholarship.
Taking region seriously is significant not simply because it adds yet another layer to the
complex combinations that form social identities and therefore social life. It is important also
because, if the cases in this dissertation are considered, it is clear that the images surrounding
regional deviance and/or acceptability shape individual and group experiences. Some of the
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women in this dissertation were clearly subject to regionalized expectations at the outset of their
cases. Edith Maxwell, for example, was immediately subject to media attention that focused on
her Appalachian, Southern background. The Duke lacrosse case was also subject to a wide range
of discourses that referenced Southern history and race relations. For other women, the
importance of region came later, through the process of memory formation. Frankie Silver serves
as an excellent example. During her lifetime, the full Appalachian imaginary had not been
formed, but was instead in the process of formation. While expectations about Appalachian
people may have played a minor role in Frankie Silver’s initial legal experiences, one cannot
deny that they played a much larger role after her execution. Later stories of Frankie Silver
invariably cast her as one or another stereotype of Appalachian or Southern womanhood—she
became the violent, aggressive, lower class mountain woman, or the frail, remorseful Southern
white lady. Adding region to an analysis of Silver’s experiences points to yet another facet of
identity, namely, that it is not static over time. As Spira and Turcotte (forthcoming) have noted,
intersectionality theory must avoid construing identity as unchanging or unmoving, as differing
strands of identity are not only simultaneously experienced but also subject to change. For
Frankie Silver, the cultural shift that created the Appalachian imaginary also changed how her
identity was conceived of and represented after her death. The changes in how folklore and
fiction envision Frankie Silver point to an identity that moves and changes alongside popular
understandings of gender, race, class, and region. Focusing on region as a means of shaping
identity ads breadth to intersectionality scholarship while also offering a lens into one way that
identity can morph over time. The women whose cases I have profiled all were subject to some
degree of region-specific image, either during their lifetimes or after. Fully theorizing the role of
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region in their cases is necessary to uncovering the political and social meanings behind their
treatment and memory.
III. Region in Context
In addition to the work that the cases and fictions in this dissertation do for intersectionality
and theories of identity, there are other lessons to take away from them. One is the way in which
they reflect realities, histories, and images of the South and its relationship to the law. My aim is
to consider this subject with great care. I want to highlight both the extent to which the women in
this dissertation were subject to legal logics specific and intrinsic to the South, but also the ways
that their cases were used to convey a series of messages about the South that may be
problematic. First, I will discuss the concrete realities of Southern legal systems that have had
specific effects on cases in this dissertation. My primary focus will be the rules of testimony in
North Carolina criminal trials and in Fugitive Slave trials. Second, I will note the socio-legal
specificities that have shaped cases like that of Joan Little, for whom jury selection was critical
to overcoming narratives about black women’s sexuality.
I begin with the realities of the legal record in order to recognize that Southern legal systems
have engaged in practices that are fundamentally unjust. This discussion also better allows me to
outline the departure of myth from reality in discourses about the South, which will follow in a
later chapter. While I do not wish to dwell on the myriad of ways that Southern legal systems
have been and may continue to be problematic in their treatment of legal actors and defendants, I
do want to focus on several specific legal rules that have shaped cases like those of Betsy,
Frankie Silver, and Margaret Garner. In particular, rules of testimony are of paramount
importance.
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As I have noted throughout this dissertation, there is no complete legal record of the voices
of these three women, and this is the case because legal rules during their trials allowed them
limited speech, if any speech at all was allowed. In the cases of Betsy and Frankie Silver, these
rules were not tied directly to their identity or to Betsy’s status as enslaved, but it is likely that
the rules of testimony both women were subject to were more problematic for them because of
gender, race, and class. For Garner, it is clear that the rules of testimony in fugitive slave courts
were developed with the express intent of disadvantaging those accused of being fugitive slaves,
to the point that they could even transform those born free into slavery.
Until the late 19th century, the state of North Carolina functioned with rules of testimony
that barred those accused of felonies from testifying at their own trials. Like many similar laws
found in a variety of US states, the presumption was that defendants would perjure themselves
because their legal predicament would compel them to lie on the stand. Southern states were not
alone in having these types of rules, but they were unique in their attachment to them. New
England states, beginning with Maine, were the first to change these laws beginning in 1864, and
by the early 20th century most US states allowed accused felons to testify. However, it was the
state of Georgia that remained the sole dissenter, still restricting felons from speaking in their
own defense at the end of the 19th century (Miller 2012). While the rule that Betsy and Frankie
Silver were subject to was not unique to the South, it was certainly an ingrained part of the North
Carolina justice system in both of their trials. By barring Betsy and Frankie Silver from
testifying, the state of North Carolina made both women much more likely to lose their trials and
their lives. In addition, the lack of testimony stymies scholars, who may search the legal record
fruitlessly in an attempt to find the voice of Frankie Silver or Betsy. Without an account of the
crimes they were accused of, we are left with only the state’s understanding of the murders of
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Charlie Silver and John McTaggart. In addition, while the rule barring testimony applied equally
to men, women, free, and enslaved, upper and lower classes, it did not effect all equally. Betsy
and Frankie Silver had to face powerful narratives about their gender, race, and class while in the
courtroom. As women, their violent actions made them particularly deviant in the eyes of a legal
system that presumed only men as capable of violence. They likely made juries fearful of what
they represented—the inevitable rebellion of oppressed peoples subject to daily violence. Both
women were tried by all-white, all-male juries, and neither stood a chance without even the
possibility to speak in court and provide their own narratives of the crimes in question.
In Margaret Garner’s case, it is difficult to imagine a positive legal outcome regardless of
the system under which Garner was tried. There were three options for Garner—she could be
tried under Ohio’s legal system, she could be tried in a special court for fugitive slaves, or she
could be returned to Kentucky with the possibility of facing trial there. Ultimately, Garner was
tried as a fugitive slave, but the other two options also left much to be desired. Abolitionists
hoped that a criminal trial in Ohio would arouse public sympathy for Garner’s plight as an
enslaved woman and that she would be acquitted of the murder of her child, Mary. However,
there is no guarantee that Garner would have faced a sympathetic jury. Historically, juries were
not friendly to women who killed, especially those who killed their children or family members
(Berry 2000). If Garner had been tried in Ohio, she would have been symbolically and legally
recognized as a person, but she also would have faced the possibility of being put to death for
Mary’s killing. A trial in Kentucky also poses a multitude of primarily negative possibilities. If
Garner had actually been tried for murder or a related crime in Kentucky (and the trial itself was
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not a guarantee)50, the differing legal standards for enslaved persons would have influenced her
trial. Slave law differed from state to state (Tushnet 1981, 2003), but there were clearly different
common law standards for enslaved defendants in most slave-holding states (Tushnet 2003).
State v. Mann (1830), a North Carolina Supreme Court case, was the first legal recognition that
slave owners could not be prosecuted under common law because slaves were absolute property.
Judge Ruffin, who would author the denial of Frankie Silver’s appeal only a few years later,
declared that “the power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave
perfect” (State v. Mann 1830). Slaveholders could not be punished under the law for assaulting
or killing their slaves. Enslaved persons, on the other hand, could be subject to legal penalties far
beyond what whites could suffer for committing the same crimes. While not always explicitly
encoded into law via statutes, judicial decisions in most slaveholding states found judges
amenable to the idea that enslaved persons had no right to self-defense, as brooking the abuse of
whites was simply part of the condition of slavery (Tushnet 2003). As Frederick Douglass
pointed out in his well-known speech, “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” Southern
states like Virginia often imposed the death penalty on crimes committed by the enslaved while
offering lesser sentences for the same crimes if committed by whites. Conversely, crimes against
the enslaved, including physical abuse and murder, were not considered felonies in most
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Tushnet (2003) notes that there was a Southern common law tradition that gave masters the
ability to punish the enslaved in lieu of having the enslaved person appear in court. While this
was not always what occurred, most Southern states did allow slaveholders to circumvent the
legal system, especially if the enslaved person had been accused of destruction of property.
Indeed, in Margaret Garner’s case we see that when Garner was returned to Kentucky, she did
not stand trial for Mary’s killing, but instead Archibald Gaines sold her to a judge and plantation
owner in New Orleans.
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slaveholding states (Morris 1996).51 The differing standards to which slave holding states held
enslaved defendants would likely have proved fatal to Garner had she been tried in Kentucky.
Of course, it was neither the legal system of Ohio or Kentucky that ultimately dealt
Margaret Garner’s fate, but instead the special court convened by Commissioner Pendery.
Pendery’s fugitive slave court followed evidentiary rules that placed the defendants at an
extreme disadvantage and also resulted in profound legal silencing. Those accused of being
slaves were not eligible for a jury trial, and instead were reliant on the verdict of the
commissioner. In addition, accused slaves were not allowed to testify in their own defense. All
that was required to prove their status as slaves was an affidavit from their purported owner,
given to federal marshals who were then charged with capturing and returning the accused.
While Margaret Garner was allowed a brief period of testimony at Commissioner Pendery’s
court, her primary purpose was to speak to the status of her children and their past travel to
Cincinnati. Garner could not explain her killing of Mary, nor could she truly contest her enslaved
status. Given that the Fugitive Slave act of 1850 was passed with the purpose of mollifying
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Again, it can be difficult to locate written legislation about how states would try and punish
enslaved persons or slaveholders. Morris (1996) notes that as early as 1669, colonial Virginian
lawmakers determined that when slaveholders killed their own slaves, they should not be legally
liable for murder or manslaughter. The historical record points to a number of early cases in late
18th century Virginia, South Carolina, Maryland, and North Carolina in which slaveholders were
known to have killed people they enslaved, but were not punished or taken to trial. By the early
19th century, many Southern states had amended their laws and instituted punishments for those
who killed enslaved persons, but these laws typically contained exceptions for insurrection and
allowed masters to administer “moderate correction” (see for example Georgia’s changes in the
state’s 1798 constitution). These exceptions, which were common in state constitutions and other
Southern legal records, made it nearly impossible to hold whites accountable for killing enslaved
persons, as they could always claim that the killing was a reaction to rebellion. Well into the
mid-1800s, appellate courts in states such as South Carolina and North Carolina would conclude
that killing slaves was not homicide in the common law sense because the enslaved were legally
property (see State v. Fleming) and other Southern state courts would only charge those accused
of killing slaves with manslaughter rather than murder (see State v. Jones, Fields v. State, and
Chandler v. State).
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slaveholding states, the legal rules set forth reveal the attitudes and interests of the South, where
the bulk of slave holding states were located. The lack of testimony for the accused, the lack of
jury trial, and the overall reliance on the word of federal marshals (who would be fined if they
knowingly allowed slaves to escape and conversely rewarded for successful captures)
demonstrates the South’s views that enslaved persons were legally nothing more than property.
Indeed, so unconcerned was the South with the plight of even free African Americans that the
rules of the Fugitive Slave commissions made it possible and likely that free African Americans
would be forced into slavery simply by being accused of being fugitive slaves. The legal
silencing of the accused in commissions speaks to the lack of value given to the speech of those
presumed to be slaves—property has no voice under the law.
In Edith Maxwell’s case, it is striking that the all-male jury became a subject of local and
national discourse. Again, the state of Virginia maintained a legal system that did not allow
women (or people of color) to serve as jurors, much like the state of North Carolina in Betsy’s
and Frankie Silver’s cases. However, the 1935 Maxwell case was one of the earliest examples in
which the practice of barring women from jury service garnered the national spotlight.52

52

Women’s rights advocates began to question gender exclusionary jury regulations in the early
1920s after the ratification of the 19th Amendment. They recognized that women’s legal
treatment and their status as legal actors was connected, and jury service represented yet another
hurdle keeping women from achieving full citizenship rights (see Ritter 2000 for more on
history). While women’s group sought a number of cases they hoped would become test cases
for changing state laws on women’s jury service, the Supreme Court did not hear any cases on
the matter until the 1946 case of Ballard v. United States, in which the Court declared that states
which already allowed women as jurors on lower level trials could not bar them from federal
court juries. Later, in the 1975 case Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court finally declared that states
could not exempt women from jury service or allow special exemptions for them that were not
available to men. The Maxwell case came early in this trend. It is clear from documents relating
to the case written by members of the NWP that there was some hope of the case becoming a test
case for the issue of state bans of women’s jury service. The NWP and other women’s groups
rallied around Edith Maxwell and also contributed to much of the press attention surrounding
gender issues in her case. While Maxwell may not have been the very first attempt to create a
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Historically, nearly every US state has banned women from jury service or instituted regulations
that disfavored women for jury service (Fowler 2005; Weisbrod 1986). Western states began to
buck the trend in the late 19th century, with Utah being the first state to allow women to serve as
jurors. Southern states maintained a distinct tradition as some of the last states to change their
regulations for women jurors, with Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina being the final
states to allow women on juries in 1962, in spite of the Civil Rights Act of 1957’s proclamation
that jury service could not be thusly restricted (Ritter 2000). The traditional, cultural
justifications for women’s jury service restrictions may have been particularly pronounced in the
South, especially the New South of the mid-20th century. Rhetoric lauding white women’s roles
in the domestic sphere, along with other assumptions about their rationality and their traditional
exclusion from full citizenship all played a role in keeping women from jury service (Fowler
2005), and Southern states in the early and mid-20th century imagined themselves as holding on
to traditional “protections” given to white women. By maintaining discriminatory jury laws,
Southern states disadvantaged white women and women of color, both of whom would likely
face additional scrutiny from all male, all-white juries.
The cases of Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner, and Edith Maxwell all show that
Southern legal systems do contain distinctly oppressive legal rules, many of which stem from the
South’s reliance on slavery. Pushing further, it is also important to illuminate the socio-legal
remnants of slavery that haunt the legal landscape of the South. Both Joan Little and Crystal
Mangum experienced the power of narratives that can be traced to slavery, and both found that
the legal system and the broader social discourse have not forgotten figures like the Jezebel.
While narratives about black women’s sexuality may no longer be overtly encoded in
test case to overturn gender exclusionary jury regulations, it is certainly one of the earliest to
bring media attention to the topic.
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contemporary common law,53 Little and Mangum’s cases show that these narratives remain
important to the public, to legal actors, and to jurors. Given the pervasiveness of stereotypes like
the Jezebel throughout American society, it should not be surprising that these same narratives
are woven into legal discourse. Many scholars document the historical and contemporary
influence of the image of the Jezebel—Patricia Hill Collins calls it a “controlling image,” one
that shapes black women’s social experiences (Collins 2000, 2004). Melissa Harris-Perry (2011)
argues that the stereotype is ever-present to the point that black women in focus groups describe
their behavior as actively avoiding being perceived as overly sexual or promiscuous, and even
members of the black women’s club movement in the 19th and early 20th centuries understood
that they must counter the Jezebel narrative in order to be taken seriously in the endeavor of
“racial uplift” (Carby 1987). While the Jezebel is not only a figure in the South, her narrative
history is tied to slavery and Jim Crow, to white Southerners’ perceptions about black women’s
sexual availability and their lack of virtue.
Joan Little’s case is particularly compelling as an example of the Jezebel stereotype’s power
in the South, specifically journalists’ interviews in Washington, NC, and the survey data that
Little’s attorneys used to request a change of venue for the trial. The data that Little’s attorneys
gathered showed that rural, Southern whites found the Jezebel figure not only compelling, but
also fully believed that black women in general were more inclined to sexual deviance and
therefore less likely to be victims of rape or sexual assault. For a woman like Little, the Jezebel
was more than an image—the stereotype had the potential to inflict very real consequences. Had
Little’s case been decided by an all white or mostly white, male jury, it seems likely that she
53

By overtly encoded, I am referring to cases such as State of Missouri v. Celia (1855), in which
enslaved women were declared legally unrapeable, not only because of their status as property,
but also because of social and legal assumptions that black women were more sexually
promiscuous than white women.
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would not have been acquitted. The rumors circulating about Little’s sexual past, combined with
the broader perception that black women were Jezebels, would have ensured that Little faced
prison time for murder. Her attorneys’ careful jury selection and their insistence on confronting
the Jezebel stereotype in their courtroom narratives secured Little’s acquittal.
Though Little was acquitted, her case did not mark the end of the Jezebel’s looming over a
Southern state and legal system. Crystal Mangum’s treatment in media discourse and in later
accounts of the Duke lacrosse case also demonstrates that the Jezebel still lives. For Mangum,
the stereotype proved nearly inescapable—she could not deny her connections to the sex
industry, which provided journalists and attorneys alike with a source of stories calling attention
to her purportedly deviant sexuality. It is almost surprising that Mangum’s allegations were
initially taken seriously by police, Nifong, and members of the Durham community. Harris-Perry
(2011) argues that it was incumbent upon local actors to pursue Mangum’s allegations because,
in the past, similar (and accurate) allegations had been ignored due to assumptions that black
women could not be victims of rape, especially if the alleged attackers were white men. Though
Mangum’s alleged attackers were declared innocent, it does not change the fact that the
discourse surrounding the alleged assault was infused with the Jezebel stereotype. Indeed, the
image of Mangum and the Duke case that has remained prominent in the national imagination is
that of the lying, overly sexual black woman, another in a line of “hoaxes” perpetrated by
untrustworthy black women. The discourse of Duke encourages the American public to take
seriously the notion that a legal system that was biased in favor of white, middle and upper-class
men for over two hundred years has, in short order, become too trusting of women of color. This
discourse asks the nation, in coded language and whispers, to resurrect the Jezebel (as if she was
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dead to begin with) and to imagine her as a real threat to the rule of law. The fact that this case
occurred in a Southern state and invoked both local and national racial politics is no coincidence.
IV. Southern identities
Representational fictions and the cases that spawned them are tied to dominant ideas
about the US South, and particularly the region’s relationship to both gender and race. An
intersectional understanding of identity is necessary to fully illuminate the meanings contained
and transmitted within representational fictions. In this section, I discuss the intersecting
identities found in the cases contained within this dissertation and the ways in which
representational fictions tie them to one another. Cases like Betsy’s, Frankie Silver’s, and others,
can tell scholars much about identity. In particular, the identities of all of the women in the cases
in this dissertation display intersections not only of race, class, and gender, but also region and
history. Their identities and the representational fictions that surround them are inherently tied to
the larger social frame of the US South—these women are, in addition to being black or white
women, Southern women. Not only that, they are deviant Southern women. I analyze Kara
Walker’s work to further illuminate how fiction and cultural work can be used to make visible
the same types of relationships that representational fictions have the power to hide. While much
of my previous analysis of representational fiction focuses on what they cover, Walker’s work
serves as a deliberate, political effort to make clear historical relationships between whiteness
and blackness.54 Here I draw from Tara McPherson’s work on lenticular logics, or schemas by
which the relationship between two identity categories is distorted or hidden. In previous
54

The two pieces of Walker’s artwork that I have chosen for analysis have also appeared in the
work of Tara McPherson, which has been extremely influential to this project. McPherson’s
argument that Walker’s work portrays and reframes the complex relationship between gender,
blackness, whiteness, and Southernness forms the core of my analysis. However, I also call
attention to how Walker’s work represents deviance in addition to race, and how it represents
white women’s violence.
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chapters, I have used the framework of the “lenticular logic” to make clear the interrelatedness of
paired cases, especially those of black and white women. Now, I also wish to complicate the
lenticular logic. McPherson uses the term to specifically detail the reliance of the image of the
upper class, white plantation woman on the image of the servile, black “Mammy.” The cases in
this dissertation, however, involve lower-class white women who were disadvantaged by their
class status even as they were able to claim racial privilege. The role of class and region within
their cases suggests that lower-class white women are also rendered deviant and untrustworthy,
both socially and legally, because of their inability to participate in classed, racialized, and
gendered norms. Rather than the juxtaposition of two identities that McPherson interrogates
within lenticular logics, I am positioning three identity categories as interrelated.
As Lopez (2007) writes of race, certain identity categories are formed in opposition to
one another. This is true of the identities of the women discussed in this project. Understanding
their race and their class, and the ways in which law and society viewed their gender, is
unquestionably important. But beyond this, to fully account for their legal experiences and the
memories that have preserved them, we must also view their Southernness as part of their
identity. There exists a set of ideal behaviors and identity categories that constitute Southern
womanhood, and the women in this project are separated from these ideals in various ways. The
image of the ideal Southern woman has changed over time, but there are some facets of her
identity that I can identify. They can be found on displays in a variety of contexts, from beauty
pageants to the magnets that Southern states sell to promote their tourist industries.
Figure 1: State of Georgia magnet
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The above figure may initially appear to showcase nothing more than an ordinary
magnet. I came across this magnet at the National Women’s Studies Association in 2011, the
year that the conference met in Atlanta, GA. In the gift shop of a large, Atlanta hotel, this magnet
immediately struck me as an image conveying the different “things” that the state of Georgia
produces. Unsurprisingly, ideals of Southern womanhood make a prominent appearance.
Alongside food products (peaches, peanuts, pecans), a representation of the University of
Georgia, and a large alligator (itself the only non-white figure presented), are two representations
of historical and contemporary Southern femininity. The first is the plantation lady, and the
second is a white woman, legs spread suggestively, wearing a red bathing suit. The plantation
lady is the most recognizable and enduring image of ideal Southern femininity. She is,
invariably, white, wealthy, and cultured. In addition, she represents the national and regional
nostalgia for the “Old South,” a culture imagined by mainstream, white Americans as genteel
and historically rich. As Tara McPherson (2003) notes, the figure of the plantation lady has
captured the national imagination since the antebellum period, and was revived by the novel and
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film Gone With the Wind. Southern states quickly realized that if they were to serve as tourist
destinations, playing up popular notions of antebellum history could be profitable. By the late
21st century, Old South nostalgia was in full swing, with states from Louisiana to Virginia
promoting plantation tours, riverboat rides, and Civil War battle reenactments. The plantation
lady was part and parcel of this promotional strategy—she allowed white Americans, both
Southern and non-Southern, to imagine themselves as wealthy, well-mannered landowners in a
fictional, idyllic past (Eichstedt and Small 2002; McPherson 2003). The plantation lady is
femininity embodied, imagined not only as beautiful and stylish, but also as the last vestige of an
age of American chivalry and grandeur. Of course, what is elided in this powerful fantasy is the
fact that the plantation lady derived her status from her relationship to other women and men,
many enslaved, and others lower class and nearly destitute.
The plantation lady’s beauty and social graces required a large staff of enslaved men and
women to work within the home and without (Glymph 2008). The plantation lady was viewed as
having a distinctly feminine, very Southern sort of power—the power of manners and the power
of the pedestal. Yet at the same time as she was imagined as incapable of real, physical violence,
the plantation lady maintained her elevation because of the hidden violence that surrounds her.
Figure 2: The Emancipation Approximation, Kara Walker, 2000
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Kara Walker represents this other side of the plantation lady in her silhouette, “The
Emancipation Approximation.” Like much of Walker’s art, we see only figures in black and
grey, who are identifiable only by their clothing and the shapes of their hair. Technically,
everyone in the silhouette is black, yet the viewer instinctively knows whom to identify as white.
The plantation lady in this piece is recognizable due to her dress and delicate figure, calling to
mind the many other historical and contemporary images of Southern belles that permeate
American culture. The lady leans gently on a tree stump, with an axe positioned nearby. Beneath
her is an assortment of heads, decapitated from the enslaved bodies to which they once belonged.
The plantation lady’s complicity in a system of violence is clearer here, yet she maintains her
femininity. This image is jarring not only because it invokes the violent system of legal chattel
slavery, but also because it ruptures the popular understanding of the plantation lady as delicate,
demure, and harmless. It makes her deviant, yet never quite approaching the level of deviance
attributed to Frankie Silver or Margaret Garner—her violence is still disconnected from its

177
subjects, her image does not carry with it the weight of hundreds of years of representational
fiction painting her as monstrous.
Frankie Silver and the other women in this project never were, and can never fully
become, this version of the Southern ideal. Betsy remains a forgotten figure, one whose place on
the plantation was only as property; her revolt became a living image of the fears that Southern
whites held of slave rebellions. Frankie Silver, though white, cannot be separated from the axe
she used to kill Charlie, or her home in the mountain South. The plantation lady serves to support
the men in her life and to maintain their position as racial and patriarchal authorities. Frankie
Silver’s class background, her Appalachianness, and her violence against her husband render her
no lady at all. Margaret Garner, like Betsy, cannot attain ideal antebellum Southern womanhood
in part because of her blackness and her status as enslaved. Furthermore, Garner’s actions
threatened the accepted Old South order in many ways—she stole herself and her family, she
deprived her enslaver of “property” in the form of her daughter, and her story brought about a
national discussion of sexual violence against enslaved women. Garner laid bare all about
plantation life and slavery that Southern whites sought to cover.
Only Edith Maxwell comes close to achieving Southern white ladyhood in the vein of the
plantation lady. While Maxwell’s position historically makes it impossible to fully imagine her
as a plantation lady, her case did occur during a time in American history when the Old South
was becoming new, which came alongside a nostalgia for the Old, “lost” South and its ways. In
addition, Maxwell’s case occurred at the height of the extra-legal (but implicitly accepted)
Southern disciplinary regime of lynching, a form of violence often justified though a discourse
focused on protecting white “ladies” from supposedly rapacious black men (Apel 2004; Davis
1983, 1998; Feimster 2009; Simien 2011). By hearkening back to a time period in which white
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Southern womanhood was seen as more respected and more protected, the cultural landscape
surrounding Maxwell’s trial was one means of making possible Maxwell’s ultimate escape from
strict legal disciplining. Maxwell’s petitions for pardon, discussed in chapter three, make this
obvious. As Southerners and non-Southerners alike contrasted the educated, pretty Maxwell with
their own imaginary of a violent, backwards Appalachia, they extracted her from her true
regional home and found her ladylike enough to be worthy of legal protection. Edith Maxwell,
like the plantation lady and the virtuous white woman at the heart of lynching discourse, needed
“saving,” and saved she eventually was.
Perhaps it is less productive to compare the later cases, Joan Little and Crystal Mangum,
to the ideal of the plantation lady. However, it is a different part of the state of Georgia magnet
that speaks more explicitly to these two women. The other ideal of Southern womanhood present
on the magnet is less historically tied than the plantation lady, but she is recognizable
nonetheless. This ideal is sexualized in the vein of the spectacle of the Southern beauty pageant,
a white woman wearing a red bikini as if she is participating in the swimsuit portion of the
contest. In addition, her positioning at the southern end of Georgia draws attention to the new
leisure economy of this Southern state—it is a site where tourists can travel to relax on the beach.
Though the plantations are now museums, the Southern nouveau riche can still derive pleasure
and profit from the landscape.
As Blain Roberts (2013) writes in his New York Times op-ed, the South has long held
special ties to beauty pageants. This history culminated in the 1950s and 60s, when Southern
states steadily supplied the nation with Miss Americas, all young, fresh-faced, and of course
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white.55 These pageant women and the continued tradition of pageantry in the South created a
cover for the violence of the Jim Crow-era South. Roberts writes, “Other whites, many of them
pro-segregation themselves but fearful of the national reaction brought on by anti-civil rights
violence, understood that Southern beauty queens could serve as persuasive public relations
agents, a genteel veneer to cover up the region’s unsavory behavior.” These women were the
new plantation ladies—more modern in style and background, but still evocative of the image of
a well-mannered, smiling, attractive South. They were performing “proper” white, middle-class
femininity before a national audience (Tice and Deel 2013). In addition, pageants flirt with
female sexuality while constraining it—the contestants are judged primarily on their looks, and
are expected to perform in evening gowns and swimsuits, yet are also expected to be wholesome
and sexually unattainable.56 These women, and the dominant image of them as white and
therefore sexually pure, frames the new Southern ideal of womanhood. It is equally as
unattainable for women like Joan Little and Crystal Mangum as the plantation lady ideal would
have been for Betsy, Frankie Silver, and Margaret Garner.
Contrasting Little and Mangum with the ideal of the bikini clad pageant woman
highlights the sexual and racial mores of the South in contemporary times. While middle and
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This is not to say that Southern pageant culture is reserved exclusively for white women.
Beauty pageants aimed at African-American women exist, and pageants are now integrated.
Indeed, several Southern winners of the Miss America pageants have been black women, though
their success did not occur until the 1990s. However, when we consider the South as an imagined
region, and particularly the cultivated image of itself the South projects onto a national scale,
pageant culture is primarily associated with whiteness.
56
Particularly telling of this fine line with respect to women’s sexuality are the perennial
controversies surrounding pageant winners who are later found to have posed for nude pictures
or participated in pornography. While these women are brought to the national stage because
they fit conventional notions of sexual attractiveness, they are also punished for any nonmainstream or unconventional sexual behavior, even if that behavior is little more than using
their bodies for their own personal profit, an act itself barely separable from the motives women
may have for participating in pageants.
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upper class white women may display hints of sexuality and sexual availability within certain
cultural confines and maintain their dignity, black women, especially if they are lower class,
cannot do the same. The sexualized white woman on the Georgia magnet is no Jezebel. Her open
display of sexual suggestiveness is acceptable enough to appear on the state’s tourist
memorabilia, implying that it is not meant to be threatening but rather titillating, and certainly
not an invitation for sexual violence. This woman does not lose her respectability the moment
she opens her legs. Yet, consideration of Little’s murder trial and the narratives about Crystal
Mangum demonstrate that black women cannot engage in the same type of overt displays of
sexuality and avoid being subject to the Jezebel stereotype. Little’s rumored sexual relationships
were enough for a prosecutor to accuse her of having engaged in prostitution, and journalists and
other commentators quickly shifted Mangum’s work as an exotic dancer into the possibility that
she was a prostitute. In both cases, the broader implication was that women who engage in
deviant sexual behavior on their own terms must also do so on everyone else’s, that their bodies
have become public property, and that they are putting themselves at risk for sexual violence.
Indeed, any sexual acts against Little and Mangum were discursively separated from the term
violence—these acts either did not occur at all (because Jezebels are untrustworthy), or they
were consensual (because Jezebels always consent).
Figure 3: From “The Rich Soil Down There,” Kara Walker, 2002
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Both the figures of the plantation lady and the pageant/swimsuit model, when
considered in their intertwined relationship with their deviant Southern others, suggest that it
would be productive for intersectionality scholarship to discuss what Tara McPherson (2003)
terms the “lenticular logic.” Here McPherson notes that blackness and whiteness, gender, and
class, cannot be considered separately but as part of the same larger picture, one in which certain
images may be more difficult to discern or deliberately hidden. Images of black and white
women help society define precisely who is and who is not expressing gender appropriately,
through a raced and classed lens. In addition, I argue that region must also be taken as an
intersecting quality here. Many of the images associated with white femininity and black
womanhood are regionalized and tied to specific Southern histories and contemporary cultural
practices that stem from them. The pageant woman is connected in her historical context to Jim
Crow, Crystal Mangum and Joan Little cannot be discussed without also discussing the Jezebel,
and Frankie Silver cannot be read separately from the image of Elly May Clampett. Figure 3
demonstrates one rendering of the notion of lenticular logics—in this portion of a larger
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installation by Kara Walker, a black figure (both in actual color and in representational
signaling) holds a white, feminine figure above her head. The white figure wears the wideskirted ball gown symbolic of the wealthy plantation lady, while the black figure is barefoot and
more plainly clothed, clearly an enslaved woman. The two figures cannot be historically
separated, and their legacies also cannot be. It is the deviant other who makes the proper
Southern woman, here seen lifting her up to the public eye. The deviant other is likely to be
black, especially in discourses of lowland Southern history, but she can also be white, lowerclass, or from the “wrong” region of the South. Her existence, as the figure on the bottom, does
the real work. She makes ladies, who are themselves ladies precisely because they are not her.
The cases and representational fictions in this dissertation call for analyzing region when
considering intersectional identities, and also a careful consideration of the discourses
concerning identity in the South. First, region clearly plays a role in how each of these women
was viewed, both in their own times, and even more so after their encounters with the law. The
images, folklore, novels, theatrical productions, and other forms of fiction that convey meaning
about the women in this dissertation speak not only their identities in terms of race, gender, class,
and sexuality, but also to their status as symbolic figureheads in their region. Garner, for
example, is presented as both an unruly slave and a mother martyr, tying her individual case to
the broader discourse about slavery, the South, and women. Frankie Silver has been represented
as a violent, ill-tempered Appalachian child-bride and a simple but innocent Southern white
victim. Betsy’s invisibility stems from her status as an enslaved black woman in a region thought
to be innocent of slavery. These are only a few examples of how each woman’s representation
and memory is tied to region. Second, the cases call scholars to recognize that identity formation
requires others. McPherson’s lenticular logic is productive for this discussion—scholars of

183
identity and intersectionality must take seriously not only one (intersectional) experience, but
also the way in which each experience and narrative relies on others in order to be distinct and to
retain power.
In addition, the influence of region in these cases implicates the power of history and
memory. All of the figures, deviant or ladylike, are part of the South as imagined and
remembered, a social process tied deeply to history. In this dissertation, I have traced how
particular intersectional identities shift, change, or remain stagnant over time. It is clear that
while shifts occur (for example, the shift in valuing lower class whiteness that occurs between
the Frankie Silver and Edith Maxwell cases), roots remain important as well. This is especially
true in the cases involving black women like Betsy, Garner, and Little. The Jezebel stereotype is
not only racialized and regionally centered, but it stems from a specific historical moment and
need. If Southern legal systems were to continue to allow slavery, and to determine enslaved
status by the status of one’s mother, then it follows logically that sexual violence against
enslaved women would be legally accepted. However, as law and society scholars such as Ewick
and Silbey (1998 ) and Engel (1984) note, law and systems of social acceptance or morality are
mutually constitutive. Thus, the Jezebel stereotype became the social justification for the legal
treatment of enslaved women. Even after slavery ended, the Jezebel figure remained salient in
the Southern climate where it had thrived, emerging again and again in cases like those of Joan
Little or the Duke lacrosse case. Intersectionality scholarship has long taken history into account.
Early articulations of intersectionality, such as the Combahee River Collective Statement ([1977]
1983), stress the importance of understanding the deep roots of black women’s oppression. The
Collective, which even drew their name from Harriet Tubman’s raids to rescue the enslaved,
begin their statement by emphasizing the role that slavery and gendered oppression played in
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shaping black women’s distinctly violent history with American political and legal systems. The
statement refers back to women like Ida B. Wells and Harriet Tubman, women who spoke often
about the overlap of identities such as race, gender, and class. Intersectionality scholarship has
retained this historical influence (Carby 1987; Crenshaw 1994; Hancock 2004; Williams 1992),
tracing how historical social and political relationships form and shape issues such as welfare,
social movements, and law. The cases I have analyzed as well as the broader frame of
intersectionality scholarship suggest that scholars must continue to document, link, and trace
how it is that overlapping identities and figures are formed. While the history of the Jezebel
figure is well-documented, cases like those of Frankie Silver and Edith Maxwell show that
historical moments also shape the intersecting identities of white women—lower-class, white,
Appalachian women are subject to overlapping categories of identity that are shaped not only by
region, but also by historically informed understandings of region, gender, race, and law.
V.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that a truly intersectional analysis of the cases in this
manuscript requires attention to region, history, and memory. The women whose cases I have
profiled were subject to specific legal practices that were a product of region. Socially, the raced,
gendered, and classed expectations foisted upon these women were also distinctly Southern. This
suggests that intersectionality scholarship must focus on region as another potentially meaningful
strand of identity, one that has power to shape both social and legal institutions. While
representational fictions often hide or cover important aspects of legal cases, in this chapter I
have highlighted artwork and cultural material that present identity as a more complicated,
historically formed process. Kara Walker’s art brings both blackness and whiteness, along with
ideas about region, gender, and history, into one frame. This work visually defies the historical
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social and legal separation between white and black women, instead insisting that these identities
cannot exist without one another. In this way, Walker’s work represents one of the key
contributions of this project, that is, an account that traces how in the US South, race and gender
are formed together and against one another.
By drawing these comparisons and relationships into focus, I hope to create a productive
space for analyzing the role of region in intersectionality scholarship. In addition, this focus
further deconstructs the experiences and fictions surrounding Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret
Garner, Edith Maxwell, Joan Little, and Crystal Mangum. It was not simply the complicated
identities these women did possess that marginalized them, but also the identities they did not
and could never possess. These women, by virtue of their race, gender, class, deviant behavior,
and their failure to live up to the nearly impossible Southern “lady” ideal, found themselves on
the receiving end of legal disciplining and social disapproval. To attribute this treatment (and the
resulting representational fictions) to only the overlap of race, gender, and class would be to miss
the larger frame in which these women were (and are continually, via ongoing fictions) punished
for their inability to conform to an ideal that was always-already formed against the identities of
women like them.57 Both law and the broader American culture created an impossible situation
for these women, culminating in silence, disciplining, and for some, death.

57

Again, Edith Maxwell’s case is somewhat of a caveat to this pattern. Maxwell’s ascension to
ladyhood certainly appears to have influenced her eventual successful pardon. However, it did
not initially spare her from spending four years in prison.
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Chapter VI: Magnolias and Mountain Laurels: Identity, the South, and the Law
I. Where Have We Been?
Frankie Silver stood at the gallows. She experienced violence within the private sphere of
the home, and she awaited her fate within the courtroom. She lived her life on southern soil. In
this chapter, I ask how the law influences narratives about the region of the US South, and also
how the South is subject to specific narratives about the law. Throughout this dissertation, I have
returned to Frankie Silver’s case and the folklore surrounding it as a means of building legal
theory about marginalized women, their experiences with the law, and the means by which those
experiences are communicated and remembered. Now I advance a series of arguments that I
have drawn from the theoretical implications of the cases in this project. In my previous chapter,
I argued that regional legal rules and ideas about identity can be unique forces that shape
interactions with the law as well as legal memory. In this concluding chapter, I complicate that
argument by noting that while certain facets of law and identity are bound by region, the larger
pattern of the law’s operative power—that it serves the interests of the most privileged members
of society, often to the detriment of the marginalized—is not uniquely Southern at all. I argue
that it is important to focus on both the implications of region and the larger, national image of
the South that serves to distract from the US legal system’s history of racialized, gendered, and
classed legal violence. First, I outline the similarities that first drew me to the cases I have
highlighted in this dissertation. Second, I discuss the ways in which national legal tensions over
identity are often projected onto the South. Third, I conclude by returning to the themes of
representational fiction and the failure of the law to provide justice for marginalized women.
Frankie Silver’s case bears theoretical and empirical similarities to the other cases
contained within this dissertation. First, nearly all of the cases, with the exception of Edith
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Maxwell’s case and the Duke lacrosse case, take legal disciplining to its ultimate end: the death
penalty. While only Betsy and Frankie Silver were actually subject to the death penalty,
discussions about this potential form of punishment were also present in the Margaret Garner
case and the Joan Little case. In addition, Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner, Edith
Maxwell, and Joan Little experienced legal disciplining via imprisonment and sentencing. Thus,
the cases each point to the very real power that the law exercises over individuals—the law
becomes an arm of the state that is empowered to inflict violence to the point of death or at the
least to restrict bodily liberty. For the women I have written about, the differing types of abuse
that they experienced could be solved only by individual action, yet the actions these women
performed were heavily sanctioned by the state via the law. Second, Frankie Silver’s case also
points to the legal and social importance of the private sphere. For women like Frankie Silver,
private violence was considered out of the reach of the state, itself a form of patriarchal
disciplining that the state and society chose to condone. For Betsy and Margaret Garner, the
violence of slavery was both private in nature and publically, legally condoned. Cases like those
of Frankie Silver, Betsy, Margaret Garner, and Edith Maxwell each illuminate the power of the
notion of the home as fiefdom for white men—within the private realm, men were allowed to
take on standing similar to that of the state, wielding violence as a means to uphold power. Third,
Frankie Silver, like most of the women in this dissertation,58 eventually stepped into the
courtroom. This is a space shaped by narrative, yet covered by judicial interpretation that is
ostensibly neutral. Betsy’s experience and missing legal record, as well as Frankie Silver’s

58

Here the Duke lacrosse is again an exception, though it remains important the case did involve
a courtroom indictment. In addition, Crystal Mangum has since been arrested and charged with
the murder of her boyfriend, who she claims was abusing her when she reacted by stabbing him
to defend herself. Though Mangum did not appear in the courtroom during the Duke case, she
has and will continue to in her ongoing murder case.
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legally mandated silence, set the tone for what the other women I write about experienced within
the courtroom. It was not a space of justice for them, and in fact it did not even have the potential
to be one. Even had Betsy or Frankie Silver been able to speak freely in their defense, or if
Margaret Garner had been able to offer a fuller narrative in her fugitive slave trial, none of these
women would have been able to counter the powerful narratives about their race, gender, and
class that already permeated the courtroom. Only with a successful campaign for pardon (Edith
Maxwell) or a skilled team of lawyers (Joan Little) are these narratives countered, and even in
these cases it is clear that negative gendered, race, and classed narratives do not lose their power.
There is a final theoretical strain that stems from Frankie Silver’s case but is common to all of
these other cases: the regional location of the US South. Each case either occurred within an area
recognized as part of the South, or concerns issues relating to Southern politics.59 These cases
send social messages not only about the images and narratives associated with race, gender, and
class, but also about the region of the South, its values, and its legal and social concerns.
What ties together the ideas of legal disciplining and memory, the private sphere, and the
reliance on narrative in the courtroom is twofold. Not only do these facets of Frankie Silver’s
case make a statement about the law’s inability to produce “justice,” but also they speak to a
geography that can be mapped onto the imagined region of the South and onto legal cases
themselves. Frankie Silver’s case, and others like it, create their own geographies and rely on
largely imagined borders and spaces that remain socially meaningful. The manner in which we
can learn about these spaces and interpret their social cache is by examining the fiction and
folklore that surround each case. These representational fictions are themselves maps, pointing
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Here I reference Margaret Garner, who technically speaking, was not tried in the South but in
the free state of Ohio. However, Garner’s fate was inextricably tied to her birth in the southern
state of Kentucky, which rendered her property rather than a free woman.
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not only to the particular narratives associated with identity categories such as race, gender, and
class, but also to where and how these identities matter.
II: The South as Legal Landscape
Earlier, I argued that there are distinct elements of Southern legal systems and society
that disadvantage women of color and lower-class white women. The history of slavery and the
racial formation it inspired remains part of the legal landscape of the South and characterizes the
mutually constitutive relationship between law and society. Even as the laws of slavery and Jim
Crow fell, the images and narratives about race, gender, and class that stemmed from the system
stayed behind, shifting and changing, but never too much. However, I also wish to document the
ways in which the South serves as the landscape onto which the nation can project its own racial
and gendered anxieties, which are often problems that go far beyond region. This move has
resulted in a discursively constructed, fictional South that is presented as set apart from the US in
ways that obscure the nation’s history with slavery, racism, and gender and class oppression.
Perhaps Edith Maxwell’s case and the discourse surrounding it demonstrates the
construction of the South best of all. The petitions for pardon that circulated in Maxwell’s favor
played on the notion that Maxwell was a victim of a verdict that was distinctly Southern. Even
before Maxwell was convicted in her second murder trial, journalists from all over the country
had determined that the Southern, and specifically Appalachian, justice system could not give
Maxwell a fair trial. Certainly the all-male, all-white jury was problematic, and the South held on
to that legal tradition longer than other states and regions. However, the very core of Maxwell’s
conviction was the anxiety she provoked by challenging and violently defeating abuse within the
home. In spite of what numerous letters to two Governors of Virginia claimed, private violence
like that within the Maxwell household was not confined only to the South. That Edith Maxwell
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could not turn to the law when her father beat her was not a problem only found in Virginia, but
one that had galvanized first wave feminists one hundred years prior, and would again form an
important locus of feminist activism later in the 1960s. In spite of this, Maxwell’s defenders,
letter writers, and petitioners made reference to the notion that it was a Southern justice system
that was doing Edith Maxwell wrong. Petitions mentioned the backwards, backwoods jury, and
Trigg Maxwell was characterized as the ultimate representation of the violent, overbearing
hillbilly patriarch. Abuse in the private sphere was not an American problem, these petitions and
journalists insisted, it was a Southern one, a peculiar feature of the Mountain South.
While women like Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner, and Edith Maxwell were
subject to rules that at, at certain points, have been unique to Southern justice systems, in broader
terms their experiences with violence and legal marginalization could have occurred in other
regions as well. Later cases like those of Joan Little and Crystal Mangum, while representative
of a stereotype that pervades the South, also do not imply that assumptions about race, gender,
and sexuality do not influence juries and journalistic discourses nationwide. While the laws
surrounding slavery are tied to Southern, slaveholding states in particular, this does not preclude
the fact that legal systems nationally have long been biased against people of color. While allmale juries were outlawed in some other states by 1935, there is a much longer, national history
of juries failing to take seriously women’s allegations of domestic violence and rape, especially
if the woman in question was lower class or in any way deviant from a white, middle-class norm
(Berry 2000). I began this dissertation project by discussing the interventions made by scholars
in the fields of critical legal studies (CLS), critical race theory (CRT), and feminist legal theory.
These intellectual endeavors have been necessary because the violence of the law is a national,
even global phenomenon. Within the US, law’s violence manifests itself against those same
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individuals who had little input into its formation—people of color, women, and the poor.
Regardless of region, defendants of color are likely to fair poorly in a court of law; they face
police targeting, harsher sentences, and the death penalty in disproportionate numbers
(Frampton, Haney-López, and Simon 2008; Johnson 2003; Jordan-Zachery 2003, 2009; Simon
2007). A large number of US states, some outside of the South, continue to disenfranchise
convicted felons after they are released from prison, which combined with racially
discriminatory sentencing laws and arrest rates results in a disproportionately large number of
black men who cannot vote (Alexander 2010). The second wave of the feminist movement
fought long legal battles, many of which were not fully successful, in order to force courts and
society to recognize that violence in the home should not be out of the reach of the state, and that
rape and sexual assault should be taken seriously and treated as crimes (Bartlett, Harris, and
Rhode 2006; Bumiller 2008; Kelly 2002). Lower-class and poor individuals have the least access
to the law, and tend come out with worse outcomes in the courtroom, especially when compared
to their wealthier counterparts (Galanter 1974).
The American legal system, and the society that both forms it and is informed by it,
cannot escape the reality that the law continues to marginalize individuals in ways that are tied to
identity. Furthermore, focusing only on Southern ties to slavery hides the history of broader,
national reliance on the same system. While the South held this system the longest and fought in
its favor, other regions were complicit in allowing this. Slavery was not outlawed at the
founding, it was allowed to move into western states during the expansion period, and ultimately
many Americans outside of the South also profited from the labor of slaves by using the products
of slave labor in their own economic operations. One of the earliest US slave rebellions occurred
not in a Southern state, but instead in Hartford, Connecticut in 1658. While Jim Crow was at its
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most brutal and visible in the South, a number of non-Southern states also maintained common
carrier laws60 and other laws restricting people of color, including African Americans, Native
Americans, and Latinos, from using the same public accommodations as whites ("Hernandez v.
Texas" 1954; Wolfley 1991). States like California enacted their own discriminatory laws
against Asian immigrants after relying on their labor to build infrastructure (Hong 2006). Leti
Volpp (2000) notes that it is primarily members of marginalized groups who have their “bad
behavior” attributed to culture. While the South as a region is not marginalized in precisely the
same way, the purpose of this blaming may be the same. Ascribing to one culture a set of
problems that are, in fact, common to the nation is a smokescreen allowing most of American
society to distance itself from these violent others, lest it too be perceived as complicit in the
same type of behavior. To characterize only the South as the site of sexism, racism, and classism
in the legal system is to create an imaginary America in which these histories and their
contemporary results are absent and covered.
III. Fiction, Memory, and the Law
How society remembers and imagines law is of paramount importance. It may seem odd
to say that imagination and memory are central to the functioning of an ostensibly neutral, valuefree legal system. Of course, the first step to seeing the significance of imagination comes after
accepting that the legal system is in fact value-laden and open to interpretation on multiple
fronts. The next step comes in assessing how society makes sense of the law, how it transmits
this information, and what this means for issues of identity, marginalization, and region, that is,
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A perusal of early “common carrier” or segregated accommodation cases reveals that a variety
of non-Southern states restricted access to white-only rail cars and steamboats. For example see
Chicago & NW v Williams (1870, Illinois), Chilton v. St. Louis (1893, Missouri), Younger v.
Judah (1892, Missouri), Coger v. North West Packet Co. (1873, Iowa), and Philadelphia and
West Chester RR Co. v. Miles (1867, Pennsylvania) for only a few examples.
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in assessing the act and creation of legal memory. In particular, the representational fictions that
I have analyzed in this project shed light on the intertwining of law, identity, and region. Each
case in this project has inspired multiple representational fictions, including ballads, folklore,
paintings, operas, plays, novels, and other narratives. My close examination of these fictions
demonstrates that certain aspects of the law are not only expressed or hidden through fictional
representations, but also that they shape legal memory (and it shapes them) over time. In
addition, the strands of identity and region are ever-present. Representational fictions convey
information about specific cases, but in doing so they frequently touch on well-known tropes
about identity and regional issues. What is remembered and what is forgotten about both
individual cases and the larger issues in these cases can be captured and illustrated by
representational fictions, and in turn these fictions can further shape future legal cases because
they, much like the legal record, are a powerful source of memory. In this project, I have focused
on six legal cases—Betsy, Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner, Edith Maxwell, Joan Little, and the
Duke lacrosse case. In this section, I discuss the overarching themes and relationships these cases
illuminate.
Forgetting
Betsy’s representational fiction is contained in the act of forgetting. State of North
Carolina v. McTaggart Slaves drew little attention during Betsy’s life, and even less after her
execution. Within the legal record and much of the local memory of the Burke County region, it
is as though Betsy (and others like her) never existed. This is a fiction and a falsehood, because
not only did Betsy exist, but also she was one of many enslaved persons living in the
Appalachian region, and she was one of many enslaved women who engaged in active resistance
against slavery. Yet Betsy remains in the shadows, allowing the representational fiction to
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obscure the history of slavery in the Appalachian region, the particular forms of violence that
black women faced under systems of slavery, and the ease with which the purportedly neutral
and fair legal system dispatched with unruly slaves.
Spectacularity and the Appalachian Imaginary
The forgetting of Betsy persists in part because of the spectacularity of Frankie Silver.
Frankie Silver’s trial was a local scandal and remained present in the local memory of Burke and
Yancey Counties because of “The Ballad of Frankie Silver” and the attached folklore of the case.
The case draws researchers, novelists, and historians to it, all of whom perpetuate Frankie
Silver’s memory in some form. Frankie’s ballad as representational fiction makes clear much
about identity and the law. Frankie Silver’s gender, and specifically her relationship to the asyet-unrecognized crime of domestic violence, is important to her legal treatment yet remains
absent from her ballad. Though the ballad is a later development than the case itself, it still
represents the prevailing attitudes of the 19th century, in which violent women were deviant,
untrustworthy, and in need of strict legal disciplining. Frankie’s whiteness has also shaped her
memory—she is consistently referred to as the first and/or only woman hanged in Burke County,
even in recent accounts of the case (Resources 2013). Betsy is lost in this memory, likely
because her own value during her trial was not the same as that accorded to white women.
Frankie Silver may have been lower-class and she may have struck the city-dwellers of Burke
County as “uncivilized,” but her status as a white women has, over time, transformed her into a
more legally and socially noteworthy person than Betsy. Frankie’s whiteness also allows her to
fit easily into what I term the Appalachian imaginary, a set of ideas about who and what
constitutes the mountain South. Central to this idea is the notion that the Appalachian region is
primarily white, in spite of the empirical reality that the Appalachian region has historically been
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home to populations of color. As a white, Appalachian woman, Frankie is symbolic of her region
in a way that Betsy cannot be.
Distorting the Private Violence of Slavery
Unlike Betsy, the later case of Margaret Garner requires a more direct memory of
confrontations with the issue of slavery. However, the representational fictions surrounding
Garner’s case still evade and distort, and combined with the lack of legal record, they contribute
to the persistence of a series of myths about Garner and about the experiences of enslaved black
women more generally. Early works, such as “The Modern Medea,” show a vengeful Garner
whose dark skin and fierce expression are meant to symbolize her potential for violence to the
viewer. Rather than the attractive woman described in contemporary newspaper accounts,
Thomas Satterwhite Noble paints Garner in a manner that avoids much of the controversy that
her case sparked. By showing Garner only as a raging woman destroying dark-skinned children,
Noble not only distorts her crime61 but also makes it obvious as destruction of property, not an
attempt to spare her daughter the sexual violence endemic to systems of slavery. For some time,
Noble’s image created and shaped this memory of Garner, until the publication of Toni
Morrison’s Beloved revived interest in the case. Later treatments of Garner’s case demonstrate
the awareness of a politics of memory—the opera Margaret Garner was a deliberate attempt to
change public views about the case, but its drastic departure from the historical record and its
portrayal of sexual violence made it yet another participant in the politics of ventriloquism
(Reinhardt 2002, 2010) that has long surrounded Garner. Like Noble and many abolitionists
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As I discussed in Chapter III, Noble’s painting exaggerates the number of children Garner
killed and changes their sex from female to male. This change gives the public the notion that
Garner engaged in significantly more violence than she actually did, and her destruction of male
children in the painting avoids the issue of sexual violence and instead implies that she was
guilty of depriving Gaines of economically necessary male workers.
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during Garner’s trial, the opera attempted to give voice to a silenced subject, but succeeded only
in appropriating her.
White Femininity as Property
Edith Maxwell’s case and the newspaper accounts that documented it construct yet
another fiction, one that revives the issues central to Frankie Silver’s case. Maxwell, also a
white, Appalachian, lower class woman, found that the passing of one hundred years mattered
both very little and very much. Maxwell was twice convicted of the murder of her father. Much
like the discourse surrounding Frankie Silver in 1833, a prosecutor in 1935 would call Edith
Maxwell cruel, scheming, and violent. However, Maxwell was the subject of considerable
nationwide newspaper coverage, which was largely sympathetic to her plight. On a national
scale, Maxwell was not “white trash” but a proper modern lady, one who was viewed as
deserving legal protection and social respect. These same messages were conveyed in the
ultimately successful petitions for Maxwell’s pardon, which often characterized Maxwell as the
victim of backwards mountain justice. The American public separated Maxwell from her
Appalachian roots, imagining her as the lady and her father and the all-male juries that heard her
case as lawless hillbillies who had yet to move their thinking into the modern world. Maxwell, as
an attractive, white, and educated young woman cemented her public image as incapable of
premeditated violence. Her race and upward class mobility garnered her forgiveness, even as it
relied on her identity to be separate from the other white Appalachians of Pound, Virginia.
Jezebel in the Courtroom
The murder trial of Joan Little provides a window into the importance of legal and social
narratives inherited from the South’s connection with slavery. Little was not an ideal defendant
in any way. Her race and gender disadvantaged her, as did her past involvement with the legal
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system and the fact that she was already jailed when she killed Clarence Alligood. Rumors about
Little’s sexual activities circulated around Washington, North Carolina, and their merging with
the powerful Jezebel stereotype made it unlikely that Little would be acquitted of murder in her
hometown. However, Little’s attorneys were well aware of the extent to which the legal system
and juries rely on fiction and narrative to make their decisions. A change of trial venue and a
clear counter-narrative to the Jezebel image ultimately saved Joan Little from the death penalty
and extended jail time. Little’s case demonstrates the salience of fiction in the courtroom—the
space that most Americans are taught is reliant wholly on truth is in fact one that necessitates
story telling. In this case, Little’s attorneys and Little herself told the best story, one that
confronted the legal system’s history with black defendants and the South’s history of granting
white men sexual access to black women.
Jezebel and the Law
If Little’s case was a success story, the Duke lacrosse case points to a different lesson.
The alleged victim, Crystal Mangum, was ultimately found to have significant problems in her
account of her alleged attack and her alleged attackers were declared innocent. Their battle with
the legal system and the national media coverage sparked outrage, much of which was directed at
Mangum herself. While it is clear that the accused lacrosse players did not attack Mangum that
March night,62 the discursive treatment of Mangum goes far beyond recognizing the errors and
missteps of the case. Journalists and other authors have held up the Duke case as representative
of a new shift in the legal system, arguing that the initial trust of Mangum’s allegations shows
62

In Mangum’s self-published memoir, Last Dance for Grace, she gives a brief account of the
night she was allegedly attacked. Mangum accepts that the individuals she accused were not
responsible for the attack because of the alibis they were able to provide. She also notes that she
was traumatized from the alleged attack and does not have a vivid or detailed memory of her
attackers. However, Mangum maintains that she was indeed attacked on the night in question,
and that at least three men at the party were responsible.
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that society and legal actors are too trusting of women who, they imply, should garner no trust at
all. Mangum’s race and class status, combined with her work as a dancer, rendered her deviant in
most accounts of the case. In their efforts to defend the accused lacrosse players, many authors
also imply that Mangum initiated an elaborate, deliberate hoax and that the take-away lesson
from the case is that women like her should not be trusted. Mangum, much like Little, again
became representative of the Jezebel stereotype, as well as proof that the image had not
necessarily been overcome or fully challenged in either the legal system or society. In addition,
the larger discourse surrounding the Duke case indicated that many authors found it indicative of
a new legal attitude towards the previously privileged—i.e., white upper-class men. Authors such
as Gordon (2007), Parrish (2009), and Yaeger and Pressler (2008) used the case to imply that the
legal system had shifted from its previous bias inherited from slavery and Jim Crow and moved
instead to the polar opposite, a legal bias against upper-class white men. Mangum’s involvement
and the quickness with which she was believed by legal actors, academics, and locals in Durham
only served to heighten what these authors attempt to identify as a trend.
Representational Fictions
The representational fictions surrounding each of these six cases send messages about
specific trials, but also convey broader messages through what aspects of law their cases
highlight and which they cover. It is those facets of law that have structured this project. Many of
the representational fictions I have analyzed display deep discomfort with confronting violence
in the private sphere. “The Ballad of Frankie Silver” makes no mention of the possibility of
domestic violence, in spite of Frankie’s confession, which archival evidence suggests was widely
read and indicated that Charlie Silver had a history of abusing Frankie. Even later Frankie Silver
folklore continues the same omission, with stories like those of Bobby McMillon still framing
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Frankie as a jealous and manipulative woman who killed the wholly innocent Charlie. Fictions
associated with the Margaret Garner case make similar elisions. In spite of the fact that the
Garner’s trial sparked public discussion about the sexual violence commonly faced by enslaved
women, Noble’s “The Modern Medea” obscures this aspect of the case. When newspaper
reporters discussed private violence in the Edith Maxwell case, they did so through a lens of the
Appalachian imaginary, not framing the issue as a widespread problem with historical roots in
English and American common law. Even Joan Little’s case replicates this pattern, with the
prosecutor and many Washington, North Carolina locals blaming Little for the encounter with
Alligood and also insisting that black women could not be raped. It is clear that representational
fictions, especially those produced roughly at the time that these cases occurred, often cover
important raced, gendered, and classed legal histories. In each of these cases, both legal actors
and the general public were more or less unwilling to admit that private violence should be
within the reach of the law. Instead, case after case, and fiction after fiction, the discourse
remains similar—private violence is a right of authority, it does not occur frequently, or it must
have been the victim’s fault. Even later representational fictions, such as McCall’s re-telling of
the Frankie Silver tale or Morrison and Danielpour’s 2005 Margaret Garner have difficultly
confronting private violence without also jettisoning the resistance of women like Silver and
Garner. Somehow in these fictions, victims of private violence must be passive in order to be
sympathetic.
Representational fictions also often cover the larger trend of the violence of the law.
These fictions, already unwilling to admit the problem of private violence, further insist that law
is just by portraying women like Frankie Silver, Margaret Garner, Edith Maxwell, Joan Little,
and Crystal Mangum as deviant. Fictions like “The Ballad of Frankie Silver” and “The Modern
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Medea” serve to justify the legal disciplining their subjects experienced. If the women involved
are painted as unladylike, violent, rageful, and reactionary, their monstrous nature provokes
anxiety and requires legal disciplining. Rather than accept that these women were unable to turn
to the law for justice, they are made appropriate subjects for death, long legal sentences, or a
return to slavery. In general, almost none of the representational fictions I have analyzed convey
the central problem that most of the women in this project faced.63 They were marginalized by a
legal system that did not view their bodies as worthy of protection, and eventually they resorted
to violent resistance when they had no other options for escape. When they went before the law
and were sentenced, the law did them violence yet again—it punished them for trying to protect
themselves. Representational fictions, especially those produced the earliest, do not complicate
or challenge the legal disciplining in these cases. Instead, they produce new monstrous subjects
whom the public can easily believe should have faced harsh sentencing. While later fictions
often attempt to correct this trend, they often still rely on legal understandings of certain
interactions rather than questioning whether the law is really able to define and capture the
complex nature of interpersonal violence.
This pattern makes clear that in some cases, representational fictions can be agents of the
law. By hiding the violence of the law, representational fictions can create and shape specific
memories of the law’s functions, making it appear just, objective, and divorced from concerns
about identity. One way that law’s violence persists and one way that law maintains its power is
through public memory, and representational fiction has a uniquely powerful role to play in its
63

Again, the exception to this statement is Crystal Mangum. Because Mangum did not engage in
active violence in the Duke case, and because her allegations were ultimately found to be
inaccurate, she does not fit this pattern. She was also a plaintiff rather than defendant, meaning
that the law was unable to perform violence against her through sentencing. However,
Mangum’s current legal battle fits more easily into the pattern of the previous cases, and it
remains to be seen how her sentencing will proceed.
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creation. As long as representational fictions present uncomplex, unquestioning accounts of law
and its relationship to marginalized identity groups, the law will remain able to function as a
violent institution. I do not mean to say that representational fiction is the only way that the law’s
violence exists or continues, but rather that it is one of many support systems. Even when the
legal record fails to record cases, representational fiction can serve to fill in gaps, eventually
becoming one of the central means of conveying memory and information about the law in
general and certain cases in particular. Representational fiction helps to establish legal memory,
it relies on recognizable narratives about identity, and it tends to hide the possibility and
likelihood of law’s violence.
The themes that began this chapter, which I initially drew from Frankie Silver’s legal
experiences, also stem from representational fictions. Each chapter in this project has highlighted
specific legal and social aspects of the cases contained within, and the fictions that are often the
most visible representations of these themes. Each theme—the violence of the law, the elision of
the private sphere, and the role of fiction in and about the courtroom—also highlights the
theoretical contributions of an analysis of representational fiction by making clear the
relationship between representational fiction and the law. Representational fictions illustrate a
variety of information, from the memories of specific cases to the larger memories constructed
about the law and who it should protect or discipline.
The violence of the law goes even beyond these instances. Cover articulates the law’s
violence through his analysis of legal interpretation as cutting off possibilities and imposing
specific, socially constructed rules and expectations. For the women in this project, the law was
violent because the law, for them, was fiction. The language of the law was used to tell not only
what these women had done, but also who they were. Individuals acting within the formal legal
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system, as well as broader constructs of legality, created stories about these women, their lives,
and their motives for committing crimes. If we accept, as Joan Little’s case shows, that the
courtroom itself relies on narrative, and we also accept, as Betsy, Frankie Silver’s, and Margaret
Garner’s cases show, that legal action silences, creates gaps, and then fills them with its own
voice, then we can recognize that law for these women was yet another form of representational
fiction. Law, just as much as other fictional representations, relies on socially accepted narratives
about identity and about “appropriate” behavior. The legal record, the voice of the law, does not
reveal the actual voices of the women in this project. Either they were completely silenced
(Betsy, Frankie Silver, and Margaret Garner), or they were forced to twist and shape their
account of their behavior into the narrative that would win them the best legal treatment (Edith
Maxwell, Joan Little). We cannot look to the legal record to find their complete narratives or
accounts; the law lacked the necessary language to do so, often by constructing violence they
experienced, such as domestic abuse or rape, as acceptable when targeted at specific bodies.
Reading the law may be one way to know about the legal cases in this project, but it should not
be privileged as containing inherent truths about them, any more so than an opera, a ballad, or a
painting.
I do not mean to suggest here that law does not matter. It matters profoundly. The law
resulted in the killing of Betsy and Frankie Silver via single verdicts. It killed Margaret Garner
by sending her back to slavery. It had the potential to kill Edith Maxwell and Joan Little. At the
very least, it metaphorically killed their stories and forced them to relinquish control over their
own lives. Law does place bodies on the line, but as a system it may be made even more
monstrous when it does so in connection with its narrative power to shape or destroy. There is
even an element of projection—the law as practiced through formal legal systems made women
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like Betsy, Frankie Silver, and Joan Little seem like violent monsters, when for them, it was law
itself that waited menacingly in the shadows. Law, as the arm of the state, reflects the fears and
anxieties of its creators, those who are more often than not imbued with racial, gender, and class
privilege. Yet it is precisely these people, their power, and their creation that struck fear into
women like those I have focused on in this project.
IV. Conclusion: Magnolias and Mountain Laurels
I chose the title for this chapter while I was driving through Morganton, North Carolina
towards Kona. Morganton is where Frankie Silver’s trial and execution were held, but Kona is
where Frankie Silver lived most of her life. In Morganton, one will find oneself surrounded by
large magnolia trees, and if the season is right, they will be blooming the huge, white blossoms
characteristic of magnolia grandiflora. During the ascent to Kona, the landscape will change.
The Blue Ridge mountains begin to surround the traveler, no longer simply shadows in the
distance. The magnolias of Morganton will give way to a stouter shrub with noticeable white and
pink flowers, blooming in clusters. This is the mountain laurel. The mountain laurel has become
symbolic of Appalachia, and to me, of a certain deviant Southernness in general. Mountain
laurels grow wild for the most part; they are not prized garden plants. Magnolias, on the other
hand, are representative of the imagined South. They remain the official flower of some Southern
states and are evocative of plantations, steamboats, and “civilized” Old South living. The women
of this dissertation are decidedly mountain laurels, made deviant during their own time and often
even in memories. They can be contrasted to magnolias, to the imagined, nostalgic South they do
not fit and the ladies they could never be. Both plants, magnolias and mountain laurels, are
somewhat regionally bound. The large magnolias that dot that Southern landscape need heat and
humidity to grow, and the mountain laurels common to the Appalachians require acidic soil and
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a specific growing season found mostly in mountainous areas. These plants, like the real and
imagined women of this project, are tied to the South.
I chose the women who are the subject of this dissertation because they are mountain
laurels. Their interactions with the law, their deviance, and their violence revealed the ways in
which the law refused to protect them and the way in which both legal and social actors were
willing to discipline them for responding to that failure. I also chose them because their deviance
clearly has struck many others, resulting in the variety of representational fictions I have
analyzed, themselves also means of transmitting information about the law and shaping legal
memory. I began this project by describing Frankie Silver, whose violent actions captivated an
entire community in 1831. My first chapter opened with the scene of Frankie Silver as she
ascended the gallows. I end with what happened after that. Once Frankie had died, her family
hoped to take her body up the mountain to bury near their home. However, the hot July day and
the long wagon ride to Kona convinced them that they could not. About seven miles outside of
Morganton, they buried Frankie on a hill near an inn, and there she lay, with not even a grave
marker for over a hundred years. Eventually, the gravesite was forgotten and the forest re-grew
around it. At the foot of her grave grows a mountain laurel, its limbs reaching upward toward the
forest canopy, its roots reaching down and feeding off of the Southern soil.
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Appendix A: “The Ballad of Frankie Silver”
This version was originally printed in the Lenoir North Carolina Topic on March 4, 1886 as
“Frankie Silver’s Confession.”

This dreadful, dark and dismal day
Has swept my glories all away,
My sun goes down, my days are past,
And I must leave this world at last.

Oh! Lord, what will become of me?
I am condemned you all now see,
To heaven or hell my soul must fly
All in a moment when I die.
Judge Daniel has my sentence pass’d,
Those prison walls I leave at last,
Nothing to cheer my drooping head
Until I’m numbered with the dead.
But oh! that Dreadful Judge I fear;
Shall I that awful sentence hear:
“Depart ye cursed down to hell
And forever there to dwell”?
I know that frightful ghosts I’ll see
Gnawing their flesh in misery,
And then and there attended be
For murder in the first degree.
There shall I meet that mournful face
Whose blood I spilled upon this place;
With flaming eyes to me he’ll say,
“Why did you take my life away?”
His feeble hands fell gently down,
His chattering tongue soon lost its sound,
To see his soul and body part
It strikes with terror to my heart.
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I took his blooming days away,
Left him no time to God to pray,
And if his sins fall on his head
Must I not bear them in his stead?
The jealous thought that first gave strife
To make me take my husband’s life,
For months and days I spent my time
Thinking how to commit the crime.
And on a dark and doleful night
I put his body out of sight,
With flames I tried him to consume,
But time would not admit it done.
You all see me and on me gaze,
Be careful how you spend your days,
And never commit this awful crime,
But try to serve your God in time.
My mind on solemn subjects roll;
My little child, God bless its soul!
All you that are of Adam’s race,
Let not my faults this child disgrace.
Farewell good people you all now see
What my bad conduct’s brought on me—
To die of shame and disgrace
Before this world of human race.
Awful indeed to think on my death,
In perfect health to lose my breath.
Farewell, my friend, I bid adieu.
Vengeance on me must now pursue.
Great God, how shall I be forgiven?
Not fit for earth, not fit for heaven;
But little time to pray to God,
For now I try that awful road.

